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Avant-propos
La mémoire parle à tout le monde. On la perd, on la recouvre, on la muscle.
Bien que l’utilisation d’un terme unique puisse sembler suggérer que la mémoire
fonctionne comme un système unitaire, les recherches scientifiques sur la mémoire,
qui ont commencé il y a environ cent ans, ont montré que la mémoire n’est pas
un, mais plusieurs systèmes (Baddeley, 1997). Les systèmes varient en nature
(mémoire épisodique, mémoire procédurale, mémoire sémantique, etc.), en codage
(mémoire visuelle, mémoire olfactive, mémoire sensorielle), en durée et en capac-
ité de stockage (de quelques secondes à la mémoire à long terme) ; et en échelle
(puisque la mémoire n’est pas seulement individuelle mais peut être collective).
La mémoire est dynamique, flexible, multidimensionnelle et donc complexe.
C’est pourquoi la plupart des spécialistes parlent de mémoires plutôt que de la
mémoire. Si certains d’entre eux, en dehors de la sphère économique, venaient à
lire les études présentées ici, comme probablement toute autre étude économique
sur la mémoire, ils se moqueraient probablement (s’ils ne s’outragent pas) de la
façon dont nous considérons la mémoire comme une boîte noire. Dans notre cadre,
les individus reçoivent de l’information (de leurs propres actions ou d’un feedback
externe) et doivent ensuite s’en souvenir. Nous reconnaissons volontiers qu’un tel
cadre est restrictif à bien des égards. Notamment, outre le fait d’ignorer les mé-
canismes cérébraux (en particulier les réseaux neuronaux et la plasticité cellulaire
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permettant les différents processus de consolidation et de re-consolidation de la mé-
moire dans le temps, ce qui est d’un grand intérêt pour les neuroscientifiques), il se
concentre sur un système très spécifique de la mémoire –la mémoire épisodique–,
parmi bien d’autres qui ont été identifiés (voir Figure 1). L’utilisation du terme
mémoire en économie et tout au long de cette thèse fait toujours référence au sys-
tème épisodique de la mémoire. Ce dernier correspond à la mémoire d’événements
autobiographiques, comme le souvenir de votre premier jour d’école ou le jour
où vous avez reçu un rejet ferme d’un journal de rang un. Elle est différente de
la mémoire sémantique qui renvoie à des connaissances plus générales que nous
avons accumulées tout au long de notre vie, comme la connaissance de la capitale
de la France ou le classement des cinq premières revues en économie. Ces sys-
tèmes appartiennent à la mémoire déclarative, qui se réfère au souvenir conscient
et intentionnel d’événements et de faits passés (Ullman, 2004). D’autres systèmes
de mémoire s’appuient sur la mémoire implicite qui, en revanche, est acquise et
utilisée inconsciemment (Schacter, 1987).
Cette vision restrictive de la mémoire en économie étant reconnue, nous sommes
convaincus que l’introduction de la mémoire dans cette discipline demeure d’une
importance capitale. L’économiste n’a pas nécessairement besoin de savoir ce qu’il
y a dans la boîte noire de la mémoire. Ce qui importe, en revanche, c’est de savoir
comment et dans quelle mesure la mémoire intervient dans le processus de prise
de décision. La mémoire des expériences passées est l’une des principales sources
d’information sur nous-mêmes et sur le monde qui nous entoure. Explorer com-
ment les individus récupèrent ces informations permet de mieux comprendre com-
ment ils forment et actualisent leurs croyances et apprennent de leurs expériences
pour prendre des décisions. L’étude d’une mémoire (sélective) de l’information
permet également de mieux appréhender l’émergence de biais de perception et de
xiii
comportement, comme la sur-confiance en soi, qui peuvent avoir des implications
majeures sur la qualité des choix. En outre, dès lors que “tout ce qui fausse la ca-
pacité des individus à se souvenir d’un événement passé fausse leur évaluation des
probabilités futures” (Hammond et al., 2006), explorer les déterminants comporte-
mentaux des biais de mémoire peut permettre de mieux comprendre comment les
individus déterminent leurs attentes et forment leurs anticipations. L’introduction
de la mémoire dans le processus de prise de décision des individus met en évidence
un candidat nouveau et sérieux pour explorer la dynamique des croyances motivées.
Elle constitue une piste nouvelle en économie permettant d’expliquer l’existence
de décisions sous-optimales. Ainsi, tout comme les philosophes, psychologues, so-
ciologues ou neuroscientifiques explorent les concepts d’identité, d’éthique ou de
communication de manières très différentes, les économistes ne doivent pas avoir
peur d’explorer la mémoire humaine de manière restrictive ou simplifiée dès lors
que cela leur permet de mieux comprendre comment les individus prennent des
décisions dans un monde aux ressources limitées, tant matérielles que cognitives.
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Figure 1: Les systèmes de la mémoire (adapté de Raslau et al. 2014)
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Résumé de la thèse
Une des caractéristiques fondamentales de l’être humain est de construire des croy-
ances, de préférence positives, sur lui-même et sur le monde qui l’entoure. Les indi-
vidus chérissent des croyances qui leurs sont favorables ou désirables, et déploient
de l’énergie et des efforts pour les protéger. À titre d’exemples, nous pouvons ainsi
penser aux parents qui aiment à croire que leurs enfants sont particulièrement en
avance sur leur développement, à un candidat se convaincant d’être plus compétent
et adapté au poste que les autres candidats lors d’un entretien d’embauche, ou à
une personne au régime se persuadant volontiers que ce n’est pas une petite glace
à la crème qui fera la différence. Le besoin d’avoir des croyances positives sur soi et
sur le monde qui nous entoure peut aussi s’illustrer à l’échelle macroéconomique.
Un nombre significatif d’individus –dont certains dirigeants politiques– continuent
de croire, en dépit des innombrables preuves scientifiques, que le réchauffement
climatique n’est que partiellement dû à l’activité humaine et que les conséquences
en découlant seraient minimes. Dans un autre domaine, la prédominance des reli-
gions dans la plus grande partie du globe atteste du besoin de croire des individus,
sans que ces croyances ne soient nécessairement fondées sur des faits tangibles. À
la lumière de ces exemples, de nombreuses études montrent que le plus souvent les
croyances se forment et s’ajustent non pas façon neutre et objective, c’est à dire
d’après un processus rationnel (bayésien) de traitement de l’information, mais en
partie pour répondre à d’importants besoins psychologiques ou émotionnels. Les
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individus recueillent et interprètent l’information de façon à confirmer ce qu’ils
souhaitent croire. Dès lors, les croyances peuvent être considérées comme mo-
tivées (Bénabou, 2015).
Cette conception des croyances comme un “bien dans lequel les gens investis-
sent” (Bénabou and Tirole, 2011) a profondément remis en question la vision de
l’homo oeconomicus (Mill, 1874), censé former et ajuster ses croyances d’après un
traitement rationnel de l’information. En réalité, tout comme Schelling (1987)
décrit “l’esprit [humain] comme un organe consommateur”, les individus semblent
tirer de l’utilité non seulement de la consommation de biens ou d’expériences
comme c’est le cas en économie standard, mais aussi de la consommation de croy-
ances. Face à ce constat, les économistes comportementaux ont introduit le concept
d’ “utilité fondée sur les croyances” (belief-based utility) dans lequel les individus
peuvent retirer de l’utilité de leurs croyances, même si ces dernières sont inexactes
et nuisent à une prise de décision optimale.
Les mécanismes, cependant, sont complexes, et les individus ne croient pas
simplement ce qu’ils ont envie de croire. Les croyances doivent être motivées de
façon suffisamment plausible pour être tenues. Pour répondre à cette demande
de croyances motivées, les individus doivent donc développer des stratégies leur
permettant de se défendre de façon crédible face à des preuves ou des informations
indésirables et, inversement, d’alimenter des croyances qui leurs sont favorables1.
La question est : comment ? Les économistes se sont penchés sur cette question
depuis des années, et deux types de stratégies ont principalement été explorées.
1On suppose ici que l’information qui est disponible aux individus n’est pas manipulée per se. Il
s’agit d’une représentation restrictive de la réalité puisqu’il ne semble pas infondé de penser que des
institutions telles que les gouvernements, les médias, les partis politiques et/ou les entreprises peuvent
parfois avoir intérêt à fournir des informations ex-ante déformées ou fausses.
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Ex ante, les individus préfèrent parfois le “bonheur de l’ignorance” au “pouvoir
de la connaissance”. Ils évitent ou acquièrent l’information de façon sélective, même
lorsque celle-ci est gratuite et permettrait d’améliorer la prise de décision (Golman
et al., 2017). À titre d’exemples, Karlsson et al. (2009) ont montré que des investis-
seurs actualisent très fréquemment la valeur de leur portefeuille d’actions lorsque le
marché est à la hausse, mais cessent de la regarder lorsque le marché est à la baisse.
Dans le domaine médical, Oster et al. (2013) ont montré qu’une part significative
des individus étudiés, susceptibles de contracter la maladie d’Huntington, refusent
des tests de dépistages, pourtant gratuits, pour ne pas avoir à être confrontés à
une éventuelle mauvaise nouvelle. Les stratégies d’évitement de l’information pro-
duisent de l’incertitude qui impacte les décisions des individus. De nombreuses
études ont montré que les individus ignorent délibérément certaines informations
indésirables pour s’autoriser à agir de façon intéressée. En utilisant un jeu du
dictateur, Dana et al. (2007) ont montré que les dictateurs exploitent l’incertitude
sur les conséquences de leurs décisions comme une marge de manoeuvre pour agir
de façon plus égoïste que s’ils étaient informés (voir aussi Grossman, 2014; Kajack-
aite, 2015; Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017). Les individus donnent également
moins aux associations caritatives en présence de risque (Exley, 2015; Garcia et al.,
2018) et d’incertitude (Garcia et al., 2018) que lorsque l’issue de leur décision est
certaine. Fait intéressant, il n’y a pas qu’une demande d’ignorance d’information
mais également une offre d’ignorance. Dans une expérience de laboratoire, Shalvi
et al. (2019) ont montré que certains décideurs évitaient les conseillers qui leur
transmettaient des informations indésirables (côté demande), mais également que
la majorité des conseillers eux-mêmes supprimaient les informations indésirables
lorsqu’ils transmettaient des informations aux décideurs (côté offre).
Ex post, la précision n’est pas non plus toujours l’objectif principal qui sous-
tend la formation des croyances. Plusieurs études ont montré que les individus
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mettent à jour leurs croyances de façon non-bayésienne (Rabin and Schrag, 1999).
À titre d’exemple, Eil and Rao (2011) et Mobius et al. (2011) ont montré que les
individus mettent à jour leurs croyances de façon bayésienne lorsqu’ils reçoivent
de bonnes nouvelles concernant leur beauté et/ou leur intelligence, mais qu’ils font
preuve de conservatisme dans l’ajustement de leurs croyances après avoir reçu de
mauvaises nouvelles. En utilisant également un test de QI, Zimmermann (2019) a
constaté que les croyances sont ajustées dans la bonne direction lorsqu’elles sont
élicitées directement après avoir reçu un feedback, mais qu’elles sont mises à jour
de façon asymétrique lorsqu’elles sont élicitées un mois après avoir reçu le feedback.
Plus précisément, les croyances des participants qui ont reçu un feedback positif
demeurent ajustées à la hausse, alors que les croyances des participants qui ont
reçu un feedback négatif ont tendance à retourner à leur état initial. Outre cette
distorsion de l’information, les individus peuvent alimenter leur besoin de croy-
ances motivées en rejetant la faute sur les autres pour leurs actions (Bartling and
Fischbacher, 2011; Oexl and Grossman, 2013), en se déresponsabilisant (Foerster
and Van der Weele, 2018) ou en se trouvant des excuses consistant par exemple à
minimiser les conséquences de leurs actes et/ou réinterpréter les circonstances de
leur comportement (Bénabou et al., 2018; Foerster and van der Weele, 2018).
Bien que l’évitement et la mise à jour biaisée de l’information aient été des
mécanismes largement étudiés en économie expérimentale, une dernière stratégie
dont disposent les individus a longtemps été délaissée. Même lorsque l’information
est reçue et mise à jour, les individus peuvent, en dernier recours, l’oublier. Les
individus peuvent avoir tendance à oublier les informations indésirables et, inverse-
ment, fournir d’importants efforts lorsqu’il s’agit de se souvenir d’informations
plaisantes ou valorisantes. En d’autres termes, le temps qui passe pourrait con-
stituer une opportunité d’oublier ou de déformer ce dont les individus préfèrent ne
pas se souvenir. Ce désintérêt pour la mémoire en économie semble très surprenant
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lorsque l’on considère que la plupart des croyances qui sous-tendent nos décisions
sont issues de notre mémoire (Tranel et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 1998). En fait,
le souvenir que nous avons des événements passés est, sinon la première, l’une
des principales sources d’information. La prise en compte de la mémoire dans le
processus de prise de décision semble donc d’une importance cruciale. Elle met en
lumière un candidat nouveau et sérieux permettant d’explorer la dynamique des
croyances motivées.
Cette thèse cherche à déterminer si les individus manipulent leur mémoire pour
soutenir leur désir de croyances motivées. Elle teste expérimentalement l’existence
et la force de la mémoire motivée dans trois contextes économiquement pertinents
que sont les préférences sociales, la performance individuelle et les décisions mal-
honnêtes ou immorales. Elle fournit un nouvel ensemble de preuves montrant que,
même lorsque l’information a été reçue et mise à jour, une dernière stratégie à la
disposition des individus consiste effectivement à oublier l’information qui menace
leurs croyances.
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I have done this, says my memory. I cannot have done that,
says my pride, remaining inexorable. Finally, memory yields.
Nietzsche, 1886, Beyond Good and Evil
La mémoire a longtemps été considérée comme un espace de stockage dans
lequel des informations sont d’abord enregistrées puis récupérées. Dans le modèle
standard d’inférence bayésienne, la mémoire n’intervient pas dans la formation
et la mise à jour des croyances. Le décideur reçoit l’information, met à jour ses
croyances, et “la croyance postérieure d’hier est égale à la croyance antérieure
d’aujourd’hui” (Enke et al., 2019). Pourtant, dès le 18ème siècle, l’économiste et
philosophe David Hume (Traité sur Nature Humaine, 1739) avait formulé l’idée
selon laquelle la mémoire humaine, de part sa malléabilité, affectait la formation
des croyances et donc la capacité de jugement des individus. Selon ses propres
mots :
De même qu’une idée de la mémoire, en perdant sa force et sa vivac-
ité, peut dégénérer d’un tel degré qu’elle est prise pour une idée de
l’imagination, de même, de l’autre côté, une idée de l’imagination peut
acquérir une telle force et une telle vivacité qu’elle passe pour une idée
de la mémoire et en contrefasse les effets sur la croyance et le jugement.
(...) Ainsi, il apparaît que la croyance, ou assentiment, qui accompagne
toujours la mémoire et les sens, n’est rien que la vivacité des percep-
tions qu’ils présentent, et que cela seul les distingue de l’imagination.
Croire, dans ce cas, c’est sentir une impression immédiate des sens ou
une répétition de cette impression dans la mémoire. C’est uniquement
la force et la vivacité de la perception qui constituent le premier acte du
jugement et qui posent le fondement du raisonnement que nous édifions
sur lui quand nous suivons la relation de cause à effet.
Dans cet extrait, Hume décrit les frontières perméables qui existent entre la mé-
moire et l’imagination. D’après l’auteur, les croyances sont uniquement basées sur
la force et la vivacité supérieures des perceptions de la mémoire par rapport à celles
de l’imagination. Cependant, comme la vivacité des perceptions peut s’altérer ou
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se renforcer au point que la mémoire et l’imagination peuvent se confondre, les
croyances sont en fait fondées sur une identification très fragile des perceptions
réelles versus imaginaires.
Au cours des dernières décennies, l’idée d’une mémoire adaptative, ni parfaite
ni stable, mais fondamentalement limitée et dynamique, a acquis une certaine
crédibilité en économie. Les économistes ont tenté de modéliser les limitations
cognitives de la mémoire et leurs impacts sur la formation des croyances et la
prise de décision. En 1991, Dow (1991) est le premier à modéliser un problème
de prise de décision d’un agent cherchant à trouver le prix le plus bas d’un ob-
jet, en ayant une mémoire limitée des anciens prix. Alors qu’avant le choix du
consommateur se limitait aux biens ou aux expériences, Dow (1991) suppose que
l’information dont l’agent se souvient est en elle-même un choix. En 1997, Piccione
and Rubinstein (1997) modélisent un problème de décision avec mémoire impar-
faite. Un décideur fait preuve de mémoire imparfaite si, à un moment donné, il
détient de l’information qui est oubliée plus tard. Les auteurs montrent qu’avec
une mémoire parfaite, le décideur n’a aucune raison de prendre ses décisions à un
moment précis (la stratégie optimale définie ex-ante reste optimale pendant son
exécution). En revanche, avec une mémoire imparfaite, la temporalité des déci-
sions joue un rôle important et le décideur doit définir quand prendre sa décision
et dans quelle mesure il peut s’y tenir. Au début des années 2000, Mullainathan
(2002) et Bénabou and Tirole (2002) développent simultanément deux modèles
avec des hypothèses opposées. Mullainathan (2002) suppose que le décideur est
naïf et ignore les imperfections de sa mémoire lorsqu’il fait des inférences. Il mon-
tre que les croyances sont influencées non seulement par les informations tirées
d’expériences, mais aussi par les souvenirs qu’elles évoquent. Bénabou and Ti-
role (2002), quant à eux, supposent que le décideur est sophistiqué et a conscience
qu’il peut avoir une mémoire sélective lorsqu’il fait des inférences. Plus récemment,
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Wilson (2014) a également analysé des problèmes de prise décision avec mémoire
imparfaite. Dans son modèle, le décideur est contraint par une capacité limitée de
mémorisation. Il ne peut mémoriser qu’un nombre limité de signaux informatifs.
L’une des principales implications du modèle est que le décideur ne réagit de façon
optimale qu’aux deux signaux les plus extrêmes (et donc les plus informatifs) afin
d’éviter de gaspiller des ressources cognitives à mémoriser d’autres signaux moins
informatifs. En 2013, Bordalo et al. (2013) ont développé le modèle de la Théorie
de l’Attention Dominante. Ce modèle soutient qu’en évaluant plusieurs choix pos-
sibles, l’attention du décideur se concentre sur des informations très différentes de
celles de son point de référence. Par conséquent, le décideur a tendance à sur-
pondérer ces “caractéristiques surprenantes” lorsqu’il fait des choix. Bien que ce
modèle n’inclut aucun mécanisme mnésique, il est à l’origine d’un autre modèle
basé sur la mémoire développé cinq ans plus tard par les mêmes auteurs. En 2017,
Bordalo et al. (2017) introduisent les deux mécanismes de base de la mémoire, –la
répétition et l’associativité–, dans leur modèle de Théorie de l’Attention de la Sail-
lance (Bordalo et al., 2013). La répétition correspond au fait que plus la fréquence
à laquelle on se souvient d’un événement est élevée, plus on se souvient de cet
événement facilement. L’associativité correspond au fait que la similitude d’un
événement passé avec un événement présent permet de se rappeler plus facilement
ce dernier événement (Kahana, 2012). Bordalo et al. (2017) constatent que les indi-
vidus présentent parfois un comportement instable et incohérent dans de nouveaux
contextes parce qu’ils fondent leurs choix sur leur mémoire des normes passées, qui
ne sont pas nécessairement adaptées à de nouveaux contextes. Considérons par
exemple le cas d’un individu se rendant pour la première fois dans un aéroport.
Ce dernier a très soif mais, face au prix (qu’il considère) exorbitant des bouteilles
d’eau sur place, il décide de ne pas en acheter. L’individu n’achète pas de bouteille
d’eau alors même que sa disposition à payer est supérieure au prix demandé car
il base son choix sur la mémoire qu’il a du prix “normal” des bouteilles d’eau qu’il
xxiii
a l’habitude d’acheter en ville. Dans cet exemple, comme dans leur modèle, la
mémoire des choix passés détermine (pas toujours de façon efficiente) l’évaluation
des choix présents. Dans un cadre similaire de mémoire associative, Bodoh-Creed
(2017) modélise la mémoire comme un processus associatif dans lequel la valence de
l’humeur déclenche des souvenirs de valence similaire. Dans son modèle, l’humeur
est un élément déterministe de la sélectivité des souvenirs. Ainsi, être de bonne
humeur (ou d’humeur positive) augmente la probabilité de se rappeler d’un événe-
ment positif tandis qu’être de mauvaise humeur (ou d’humeur négative) déclenche
le souvenir d’événements négatifs. En appliquant ce modèle aux comportements
financiers, il explique les phénomènes de sur-réaction face à l’information et de
volatilité du prix des actifs.
Comme nous venons de le voir, la littérature économique modélisant les limi-
tations cognitives de la mémoire et leurs impacts sur la formation des croyances
et la prise de décision est riche et variée. Cependant, considérer la mémoire im-
parfaite n’implique pas nécessairement que les individus manipulent leur mémoire
pour répondre à leur besoin de croyances motivées. Un individu peut oublier des
informations passées avec une probabilité positive sans pour autant faire preuve
de mémoire sélective en fonction de la désirabilité de l’information dont il doit se
souvenir. Au contraire, il peut tenter de réprimer, d’oublier et/ou de réinterpréter
des informations qui menaçeraient ses croyances ou l’obligeraient à les modifier.
Deux principales raisons sous-tendent le besoin inhérent des humains d’avoir
des croyances motivées. Premièrement, les croyances motivées ont une valeur
hédonique. Concernant le fonctionnement du monde, le maintien de croyances
positives permet de se rassurer sur l’avenir et de maximiser son utilité anticipée
(Akerlof and Dickens, 1982; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005). À cette fin, les indi-
vidus peuvent préférer maintenir des croyances optimistes favorisant la poursuite
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d’une vision de “vie en rose”. Concernant l’individu, le maintien de croyances posi-
tives peut nourrir l’ego et améliorer la confiance en soi et l’estime de soi (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2002; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). Cette valeur hédonique des croyances
motivées a été étudiée très tôt par Akerlof and Dickens (1982) dans un modèle de
réduction de la dissonance cognitive qui repose sur deux propositions. Première-
ment, les individus ont des préférences sur leurs croyances. Ces dernières entrent
donc directement comme argument dans la fonction d’utilité. Deuxièmement, les
individus sont capables de manipuler leurs croyances en choisissant l’information
qui est la plus à même de confirmer ce qu’ils ont envie de croire.
La deuxième raison sous-tendant le besoin de croyances motivées est instru-
mentale (ou fonctionnelle). D’un point de vue motivationnel, le fait d’avoir des
croyances positives sur soi ou sur son environnement peut être un puissant moteur
pour poursuivre son but, persister face à l’adversité (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) ou
améliorer sa performance2. Avoir des croyances optimistes sur soi-même peut aussi
aider à convaincre les autres de sa propre valeur et donc être un bon instrument
pour atteindre ses objectifs quand ces derniers dépendent des autres (Bénabou and
Tirole, 2002). Enfin, les croyances motivées peuvent avoir une valeur instrumentale
lorsqu’elles sont utilisées comme une excuse pour justifier un comportement dou-
teux ou irresponsable (Bénabou et al., 2018). Ce dernier point est particulièrement
important pour les économistes car un comportement répréhensible peut être coû-
teux non seulement pour l’individu mais aussi pour l’ensemble de la société. Par
exemple, nier ou sous-estimer le changement climatique peut fournir une bonne
excuse pour ne pas avoir à s’engager dans un comportement éco-responsable ou
2Compte and Postlewaite (2004) ont montré que la valence émotionnelle et la performance étaient
positivement corrélées. Ainsi, toute croyance motivée générant ou nourrissant des émotions positives
pourrait indirectement agir comme un instrument permettant d’améliorer la performance (Compte and
Postlewaite, 2004).
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pour continuer à agir de manière préjudiciable.
Très peu de modèles théoriques ont examiné l’utilisation de la mémoire comme
stratégie d’auto-tromperie pour répondre à ces besoins, hédoniques et instrumen-
taux, de croyances motivées. Bénabou and Tirole (2002) ont modélisé la manip-
ulation de la mémoire comme l’équilibre d’un jeu entre les différents “soi” d’un
individu, dans lequel ce dernier peut oublier des informations qui peuvent nuire ou
menacer sa confiance en lui. Les individus peuvent, avec une certaine probabilité
et potentiellement de façon coûteuse, varier la probabilité de se rappeler d’une
information (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). Basé sur ce modèle d’auto-tromperie
(“self-deception model”) de Bénabou and Tirole (2002), Gottlieb (2014) montre
qu’après avoir observé un signal négatif, le décideur fait face à un conflit entre
oublier le signal et avoir une meilleure image de soi, ou se le rappeler et prendre
une meilleure décision. Lorsqu’il n’y a pas de décision ex post à prendre, le fac-
teur “image de soi” prend le dessus et le décideur se souvient du signal négatif
avec une probabilité inférieure au pourcentage réel. Très récemment, Gödker et al.
(2019) ont développé un modèle dans lequel les préoccupations liées à l’image de
soi déterminent la façon dont l’information est mémorisée par le décideur. Après
avoir observé les variations du prix d’un actif dans lequel il a choisi d’investir,
l’individu se souvient davantage des variations à la hausse que celles à la baisse.
Par conséquent, il pondère de façon asymétrique chaque variation et devient trop
optimiste quant à la qualité réelle de l’actif.
Les études expérimentales qui confirment ou réfutent l’utilisation de la mé-
moire motivée comme mécanisme d’auto-tromperie sont également très limitées.
En 1992, Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) ont été les premiers en économie à
étudier expérimentalement l’existence d’une mémoire sélective. Ils ont mis en place
un jeu de négociation dans lequel deux sujets représentant des partis aux intérêts
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divergents devaient négocier avec le parti adverse afin de trouver un accord. En
cas d’échec, les deux partis devaient engager des frais. Thompson and Loewen-
stein (1992) ont constaté que les négociateurs faisaient preuve de mémoire sélective
concernant i) les frais encourus en cas d’absence d’accord et ii) les informations
échangées lors de la négociation. Les seules autres études expérimentales sur la
mémoire motivée en économie, bien plus récentes, sont Li (2013, 2017), Chew et al.
(2018), Zimmermann (2019), Carlson et al. (2018) et Gödker et al. (2019).
Chew et al. (2018) montrent qu’après un délai de plusieurs mois, les indi-
vidus se souviennent de façon asymétrique de leur performance passée dans un
test de Quotient Intellectuel (QI). Les individus oublient davantage leurs réponses
incorrectes que leurs réponses correctes (mémoire sélective), se souviennent avoir
donné des réponses correctes à des questions auxquelles ils n’ont pas été confrontés
(illusion), et transforment des réponses incorrectes en réponses correctes (confabu-
lation). En utilisant un test de QI similaire, Zimmermann (2019) trouve également
que les individus ont une mémoire biaisée des feedbacks reçus à l’issue d’un test
de QI. Précisément, il constate que i) les personnes se rappellent des feedbacks
négatifs avec moins d’exactitude que des feedbacks positifs et ii) que les personnes
qui ont reçu des feedbacks négatifs déclarent “ne pas se souvenir” plus fréquem-
ment que celles ayant reçu des feedbacks positifs. Dans l’ensemble, Zimmermann
(2019) montre que les individus parviennent à supprimer les feedbacks qui mena-
cent leur désir de se considérer comme des personnes intelligentes. Li (2017) teste
également si les individus font preuve de mémoire motivée lorsqu’ils se rappellent
de leur performance, mais utilise une tâche de saisie de mots au lieu d’un test
de QI. Quarante jours après l’exécution de la tâche, les participants doivent se
rappeler du nombre d’erreurs qu’ils ont commises et de leur classement. Le design
expérimental manipule si les individus doivent prédire leur performance relative ou
absolue et s’ils reçoivent ou non un feedback. Li (2017) trouve que le fait d’avoir
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à prédire sa performance et de recevoir un feedback élimine les biais de mémoire.
Gödker et al. (2019) trouvent également des preuves expérimentales de l’existence
d’une mémoire motivée, mais dans des décisions financières et non concernant une
performance individuelle. Dans leur expérience, les sujets choisissent d’investir
soit dans un actif risqué, soit dans un actif non-risqué, puis observent l’évolution
du prix de l’actif. Par la suite (soit immédiatement après, soit une semaine après
selon le traitement), les sujets doivent se rappeler des différents prix observés de
l’actif. Gödker et al. (2019) constatent que les sujets qui ont investi dans l’actif
risqué se souviennent mieux des gains réalisés que des pertes encourues, forment
des croyances optimistes sur l’évolution future du prix de l’actif, et sont davantage
susceptibles de réinvestir en bourse que les individus ayant initiallement choisi un
actif non-risqué.
L’image de soi ne dépend pas que de son intelligence et/ou de ses performances
individuelles. En tant qu’animaux sociaux, la demande d’une image positive de
soi est aussi fortement liée au désir de paraître pro-social, non seulement aux
yeux des autres (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007),
mais aussi à ses propres yeux (Ariely et al., 2009; Grossman and Van Der Weele,
2017). Tandis que certains individus sont profondément animés par des motiva-
tions altruistes, d’autres investissent dans de bonnes actions pour maintenir une
bonne image d’eux-mêmes, apportant ainsi la preuve qu’être pro-social joue un
rôle important dans la construction de l’image de soi (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).
Pourtant, certaines situations présentent parfois un arbitrage entre deux choix
possibles : favoriser les autres à ses propres dépens, ou se faire passer en premier
au détriment des autres. Lorsque la balance penche en faveur du second choix,
les individus peuvent s’engager dans des actions qui nuisent aux autres, contrari-
ant ainsi leur demande d’image pro-sociale et pouvant potentiellement créer des
incohérences avec leurs propres préférences (Banaji and Bhaskar, 2000; Banaji
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et al., 2004; Chugh et al., 2005; Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). Une façon de rétablir ces
contradictions ou incohérences est d’avoir une mémoire motivée. Li (2013) est le
premier à avoir étudié la manipulation de la mémoire dans les interactions sociales.
Après avoir joué un jeu de confiance (“trust game”), les deux types de joueurs (les
“trustees” et les “trustors”) doivent se souvenir des décisions prises au cours du jeu.
Li (2013) ne trouve aucune preuve de mémoire sélective de la part des trustees selon
qu’ils ont réciproqué ou trahi le trustor. Seuls les trustors font preuve de mémoire
sélective en se souvenant moins bien de leurs décisions lorsqu’ils ont été trahis que
lorsqu’ils ont été récompensés pour leur confiance. En revanche, Carlson et al.
(2018) trouvent, dans un jeu du dictateur, qu’il est plus probable que les dicta-
teurs se souviennent incorrectement du montant alloué au joueur passif lorsque la
décision qu’ils ont prise contredit leur vision personnelle de la justice et de l’équité.
Cette thèse étudie l’existence et la force de mémoire motivée dans trois con-
textes économiquement pertinents : les préférences sociales, la performance indi-
viduelle et les décisions malhonnêtes. Dans chaque contexte, elle fournit un nouvel
ensemble de preuves montrant que les individus manipulent leur mémoire pour
soutenir leur besoin d’avoir des croyances qui leur sont confortables ou favorables.
Elle explore deux potentiels déterminants de la mémoire motivée : un déterminant
hédonique lorsque la manipulation de la mémoire sert à améliorer l’image de soi,
et un déterminant instrumental lorsqu’elle sert d’excuse pour justifier ses déci-
sions futures. Chaque chapitre présenté ici se concentre sur la compréhension d’un
déterminant de la mémoire motivée dans un contexte spécifique. Plus précisément:
• Le chapitre 1 examine si les gens ont une mémoire biaisée de leurs interactions
avec autrui. Les individus oublient-ils les conséquences de leurs actes sur les
autres ? Si oui, cela dépend-il de la nature (par exemple, égoïste ou altruiste)
de leurs actions ? Nos résultats confirment la sélectivité des souvenirs dans
les interactions sociales. Les individus se souviennent davantage de leurs
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décisions altruistes que de leurs décisions égoïstes. En revanche, nous ne
trouvons pas preuve évidente de biais d’erreurs de mémoire.
• Le chapitre 2 distingue deux forces qui ont été proposées pour expliquer
l’existence de biais de mémoire concernant la performance individuelle. Pour-
quoi les individus se souviennent mieux des feedbacks positifs que des feed-
backs négatifs ? Alors que l’hypothèse d’auto-amélioration affirme que les
individus se souviennent mieux des feedbacks positifs pour améliorer leur
image de soi, la mémoire associative assure que les individus se souviennent
mieux de l’information qui est en accord avec leur humeur. Nous proposons
un environnement contrôlé dans lequel les deux théories prédisent des résul-
tats différents. Nos résultats supportent l’existence et la dominance relative
d’une mémoire d’auto-amélioration de l’image de soi par rapport à celle d’une
mémoire congruente à l’humeur.
Les chapitres 1 et 2 se concentrent sur le cas où les souvenirs ont une valeur
purement hédonique. Le décideur ne prend pas de décision ex-post, et la seule
raison motivant la manipulation de la mémoire est l’amélioration de son image. Le
chapitre 3 examine le cas où les souvenirs ont également une valeur instrumentale.
• Le chapitre 3 examine le rôle respectif des motifs hédoniques et instrumen-
taux dans la mémoire motivée, avec une application au domaine de l’éthique.
Les individus ont-ils une mémoire motivée de leurs comportements malhon-
nêtes ? Si oui, est-ce dû à des motifs purement hédoniques et/ou à des raisons
stratégiques ? Nous trouvons que les considérations hédoniques seules ne
sont pas suffisantes pour déclencher une manipulation de la mémoire. En
revanche, quand l’oubli sert d’excuse pour justifier leurs décisions futures,
les individus manipulent leur mémoire.
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Les sections suivantes présentent chaque chapitre de cette thèse et leurs con-
tributions originales à la littérature existante.
Chapitre 1: Mémoire Motivée dans des Jeux du Dictateur
Le Chapitre 1 vise à comprendre si et dans quelle mesure les individus manipulent
leur mémoire pour soutenir leur demande d’image pro-sociale. Comme Li (2013),
nous visons à identifier l’existence d’une mémoire motivée et à étudier la sélectiv-
ité des souvenirs dans les interactions sociales. Contrairement à Li (2013), nous
sommes en mesure i) d’étudier à la fois la mémoire sélective (lorsque la probabilité
de se souvenir d’un acte désirable est supérieure à celle de se souvenir d’un acte
indésirable) et le biais des erreurs de mémoire (qui se définit par la direction et
la magnitude des erreurs), et ii) de déterminer un effet causal de responsabilité de
la décision sur la mémoire sélective. Nous avons conçu une expérience en labora-
toire où les participants doivent jouer à une série de jeux de dictateurs binaires
puis, après avoir réalisé une tâche visant à distraire leur attention, se rappeler des
montants attribués au joueur passif. Nous avons introduit quatre traitements dans
lesquels nous manipulons la responsabilité des dictateurs pour le montant alloué
au joueur passif (soit le dictateur choisit le montant, soit le montant est choisi au
hasard par un ordinateur) et la présence d’incitations monétaires pour un souvenir
correct.
Nos résultats montrent que les individus ont une mémoire sélective. Première-
ment, lorsque les dictateurs sont responsables du montant alloué au joueur passif,
le pourcentage de souvenirs corrects est plus élevé après avoir choisi l’option altru-
iste qu’après avoir choisi l’option égoïste. Cela n’est pas le cas lorsque le montant
du joueur passif est sélectionné au hasard par l’ordinateur. Deuxièmement, la
présence d’incitations monétaires pour des souvenirs corrects augmente le pour-
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centage de souvenirs corrects chez les dictateurs, mais seulement lorsqu’ils ont
choisi l’option altruiste, pas lorsqu’ils ont choisi l’option égoïste. Cela suggère que
les individus n’oublient pas complètement leurs décisions passées, mais lorsqu’ils
sont incités financièrement à fournir un effort de mémoire, ils consacrent cet effort
à recouvrer la mémoire d’informations valorisantes plutôt que dévalorisantes. En-
fin, lorsqu’on demande aux dictateurs de se souvenir non pas du montant alloué au
joueur passif mais de leur propre montant, ils sont également moins susceptibles de
s’en souvenir après avoir choisi l’option égoïste que l’option altruiste. Ce résultat
montre que les souvenirs sélectifs ne sont pas motivés par une attention accrue
accordée au montant du joueur passif par des dictateurs pro-sociaux.
En revanche, nous ne trouvons pas de preuves claires de biais d’erreurs de mé-
moire. Les dictateurs sont plus susceptibles de sur-estimer que de sous-estimer
le montant alloué au joueur passif après avoir choisi l’option égoïste plutôt que
l’option altruiste, mais la même asymétrie se retrouve lorsque le montant alloué
au joueur passif est choisi de façon aléatoire par le programme informatique. De
plus, la magnitude des erreurs de mémoire des dictateurs est semblable quelque
soit le degré de pro-socialité de la décision, et indépendamment du fait que le
dictateur en soit responsable ou pas. Même si la majorité des individus préfèrent
probablement se considérer comme généreux plutôt qu’égoïstes, une explication
possible de l’absence de biais d’erreurs de mémoire est que la dissonance entre la
prise de décisions égoïstes quand une alternative pro-sociale est disponible et le
maintien d’une image positive de soi peut ne pas être assez forte pour générer un
conflit interne. L’étude de la mémoire motivée dans le domaine de la moralité et
de l’éthique, où les impératifs catégoriques (Kant, 1785) et les normes injonctives
sont plus importants, pourrait générer un besoin accru de mémoire biaisée. De
plus, dans les études qui ont été présentées jusqu’à présent, les individus ne pou-
vaient manipuler leur mémoire que pour des raisons hédoniques, c’est-à-dire pour
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améliorer leur image d’eux-mêmes et se percevoir comme plus intelligents et/ou
généreux. De telles considérations hédoniques, à elles seules, pourraient ne pas
être suffisantes pour déclencher des erreurs de mémoire biaisées. L’introduction de
raisons instrumentales, c’est-à-dire de situations dans lesquelles la manipulation
de la mémoire peut servir d’excuses ou de justifications pour des décisions futures,
pourrait permettre de mieux identifier et comprendre l’émergence des erreurs de
mémoire biaisées et leur rôle dans le processus de prise de décision. L’exploration
de ces deux possibilités est l’objet du troisième chapitre de cette thèse. Le chapitre
2 continue d’explorer les distorsions de la mémoire pour des raisons hédoniques,
mais dans le domaine de la performance individuelle plutôt que dans celui des
interactions sociales. Il étudie les mécanismes sous-jacents de la mémoire motivée.
Chapitre 2: Les Biais de Mémoire sont-ils dépendants de l’Humeur ou
de l’Image de Soi?
Les feedbacks que nous recevons sont l’une des principales sources d’information
sur nous-même : ils peuvent aider les personnes à combler un manque d’information,
à actualiser leurs croyances, à s’améliorer, à faire de meilleurs choix et ainsi obtenir
de meilleurs résultats. Bien que plusieurs études aient mis en évidence l’existence
d’une asymétrie dans le rappel de feedbacks concernant une performance individu-
elle passée, les raisons qui sous-tendent cette asymétrie ne sont pas claires. Dans
la littérature, deux hypothèses ont été adoptées pour expliquer cette asymétrie des
souvenirs. D’une part, la mémoire auto-améliorante soutient que les individus se
souviennent mieux des feedbacks positifs que des feedbacks négatifs afin de main-
tenir une bonne image d’eux-mêmes (effet d’auto-amélioration). D’autre part, la
mémoire associative assure que les biais de mémoire sont dûs une à accessibilité ac-
crue de l’information positive et à une accessibilité atténuée de l’information néga-
tive lorsque les gens sont d’humeur non-négative (effet de congruence de l’humeur).
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Bien que les deux principes ne soient pas mutuellement exclusifs et que la plupart
des preuves existantes soient compatibles avec les deux théories, il est essentiel de
comprendre la nature des mécanismes en actions. Cela permettrait de prévenir
certaines décisions économiques sous-optimales et d’élaborer des politiques visant
à atténuer ou à éliminer les comportements de sur-confiance, si nécessaire. En ef-
fet, alors que les modèles d’auto-amélioration supposent un contrôle méta-cognitif
de l’individu et suggèrent ainsi l’importance de corriger les croyances ex ante sur
ce qui est utile ou non pour l’individu, les modèles de congruence de l’humeur
supposent un processus heuristique sans intentionnalité et considèrent les biais de
mémoire comme étant un collatéral d’état affectifs positifs.
Le Chapitre 2 a pour but de démêler ces deux forces qui ont été proposées
comme explication possible des biais de mémoire concernant la performance indi-
viduelle. Pour identifier et démêler ces deux mécanismes, nous avons mis en place
une expérience en laboratoire où les deux théories, la mémoire auto-améliorante
et la mémoire congruente à l’humeur, offrent des prédictions divergentes. Dans
notre expérience, basée sur le design de Zimmermann (2019), les sujets effectuent
un test de QI puis reçoivent un feedback bruité sur leur performance relative par
rapport à leurs pairs. Un mois plus tard, ils reviennent au laboratoire et doivent
se rappeler des feedbacks reçus un mois auparavant. Avant de se souvenir, nous
intervenons ou non sur leur humeur, en utilisant la procédure d’Andrade et al.
(2015). Le laboratoire offre un environnement contrôlé où la précision du souvenir
peut être soigneusement évaluée et l’humeur manipulée de façon exogène.
Nos résultats supportent l’existence d’une mémoire d’auto-amélioration. Pre-
mièrement, les personnes se souviennent mieux des feedbacks positifs que des feed-
backs négatifs. Deuxièmement, lorsqu’ils ne se souviennent pas correctement du
feedback reçu un mois auparavant, les individus présentent des erreurs de mé-
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moire optimistes. Cela signifie qu’ils surestiment le nombre de feedbacks positifs
qu’ils ont reçu. Ces résultats répliquent les résultats de Zimmermann (2019). En
revanche, bien que notre manipulation de l’humeur s’avère efficace pour induire
l’état affectif souhaité, nous ne trouvons pas de preuve claire de mémoire congru-
ente à l’humeur. Les personnes ne se souviennent pas mieux des feedbacks lorsque
ces derniers ont une valence congruente à celle de l’humeur induite en laboratoire.
Ces résultats confirment l’effet de la mémoire d’auto-amélioration comme moteur
des biais de souvenirs asymétriques sur la performance individuelle, mais ne mon-
trent aucun rôle de la congruence de l’humeur.
Ces résultats démontrent l’importance des facteurs motivationnels plutôt qu’affectifs
dans la formation de croyances optimistes sur soi. La prédominance relative d’une
mémoire motivée par l’auto-amélioration a des répercussions directes sur les poli-
tiques visant à atténuer ou à éliminer les biais de jugement. Dans la mesure où
les individus déforment surtout leur mémoire parce qu’ils considèrent les feedbacks
négatifs comme potentiellement nuisibles, l’élimination de l’aversion ex ante pour
ces feedbacks négatifs pourrait permettre d’atténuer ces biais de mémoire pouvant
potentiellement conduire à une sur-confiance en soi pas toujours souhaitable (Bén-
abou and Tirole, 2002).
Chapitre 3: Mémoire Motivée des Comportements Malhonnêtes
Plusieurs études en économie ont identifié différentes stratégies utilisées par les in-
dividus pour maintenir leurs valeurs morales tout en agissant de façon contraire à
l’éthique. Les individus évitent de connaître les conséquences de leurs actes (Feiler,
2014; Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017), exploitent l’incertitude sur la norme
sociale en vigueur pour justifier leur propre décision de mentir (Bicchieri et al.,
2019), prétendent avoir changé (Stanley et al., 2017), rejettent la faute sur autrui
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(Bartling and Fischbacher, 2011; Oexl and Grossman, 2013), contre-balancent leur
comportements (im)moraux dans le temps (Ploner and Regner, 2013; Gneezy et al.,
2014; Cojoc and Stoian, 2014) ou trouvent des excuses consistant, par exemple, à
minimiser les externalités négatives et/ou réinterpréter les circonstances de leurs
actions (Bénabou et al., 2018). D’autant que nous le sachions, aucune étude n’a à
ce jour exploré la manipulation de la mémoire comme un autre moyen de maintenir
ses valeurs morales tout en agissant de façon malhonnête.
Le Chapitre 3 étudie la présence de mémoire motivée pour des raisons hé-
doniques mais aussi instrumentales, dans un contexte de prise de décision (non)
éthique. Notre étude contribue à deux littératures. Premièrement, elle contribue
à mieux comprendre le raisonnement moral lorsqu’on est confronté à une occasion
de mal se comporter. Malgré la littérature abondante sur la malhonnêteté qui
s’est développée au cours de la dernière décennie (pour les surveys, voir notam-
ment Rosenbaum et al., 2014; Irlenbusch and Villeval, 2015; Jacobsen et al., 2018;
Abeler et al., 2011), il n’existe aucune étude économique sur la manipulation de la
mémoire comme mécanisme permettant de soutenir une image morale de soi tout
en agissant de façon malhonnête. Deuxièmement, elle contribue à la littérature
économique récente mais croissante sur la mémoire motivée. Alors que les études
existantes (Li, 2013, 2017; Chew et al., 2018; Zimmermann, 2019; Carlson et al.,
2018) étudient la mémoire motivée dans le domaine de la performance individuelle
ou des préférences sociales, nous nous concentrons sur la mémoire des décisions
malhonnêtes ou contraires à l’éthique. De plus, nous explorons non seulement si
les individus oublient leurs comportements malhonnêtes passés pour soutenir leur
désir d’image morale de soi, mais aussi s’ils manipulent leur mémoire comme une
excuse pour ne pas avoir à s’engager dans un comportement moralement respons-
able mais coûteux. Ainsi, nous proposons le premier test expérimental de l’impact
des décisions anticipées sur la manipulation de la mémoire. Nous étudions les
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biais de la mémoire non seulement comme une conséquence d’un comportement
contraire à l’éthique, mais aussi comme un instrument pour justifier un futur com-
portement potentiellement non éthique.
Pour étudier i) si les individus oublient leurs comportements malhonnêtes
passés et ii) s’ils utilisent leur mémoire comme instrument pour justifier leurs
décisions futures, nous avons mené une expérience en ligne dans laquelle les par-
ticipants jouent à un jeu de hasard répété. Dans ce jeu, les individus observent
le résultat d’un tirage au sort et peuvent décider de mentir sur ce résultat afin de
maximiser leurs gains. Trois semaines plus tard, les individus doivent se souvenir
des montants qu’ils ont reporté lors de la première session. Selon les traitements,
nous varions i) si les individus peuvent ou non tricher en session 1 et ii) si seules
des raisons hédoniques ou à la fois hédoniques et stratégiques peuvent pousser les
individus à oublier leurs comportements passés.
Nos résultats montrent que lorsque les biais de mémoire n’ont qu’une valeur
hédonique –c’est-à-dire améliorer ou conserver une bonne image de soi–, les person-
nes malhonnêtes ne se souviennent pas moins bien de leurs décisions passées que
les personnes qui ne pouvaient pas tricher en session 1. Ainsi, dans notre contexte,
les considérations hédoniques ne sont pas suffisantes pour déclencher une manip-
ulation significative de la mémoire. En revanche, lorsque les biais de mémoire ont
une valeur instrumentale –c’est-à-dire lorsque les individus sont informés, avant de
se souvenir des montants reportés, qu’ils auront une décision future à prendre–, les
individus malhonnêtes se souviennent de leurs comportements passés avec moins
de précision que lorsqu’ils savent qu’ils n’auront aucune décision à prendre. Ce
résultat suggère que les personnes utilisent leur mémoire comme une excuse pour
justifier leurs décisions futures. Il confirme que la mémoire est impliquée dans les
différentes stratégies que les individus utilisent pour motiver leurs croyances sur
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eux-mêmes et justifie qu’ils peuvent se comporter immoralement tout en gardant
une opinion positive d’eux-mêmes.
***
L’utilisation d’expériences en laboratoire pour étudier les déterminants com-
portementaux des biais de mémoire présente de nombreux avantages. Tout d’abord,
les expériences en laboratoire permettent d’observer la mémoire d’informations
(décisions et/ou feedback) directement induites au sein laboratoire et ainsi de
mesurer précisément les erreurs de mémoire. Cela n’est pas nécessairement le cas
dans des études portant sur la mémoire auto-déclarée ou autobiographique. Deux-
ièmement, les expériences en laboratoire permettent de manipuler de manière ex-
ogène la nature de l’information dont il faudra par la suite se souvenir et donc
de tester la récupération de la mémoire en fonction du degré de désirabilité de
l’information. Ce point est particulièrement important lorsqu’il s’agit d’étudier
la manipulation de la mémoire comme stratégie utilisée par les individus pour
soutenir leur désir de croyances motivées. Enfin, les expériences de laboratoire
permettent à l’expérimentaliste de contrôler la durée de l’expérience entre les dif-
férentes phases d’encodage et de remémoration, et ainsi de distinguer l’effet du
temps de l’effet de la motivation sur les mécanismes mnésiques.
L’étude de la mémoire humaine via des expériences de laboratoire présente
cependant certaines limites spécifiques. Premièrement, dans les expériences en lab-
oratoire, il est de connaissance commune que l’expérimentaliste détient l’information
dont les participants doivent se rappeler. Une conséquence directe est que les par-
ticipants peuvent être confrontés à un arbitrage entre deux stratégies de renforce-
ment de l’image de soi lorsqu’ils doivent se souvenir de leurs comportements passés.
D’un côté, oublier une action ou un comportement dont on est peu fier permet
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d’améliorer son image de soi. De l’autre, cela peut également l’endommager car
oublier envoie un signal (négatif) indiquant que sa mémoire ne fonctionne pas cor-
rectement. Le résultat d’un tel arbitrage dépend de la nature même de l’individu.
Deuxièmement, dans la vie réelle, les événements vécus sont rarement enregistrés
et donc non vérifiables. Dans de tels environnements incontrôlés, la manipulation
de la mémoire peut survenir plus librement que dans un laboratoire où l’individu
peut être confronté à des faits tangibles et ainsi connaître des coûts intrinsèques
plus élevés de manipulation de la mémoire. De plus, toutes les études économiques
qui ont exploré la mémoire en laboratoire rémunèrent les souvenirs corrects. Bien
que les incitations monétaires soient cruciales pour tester l’existence et la force des
biais de mémoire, leur présence peut aboutir à une mesure conservatrice de ces
derniers. Dans la vie réelle, les incitations monétaires peuvent parfois être alignées
avec l’oubli ou la distorsion des souvenirs. Pour donner un example provocateur,
nous pouvons par exemple penser à un individu qui oublie (probablement de façon
volontaire mais éventuellement sans le faire exprès) son portefeuille en allant au
restaurant. De façon moins anecdotique, le fait de présenter des troubles de la mé-
moire peut conduire à des réductions de peine de la part des tribunaux de grande
instance lors de procès faisant suite à des actes criminels (Cima et al., 2002).
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Foreword
Memory speaks to everyone. We lose it, we recover it, we muscle it. Although the
use of a single term might seem to suggest that memory works as a unitary sys-
tem, the scientific investigations on memory that started about 100 years ago have
come to show that memory is not one but many systems (Baddeley, 1997). The
systems range in nature (episodic memory, procedural memory, semantic memory,
etc.), in encoding (visual memory, olfactory memory, sensitive memory), in storage
duration and capacity (from few seconds to long-term memory), and in scale (since
memory is not only individual but can be collective).
Memory is dynamic, flexible, multi-dimensional, and thereby complex. This is
why most specialists agree to talk about memories rather than memory. If some of
them outside the economic sphere were to read the studies presented here, as prob-
ably any other study in economics on memory, they would probably be mocking (if
not outraged) by the way we consider memory as a black box. In our framework,
individuals receive information (from their own actions or from external feedback)
and are later asked to retrieve it. We readily acknowledge that such a framework
is restrictive in many regards. Notably, beyond ignoring the brain mechanisms
(particularly the neural networks and cellular plasticity allowing the different pro-
cesses of consolidation and re-consolidation of memory over time, which is of main
interest for neuroscientists); it focuses on a very specific memory system −episodic
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memory−, among many others that have been identified (see Figure 2). The use
of the term memory in economics and throughout this thesis always refers to the
episodic system of memory. It corresponds to the memory of autobiographical
events, such as remembering your first day at school or that day you received a
biting rejection from a high-ranked journal. It is different from semantic memory
that refers to more general knowledge that we have accumulated throughout our
lives, such as knowing the capital of France or the ranking of the top five journals.
These two systems belong to the declarative memory, which refers to the conscious,
intentional recollection of past events and facts (Ullman, 2004). Other types of
memory systems are relying on implicit memory that, by contrast, is acquired and
used unconsciously (Schacter, 1987).
This restrictive vision of memory in economics being acknowledged, we are con-
vinced that introducing memory into the economic discipline remains extremely
important. The economist does not necessarily need to know what is in the black
box of memory and how it is processed. What is important, however, is to know
how and to what extent memory intervenes in the input-decision process. Mem-
ory of past experiences is one of the main sources of information about ourselves
and the world surrounding us. Exploring how individuals retrieve such informa-
tion is important to better understand how they form and update their beliefs. It
changes the understanding of how people learn from experiences to make decisions.
Studying (asymmetric) recall of information also permits to better apprehend the
emergence of inaccurate statements about oneself, such as overconfidence, with
major implications on the quality of choices. Also, because “anything that distort
individuals’ ability to recall an event will distort their probability assessments”
(Hammond et al., 2006), exploring the behavioral determinants of memory biases
may grant a better understanding of how individuals form anticipations and ex-
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pectations.
Introducing memory into the process of individuals’ decision-making in eco-
nomics highlights a new and serious candidate to explore the dynamics of moti-
vated beliefs. It offers an alternative channel to explain suboptimal decisions when
individuals do not adjust for the fallibility of their memory when making choices.
As philosophers, psychologists, sociologists or neuroscientists may explore the con-
cepts of identity, ethics or communication in very different ways, economists should
not be afraid of investigating human memory in a restrictive or simplified way, as
long as it allows them to better explain how people make decisions in a world with
scarce resources, both material and cognitive.
Figure 2: Memory Systems (Adapted from Raslau et al. 2014)
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The desire to hold positive beliefs about oneself and the world surrounding us is a
fundamental feature of humans. Individuals cherish subjective beliefs and invest
huge amounts of effort to protect them. For instance, parents like to think that
their children are particularly advanced in their development or abilities, job can-
didates like to think that they are more able and competent than other candidates,
people on diet easily believe that this (not so) occasional ice cream will not really
make a difference, some travellers minimize the environmental footprint of their
behavior, etc. As in these everyday life examples, often beliefs are not formed
and updated in a neutral manner but self-servingly in response to psychological or
emotional needs. Individuals collect and interpret evidence in a fashion that sup-
ports what they are motivated to believe. Beliefs are not just held, but motivated
(Bénabou, 2015).
This conception of beliefs as an “asset that people invest in” (Bénabou and
Tirole, 2011) has profoundly challenged the vision of the homo oeconomicus (Mill,
1874) that is supposed to form and adjust his beliefs in a rational response to new
information. In fact, as Schelling (1987) described “the mind as a consuming or-
gan”, individuals may obtain satisfaction not only from the consumption of goods
or experiences but also from the consumption of beliefs. As a response, behavioral
economists have introduced the concept of “belief-based utility” in which individu-
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als can derive direct utility from motivated beliefs, even if the latter are inaccurate
and can conflict with optimal decision-making.
Individuals, however, do not simply believe what they want to believe. As it
would be hard for a starting PhD student to convince himself that he is currently
the best economist in the world, a shareholder will never be certain that the value
of his portfolio will never decrease, even temporarily. Beliefs have to be plausibly
motivated to be held. To satisfy this demand for motivated beliefs, individuals
thus need to develop strategies through which they can defend themselves and
reason against potentially threatening evidence.3 The puzzling question is: how?
Economists have been studying this issue for years, and several types of strategies
have been explored.
Ex ante, evidence shows that individuals sometimes prefer the “bliss of ig-
norance” rather than the “power of knowledge”. Individuals avoid or selectively
acquire information to sustain desirable beliefs, even when it is free and it could
improve decision making (Golman et al., 2017). Examples go from investors avoid-
ing looking at their portfolios when the market is down (Karlsson et al., 2009) to
individuals eschewing free medical tests (Oster et al., 2013). Information avoid-
ance produces uncertainty which impacts individuals’ decisions. Numerous studies
have shown that individuals engage in willful or strategic ignorance of inconvenient
information as an excuse to act self-interestedly. For instance, Dana et al. (2007)
have shown that dictators use uncertainty on the consequences of their decisions as
a moral wiggle room to act more selfishly than when they are informed, because
ignorance protects their self-image (see also Grossman, 2014; Kajackaite, 2015;
3It is assumed here that information available to individuals is not manipulated per se. This is
a restrictive representation of the reality since it seems plausible to think that institutions such as
governments, medias, politician parties and/or enterprises may sometimes have interest to provide ex-
ante distorted or fake information.
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Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017). Individuals also give less to charities under
risk (Exley, 2015) and uncertainty (Garcia et al., 2018) than when the outcome
of their decisions is certain. Interestingly, willful ignorance matches a supply of
ignorance. In a laboratory experiment, Shalvi et al. (2019) have shown that not
only some decision-makers avoid advisers who transmit inconvenient information
(demand side), but a majority advisers themselves suppress inconvenient informa-
tion transmitted to the decision-makers (supply side).
Ex post, accuracy is not always the main goal underlying beliefs formation ei-
ther. Individuals often weight information asymmetrically and update beliefs in
a non-bayesian way (Rabin and Schrag, 1999). For instance, Eil and Rao (2011)
and Mobius et al. (2011) have shown that subjects’ belief updating of good news
about their IQ (and beauty in Eil and Rao, 2011) conformed more to Bayes’ Rule
that belief updating of bad news. Also using an IQ test, Zimmermann (2019)
found that beliefs are adjusted in the appropriate direction when elicited directly
after feedback is given, but are asymmetrically updated when elicited one month
after receiving feedback. Precisely, beliefs of participants who received positive
feedback remained adjusted upwards while beliefs of participants who received
negative feedback tended to return to their priors. Beyond distorting information,
individuals can defend themselves against threatening evidence by shifting the
blame onto someone else for their actions (Bartling and Fischbacher, 2011; Oexl
and Grossman, 2013), dilute their responsibility (Foerster and Van der Weele,
2018) or use narratives consisting in, for example, downplaying the externalities,
and/or reinterpret the circumstances of their actions (Bénabou et al., 2018; Foer-
ster and van der Weele, 2018).
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While ex ante willful avoidance and ex post biased updating or distortion of
information have been widely studied by experimental economists, another strat-
egy available to individuals has long been disregarded. Even when information
has been received and updated, individuals can ultimately exhibit forgetting or
biased memory of information. People may fail to retrieve undesirable informa-
tion and, reversely, strive to remember desirable one and even fake memories. In
other words, time could give individuals the wiggle room to forget or distort what
they would rather not remember. This disregard for memory by economists seems
surprising when considering that most of the beliefs that underlie our decisions
are drawn from memory (Tranel et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 1998). In fact, our
memory of past events is, if not the first, one of the main sources of information.
Introducing memory into the process of individuals’ decision-making thus seems
of crucial importance. It highlights a new and serious candidate to explore the
dynamics of motivated beliefs. This is of importance for economists since memory
biases may lead to inaccurate statements about oneself and one’s environment,
with major implications on the quality of choices.
This thesis investigates whether individuals use their memory as a self-deceptive
strategy to sustain their desire for motivated beliefs. It tests experimentally the
existence and strength of memory manipulation in economically relevant contexts
such as social interactions, individual performance and unethical decisions. It
provides a novel body of evidence that even when information has been received
and updated, another strategy available to individuals to manipulate their beliefs
about themselves is indeed to forget such information.
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I have done this, says my memory. I cannot have done that,
says my pride, remaining inexorable. Finally, memory yields.
Nietzsche, 1886, Beyond Good and Evil
Memory has long been seen as a storehouse into which discrete items of in-
formation are initially deposited and later retrieved. In the standard model of
Bayesian updating, memory does not intervenes in the belief formation and up-
dating process. The decision-maker updates his beliefs upon receipt of information
and "yesterday’s posterior equals today’s priors" (Enke et al., 2019). Yet, in the
18th century, the idea that humans’ memory malleability affected beliefs had been
formulated by the economist and philosopher David Hume in his Treatise of Hu-
man Nature (1739). In his own words:
As an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degen-
erate to such a degree, as to be taken for an idea of the imagination;
so on the other hand an idea of the imagination may acquire such a
force and vivacity, as to pass for an idea of the memory, and counter-
feit its effects on the belief and judgment. (...) Thus it appears, that
the belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is
nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that
this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is in
this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition
of that impression in the memory. It is merely the force and liveliness
of the perception, which constitutes the first act of the judgment, and
lays the foundation of that reasoning, which we build upon it, when
we trace the relation of cause and effect.
Hume’s essential point is to recognize the permeable boundaries between mem-
ory and imagination and its impacts on beliefs. Hume points out that beliefs
are solely based on the superior force and vivacity of perceptions from memory
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over imagination. However, since the vivacity of perceptions can degenerate or
strengthen to a point where memory and imagination may confound, beliefs are
in fact based on a very fragile identification of actual versus fancy perceptions.
Over the last decades, the idea of an adaptive memory, neither perfect nor
stable, but fundamentally limited and dynamic, has gained some credence in eco-
nomics. Economists have attempted at modelling cognitive limitations in recalls
and their impact on belief formation and decision-making. In 1991, Dow (1991)
is the first to model the decision problem of an agent searching for a low price,
with a limited memory of past prices. While before the consumer’s choice was
restricted to goods or experiences, he assumes that the information that is remem-
bered is itself a choice variable. In 1997, Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) model
a decision problem with imperfect recall. A decision-maker exhibits imperfect re-
call if, at a point of time, he holds information which is forgotten later on. The
authors show that while under perfect recall the decision-maker has no reason to
make his decision at a particular point of time (the ex-ante defined optimal strat-
egy remains optimal during its execution), under imperfect recall the timing of
decision plays an important role and the decision-maker needs to define when to
make his decision and to what extent he can commit to it. In the early 2000s,
Mullainathan (2002) and Bénabou and Tirole (2002) developed simultaneously
two theoretical models with contrasting hypotheses. Mullainathan (2002) assumes
that the decision-maker is naive and ignores memory imperfections when making
inferences. He shows that beliefs are affected not only by information drawn from
experience but also by the memories they evoke. On the contrary, Bénabou and
Tirole (2002) assume that the decision-maker is sophisticated and realizes that he
may select memories when making inferences. More recently, Wilson (2014) has
also analyzed decision problems with imperfect recall. In his model, the decision-
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maker is constrained by a finite memory capacity. He cannot memorize all but
only a limited number of informative signals. Under such limited memory, the
decision-maker optimally reacts only to the two most extreme signal realizations,
which prevents him from wasting limited memory resources on less informative
signals. In 2013, Bordalo et al. (2013) have developed the Salience Theory of
Attention model. This model holds that, when evaluating a choice option, the
decision-maker’s attention focuses on the information that differs the most from
his reference point. As a consequence, the decision-maker tends to overweight the
“surprising features” when making choices. While this model does not consider
memory mechanisms, it is a the origin of another memory-based model developed
five years later by the same authors. In 2017, Bordalo et al. (2017) introduce the
two baseline mechanisms of memory, –rehearsal and associativeness–, into their
Salience Theory of Attention model (Bordalo et al., 2013). Rehearsal corresponds
to the fact that the higher frequency to which an event is remembered makes it
easier to remember again. Associativeness corresponds to the fact that the sim-
ilarity of a past event to a current event makes this latter event easier to recall
(Kahana, 2012). Bordalo et al. (2017) find that individuals sometimes exhibit un-
stable and inconsistent behavior in new contexts because they base their choices on
their memory of past norms, which are not necessarily adapted for new contexts.
For instance, a first-time traveler at the airport may not buy an expensive bottle
of water even if he is extremely thirsty, just because he has in memory a norm of
“low price” for bottles of water he brought downtown. In that example, as in their
model, memory of previous choices shapes (not always consistently) the evaluation
of current choices. In a similar associative recall framework, Bodoh-Creed (2017)
models memory as an associative process where the current mood (or affective
state) is a relevant cue for retrieval. In a dynamic setting, he incorporates mood
as a deterministic element of selective recall under the assumption that positive
12
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mood increases the probability to recall a positive item while negative mood trig-
gers recollection of negative items. By applying the model to financial behavior,
he draws predictions on information overreaction and asset price volatility.
As just reviewed, the theoretical economic literature modeling cognitive lim-
itations in recalls and their impact on belief formation and decision-making is
now substantial. However, considering imperfect memory does not necessarily im-
ply that individuals use memory manipulation as a self-deceptive strategy. For
instance, individuals may forget past information with some positive probability
without exhibiting asymmetries in recalls depending on the desirability of the in-
formation to be retrieved. By contrast, individuals may try to repress, forget
and/or reinterpret information to sustain their desire for motivated beliefs.
Why do individuals need motivated beliefs? Two main reasons underlying the
demand for motivated beliefs have been identified in the literature (mainly theo-
retical). First, motivated beliefs have an hedonic value. Holding positive beliefs
about oneself and the world surrounding us is just pleasant per se. Maintaining
positive beliefs about how the world works may reassure oneself about the future,
maximize anticipatory utility and protect one’s “rosy view” of the world (Akerlof
and Dickens, 1982; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005). Maintaining positive beliefs
about the self may feed the ego, enhance self-confidence and self-esteem, and make
oneself feel better (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). Main-
taining positive beliefs may also prevent from bearing the cost of negative feelings
such that guilt, disappointment or anxiety. This hedonic value of motivated beliefs
has been early investigated by Akerlof and Dickens (1982) in a model of cognitive
dissonance reduction that relies on two propositions. First, individuals have pref-
erences over beliefs and beliefs thus directly enter as an argument in the utility
13
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function. Second, individuals are able to manipulate their beliefs by selecting in-
formation that is the most likely to confirm want they want to believe.
The second value of motivated beliefs is instrumental (or functional). From
a motivational point of view, holding positive beliefs about oneself or one’s en-
vironment can be a powerful motivator to pursue one’s goal, persist in the face
of adversity (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006), and even increase one’s performance
(Compte and Postlewaite, 2004).4 Holding positive beliefs about one’s own value
may also help better convince others of it. In that respect, having inflated beliefs
about oneself may also be a good instrument to achieve our goals when those later
depend on others’ decisions (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). In other words, deceiving
oneself helps deceiving others more efficiently (Trivers, 2011). Finally, subjective
beliefs may have an instrumental value when they are used as a narrative or an
excuse to justify future decisions (Bénabou et al., 2018). For instance, convinc-
ing oneself that humans are only partially responsible for climate change prevents
from having to change one’s habits and acting more responsibly. This instrumental
value of motivated beliefs is of particular importance for economists since it leads
to questionable behavior that may not only be costly for the individual but for the
whole society.
Very few papers have investigated the use of memory as a self-management
strategy to sustain these two needs for motivated beliefs. Theoretically, Bénabou
and Tirole (2002) have modeled memory manipulation as the equilibrium of a
game between the multiple self of a single individual, in which the later can for-
get information that may damage or threaten his self-confidence. Individuals can,
4Compte and Postlewaite (2004) show that emotional valence and performance are positively corre-
lated. Therefore, any positive beliefs that nourish positive emotions may indirectly act as an instrument
(i.e. help) to increase performance.
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with some probability and possibly at a cost, vary the probability of recalling a
given piece of data (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). Based on Bénabou and Tirole
(2002) self-deception framework, Gottlieb (2014) has shown that after observing
a negative signal, the decision-maker faces a conflict between forgetting the signal
to have a better self-image but make a less appropriate decision, or recalling it
and making a better decision. When there is no ex-post decision to make (hedonic
value), the self-image factor takes over and the decision-maker recalls a negative
(positive, respectively) signal with probability below (above, respectively) the nat-
ural percentage predicted by imperfect memory. When there is an ex-post decision
(instrumental value) and the self-image and decision-making factors have opposite
signs, the amount of memory manipulation depends on the marginal benefit ver-
sus marginal cost from remembering, which both depend in the utility function
on self-image, decision-making and memory costs factors. Very recently, Gödker
et al. (2019) have developed a model in which image-concerns form the basis for
how information is remembered by the decision-maker. After having observed out-
comes of an asset, the investor under-remembers those that are inconsistent with
his positive self-image and over-remember the preferred ones. As a consequence,
the investor weights asymmetrically each outcome and becomes over-optimistic
about the quality of the asset.
Experimental studies confirming or refuting the use of motivated memory as a
self-deceptive mechanism are very limited. In 1992, Thompson and Loewenstein
(1992) were the first in economics to investigate experimentally selective recalls.
They implemented a bargaining game in which subjects in charge of representing
different parties in labor negotiation had to reach an agreement with an opponent.
If they failed, both parties suffered from a costly strike. The authors found that
negotiators showed biased recall of information that favored their own position.
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As far as we are aware of, the only other empirical studies on motivated memory
in economics are Li (2013, 2017), Chew et al. (2018), Carlson et al. (2018), Zim-
mermann (2019) and Gödker et al. (2019).
Chew et al. (2018) show that after a delay of several months, individuals ex-
hibit asymmetric recalls of past performance in an IQ test. Individuals forget more
their incorrect answers than their correct ones (selective amnesia) but also exhibit
false memory encompassing delusion (remembering a positive answer when there
was none) and confabulation (transforming a negative answer into a positive one).
Using a similar IQ test, Zimmermann (2019) also finds evidence for an asymmetry
in the recall of feedback. Precisely, he finds that i) individuals recall negative feed-
back on their relative performance in the IQ test with less accuracy than positive
feedback and ii) individuals who received negative feedback state “I don’t recall”
more frequently than individuals who received positive feedback. Overall, Zimmer-
mann (2019) shows that individuals manage to suppress feedback that threatens
their desire to view themselves as intelligent persons. Li (2017) also tests whether
individuals exhibit biased memory in recalling their performance but using a word-
entry task instead of an IQ test. Forty days after performing the task, participants
are asked to recall their number of mistakes and their performance’s rank. The
design manipulates whether participants forecast their absolute or relative per-
formance, and whether they receive or not feedback. He finds that both having
to forecast performance and receiving feedback eliminate biased recalls. Gödker
et al. (2019) also find experimental evidence of a self-serving memory bias, but in
financial decisions and not on self-relevant feedback. In their experiment, subjects
choose to invest either in a risky asset or a risk-free asset, and observe a series of
investment outcomes. Then, either immediately after or one week after depending
on the treatment, subjects are asked to recall the observed outcomes. Gödker
16
General Introduction
et al. (2019) find that subjects who invested in the risky asset under-remember in-
vestment losses compared to gains, form overly optimistic beliefs about the future
outcomes of the asset and are likely to re-invest in the stock market. In contrast,
subjects who invested in the risk-free asset do not exhibit self-serving memory.
As social animals, the demand for positive self-image is not only related to
intelligence, performance and/or personal successes but also strongly linked to the
desire to appear pro-social, both in one’s own eyes (Ariely et al., 2009; Grossman
and Van Der Weele, 2017) and in the eyes of others (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002;
Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007). While some individuals are genuinely other-
regarding, others act altruistically not because of their very nature but because
they fear to appear selfish to others (DellaVigna et al., 2012). Individuals in-
vest in good deeds to maintain their own view of what kind of person they are,
thereby providing evidence that being pro-social plays an important role in self-
image building (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). However, many situations involve a
trade-off between favoring others at one’s own expense or going first, and people
sometimes engage in actions that harm others. This may contradict their demand
for pro-social image and even be inconsistent with their own preferences (Banaji
and Bhaskar, 2000; Banaji et al., 2004; Chugh et al., 2005; Tenbrunsel et al.,
2010). One way to restore these contradictions or inconsistencies between positive
self-image and past image-threatening actions is through motivated memory. Li
(2013) is the first that studied the existence of memory manipulation in social
encounters. He investigated the recollection of decisions in a trust game after
various delays but found no evidence that trustees recalled their past decisions
asymmetrically depending on whether they reciprocated or betrayed the trustor.
Only trustors exhibited asymmetric recalls, betrayed trustors recalling less accu-
rately their decisions than trustors who benefited from reciprocity. Of contrasting
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evidence, Carlson et al. (2018) found that misremembering in dictator games was
more likely when participants made decisions that fell short of their personal view
of fairness.
This thesis investigates experimentally the existence and strength of memory
distortion in three economically relevant contexts: social preferences, individual
performance and unethical behavior. In each context, it provides a novel body of
evidence showing that individuals do use their memory as a self-deceptive strat-
egy to sustain their desire for motivated beliefs. Second, it explores two different
determinants underlying memory manipulation: hedonic when memory manipula-
tion only makes oneself look better in one’s own eyes, or instrumental when it also
helps to justify future decisions. It provides evidence on the existence on memory
manipulation for both determinants. Each essay presented here concentrates on
the understanding of one determinant of motivated memory in one specific context.
More precisely:
• Chapter 1 investigates whether people retrieve their memory self-servingly in
social encounters. Do individuals forget the consequences of their actions on
others? If so, does it depend on the nature (e.g. selfish or altruistic) of the
action? Our results identify a causal effect of the responsibility of pro-social
decisions on selective recalls. In contrast, there is no clear evidence of biased
memory errors.
• Chapter 2 disentangles between two driving forces that have been proposed
as explanations of memory failures for self-relevant information. Why do
people exhibit asymmetric recalls for negative and positive feedback on their
performance? While the self-enhancing hypothesis claims that people pri-
oritize positive information to enhance their self-image, associative memory
states that people just better remember information that is congruent with
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their mood. We provide a controlled environment where the two theories
predict different outcomes and find that self-enhancing memory takes over
mood-congruent memory in the recall of self-relevant feedback.
Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the case where recalls have a purely hedonic value.
The decision-maker does not make any ex-post decision, and the only reason for
memory manipulation is thus the improvement of his self-view. Chapter 3 explores
the case where recalls also have an instrumental value.
• Chapter 3 investigates the relative role of affect and of strategic reasoning in
motivated memory, with an application in the domain of unethical behav-
ior. Do individuals exhibit motivated memory of past unethical behavior? If
so, is this due to purely hedonic motives and/or strategic reasons? We find
that hedonic considerations are not sufficient to trigger memory manipula-
tion. When forgetting serves as a justification for future decisions, however,
individuals do motivate their memory.
The following sections present each chapter of this thesis and their original contri-
butions to the existing literature.
Chapter 1: Motivated Memory in Dictator Games
Chapter 1 aims at understanding whether and to what extent individuals ma-
nipulate their memory to sustain their demand for pro-social self-image. Like Li
(2013), we aim at identifying motivated memory and investigate the selectivity
of recalls in social interactions. By contrast to Li (2013), i) we investigate both
selective memory (e.g., asymmetric rate of correct recall depending on the desir-
ability of information) and biased memory errors (e.g., overly optimistic recalls),
and ii) we identify a causal effect of personal responsibility on selective memory.
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We designed a laboratory experiment where participants were asked, first, to play
a series of binary dictator games and, second, after completing a filler task, to re-
call the amounts allocated to the receiver. We introduced four treatments in which
we manipulated dictators’ responsibility for the amount allocated to the receiver
(either the dictator chose the amount or the amount was chosen at random by a
computer) and the presence of incentives for correct recalls.
Our results show evidence of selective recalls driven by the responsibility of
actions. First, when dictators are responsible for the amount allocated to the re-
ceivers, their percentage of correct recalls is higher after they chose the altruistic
rather than the selfish option. This is not the case when the receiver’s amount
is selected by the computer. Second, incentivizing correct recalls increases the
dictators’ percentage of correct recalls but only when they chose the altruistic op-
tion and had no effect on accuracy when dictators chose the selfish option. This
suggests that people do not completely forget their past decisions but when given
a monetary incentive to provide a memory effort, they allocate this effort to re-
trieve the memory of desirable rather than undesirable information. Finally, when
dictators are asked to recall not the receiver’s payoff but their own amount, they
are also less likely to remember it after choosing the selfish than the altruistic
option, showing that selective recalls are not driven by a higher attention paid to
the receiver’s amount by other-regarding dictators. Together, these results identify
a causal effect of the responsibility of pro-social decisions on selective recalls and
show that memory errors in social interactions can result from cognitive impair-
ment but also from selective memory.
If our study provides evidence of selective memory, we do not find clear evidence
of biased memory errors. Dictators are more likely to over-estimate than under-
20
General Introduction
estimate the amount allocated to the receiver after choosing the selfish rather than
the altruistic option, but the same asymmetry is found when the amount allocated
to the receiver is randomly selected by the program. Also, the magnitude of dic-
tators’ memory errors is similar regardless of the pro-sociality of decisions and
of whether dictators are responsible or not for the amount allocated. Even if a
majority of individuals probably prefer to think of themselves as generous rather
than egoist, one possible explanation for the absence of biased memory errors is
that the dissonance between making selfish decisions when a pro-social alterna-
tive is available and maintaining a positive self-image may not be strong enough
to generate an internal conflict. Investigating motivated memory in the domain
of morality and ethics, where categorical imperative (Kant, 1785) and injunctive
norms are more salient, could generate a stronger need for biased memory. Also,
in our study individuals could manipulate their memory only for hedonic reasons,
i.e., to make themselves look more generous. Such hedonic considerations, alone,
may not be sufficient to trigger biased memory errors. Instead, introducing in-
strumental reasons, i.e., observing situations in which memory manipulation may
serve to justify future decisions, could help better identify and understand the
emergence of biased memory errors and their role in the input-decision process.
Exploring these two possibilities is the purpose of the third chapter of this thesis.
Chapter 2 continues exploring memory distortions for hedonic reasons, but in the
domain of individual performance rather than in social encounters. It investigates
the mechanisms behind memory manipulation.
Chapter 2: Mood-driven or Goal-driven Memory Biases?
While several studies find evidence of an asymmetry in recall of self-relevant feed-
back (Li, 2017; Chew et al., 2018; Zimmermann, 2019), the reasons underlying
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this asymmetry are still unclear. In the literature, two main explanations of this
recall asymmetry have emerged. On the one hand, motivated memory highlight
self-serving explanations, according to which people recall positive information
to enhance or protect themselves (self-enhancement effect). On the other hand,
theories of associative memory explain asymmetric recall as the result of the en-
hanced accessibility of positive information and the attenuated accessibility of
negative information, when people are in a non-negative mood (mood-congruency
effect). Despite the two principles are not mutually exclusive and most existing
evidence is consistent with both theories, understanding the driving force of the
phenomenon is crucial to predict some suboptimal economic decisions and develop
policies aimed at mitigating or removing over-confident behaviors, whether nec-
essary. Indeed, while self-enhancement models grant large meta-cognitive control
and thereby suggest the importance of correcting ex-ante beliefs on what is helpful
for oneself; mood-congruency models assume an underlying heuristic process with-
out intentionality and thereby suggest that memory biases are simply collateral
effect of good affective states.
Chapter 2 is the first attempt to disentangle these two forces which have been
proposed as explanations of memory failures for self-relevant information. To iden-
tify and disentangle the underlying mechanisms of asymmetric feedback recall,
we set a laboratory experiment where both self-enhancing memory and mood-
congruent memory offer divergent predictions. Based on the design by Zimmer-
mann (2019), subjects have to perform an IQ test and receive incomplete feedback
about their performance relative to their peers. One month later, they come back
to the laboratory and are asked to recall their feedback. Before retrieval, we
intervene or not on their mood, using Andrade et al. (2015)’s procedure. The
laboratory offers a controlled environment where recall accuracy can be carefully
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assessed, and mood exogenously manipulated.
Our results provide support for the existence of self-enhancement memory.
First, individuals exhibit higher percentage of correct recalls when the feedback
was positive than when it was negative. Second, when they do not recall correctly,
individuals exhibit positive memory errors. This means that they overestimate
the number of positive feedback they received. In other words, individuals ex-
hibit overly optimistic recall of past feedback. Together, these results replicate
the findings in Zimmermann (2019). In contrast, we do not find clear evidence
of mood-congruent memory, even though our manipulation proves to be effective
in inducing the desired affective state. Individuals do not exhibit higher percent-
age of correct recalls when the feedback to retrieve is congruent to their mood.
Overall, these results confirm the effect of self-enhancement memory as a driver of
asymmetric recall, but they fail to support any role of mood-congruency.
Our results underline the importance of motivational over affective factors in
the formation of optimistic beliefs about the self. The relative dominance of self-
enhancement offers direct implications for policies aimed at mitigating or removing
biased judgments. Insofar as individuals mostly distort their memory because they
consider negative feedback to be potentially harmful, removing ex-ante aversion
to negative feedback should be the focus of this agenda.
Chapter 3: Motivated Memory of Unethical Decisions
Chapter 3 investigates the relative role of hedonic motives and of strategic rea-
soning in motivated memory, with an application in the domain of ethics. Several
studies in economics have identified different strategies used by individuals to sus-
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tain their value for morality while acting unethically. Individuals avoid knowing
the consequences of their behavior (Feiler, 2014; Grossman and Van Der Weele,
2017), exploit norm-uncertainty about lying behavior to justify their own deci-
sion to lie (Bicchieri et al., 2019), claim that they have changed (Stanley et al.,
2017), shift the blame onto someone else (Bartling and Fischbacher, 2011; Oexl
and Grossman, 2013), balance their moral behavior over time (Ploner and Regner,
2013; Gneezy et al., 2014; Cojoc and Stoian, 2014), or use narratives consisting in,
for example, downplaying the externalities and/or reinterpret the circumstances
of their actions (Bénabou et al., 2018). As far as we are aware of, none of them
has explored memory manipulation as another way to sustain humans’ value for
morality while acting unethically.
Chapter 3 investigates the existence of motivated memory for hedonic and
instrumental values in the context of dishonest decision-making. Our study con-
tributes to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to better understand
moral reasoning when facing an opportunity to misbehave. Despite the vast lit-
erature on unethical behavior that has flourished in the last decade (for surveys,
see Rosenbaum et al., 2014; Irlenbusch and Villeval, 2015; Jacobsen et al., 2018;
Abeler et al., 2019), there is no economic study investigating memory manipu-
lation as a self-management mechanism to sustain moral self-image when acting
dishonestly. Second, it contributes to the recent but growing economic literature
on motivated memory. While existing studies (Li, 2013, 2017; Chew et al., 2018;
Zimmermann, 2019; Carlson et al., 2018) investigate motivated memory driven
by self-image concerns in the domain of intellectual ability or social preferences,
we focus on the memory of dishonest decisions. Moreover, we explore not only
whether individuals forget their past unethical behavior to sustain their desire for
moral self-image, but also whether they manipulate their memory as an excuse not
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to engage in subsequent morally responsible behavior. Thereby, we provide the
first experimental test of the impact of anticipated decisions on memory manipu-
lation. We investigate memory biases not only as a consequence of past unethical
behavior, but also as an instrument to justify future ones.
To study i) whether individuals manipulate the memory of past dishonest
choices, and ii) whether they use their memory as an instrument to justify their fu-
ture decisions, we conducted an on-line experiment where participants first played
a repeated mind game allowing them to misreport their outcomes and, three weeks
later, were incentivized to recall the distribution of their reports in this game. We
varied, across treatments, whether individuals were able to cheat in session one
and whether only hedonic or both hedonic and strategic reasons could motivate
their memory in the second session.
Our results show that when motivated memory only had an hedonic value –i.e.,
making oneself look more honest–, dishonest individuals did not recall their past
decisions less accurately than participants who were not able to cheat. Although
we used a very conservative test, this result suggests that hedonic considerations
are not sufficient to trigger a significant memory manipulation in our setting. By
contrast, when memory manipulation had an instrumental value –i.e., when in-
dividuals were informed, before recalling, that they would have a future decision
to make on whether or not returning undeserved money–, dishonest individuals
recalled their past behavior with less accuracy than when they knew that they
would not have any decision to make. This finding suggests that individuals recall
selectively as a self-excusing strategy to justify anticipated future decisions. It
confirms that memory is involved in the various strategies people use to motivate
their beliefs about themselves and justify they can behave immorally while keeping
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a positive self-view.
***
The three chapters of this thesis use the experimental method to explore the ex-
istence and underlying mechanisms of motivated memory. The benefits from using
laboratory experiments to investigate the behavioral determinants of memory dis-
tortion are numerous. First, it enables to observe the memory of outcomes induced
in the laboratory and thereby allows the experimenter to measure precisely mem-
ory errors. This it not necessarily the case in studies investigating self-reported
or autobiographical memory. Also, observing both the action and the recollection
phases permits not only to identify selective recalls but also to measure the direc-
tion and magnitude of memory errors. Second, laboratory experiments enables to
exogenously manipulate the nature of the information to be recalled and thereby
to test memory retrieval depending on the degree of (un)desirability of informa-
tion. This is of particular importance when exploring memory as a self-deceptive
strategy used by individuals to sustain their desire for motivated beliefs. Finally,
it allows the experimenter to control for the experienced duration between the
encoding and retrieval phases, and thereby to disentangle the effect of time and
the effect of motivation on memory retrieval.
Studying humans’ memory by means of laboratory experiments, however, has
some specific limitations. First, in laboratory experiments it is common knowl-
edge that the experimenter knows the information that participants are asked to
recall. A direct consequence is that participants may face a trade-off between two
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self-image serving strategies when asked to recall past behavior. While forgetting
undesirable past action or behavior may help sustaining or enhancing a positive
self-image, it can also damage it by sending a (negative) signal that one’s mem-
ory is not performing well. The outcome of such a trade-off may depend on the
very nature of the individual. Second, in real life experienced events are rarely
recorded and therefore not verifiable. In such uncontrolled environments, mem-
ory manipulation may arise more freely than in the lab in which the individual
can be confronted with tangible facts and thus experience higher intrinsic costs
of memory manipulation. Also, all economic studies that explored memory in the
laboratory incentivize correct recalls. While this is crucial to investigate the ex-
istence and strength of memory biases, it may provide a conservative measure of
memory manipulation. In real life, monetary incentives can sometimes be aligned
with forgetting or distorting one’s memory. As a provocative example, on can
think of an individual who (on purpose but eventually truly) forgets his wallet
when going to the restaurant. Less anecdotally, exhibiting memory impairment
can lead to alleviated sentences in trial courts (Cima et al., 2002).
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Chapter 1
Motivated Memory in Dictator
Games1
1.1 Introduction
The desire to see oneself in a positive light is a fundamental feature of humans (e.g.,
Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). People like to think of themselves as good persons.
Yet, this demand for positive self-image can be challenged by the fact that most
people sometimes behave in ways that they would like to think they did not. The
discrepancy between what people do and how they would like to see themselves
may create intra-personal conflicts (Conen et al., 1957; Bazerman et al., 1998;
O’Connor et al., 2002). One way to restore consistency between positive self-image
and past image-threatening actions is through motivated memory. Time gives in-
dividuals a wiggle room to forget or distort the memory of actions they would
rather not recall (e.g., Moore, 2016). By forgetting or arranging versions of past
behavior, motivated memory allows individuals to reconcile the present "want"
self with the ex-post "should" self when these two are in conflict (e.g., Bazerman
1This chapter is a joint work with Marie Claire Villeval. It has been published in September 2019
in Games and Economic Behavior.
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et al., 1998; Bénabou and Tirole, 2002).2 Motivated memory can develop through
two channels. Selective recalls correspond to asymmetric probabilities of recalling
desirable vs. undesirable events (Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000; Bénabou and Ti-
role, 2002; Mullainathan, 2002; Bernheim and Thomadsen, 2005; Gottlieb, 2014;
Wilson, 2014) and lead to uncertainty about past self-image threatening actions.
Biased memory errors refer to the direction and magnitude of errors; they corre-
spond to overly optimistic recalls of past behavior.3 Motivated memory can thus
play in various directions, including selective amnesia but also positive delusion or
confabulation. (Chew et al., 2018).
While memory is at the source of any belief formation and updating process,4
little is known about how individuals use it strategically to sustain their demand
for positive self-image, especially in social encounters. Exploring memory biases
is important since they may lead to inaccurate statements about oneself, such as
overconfidence (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2002), with major implications on the
quality of choices. They may also indirectly favor behaviors that are potentially
costly for the society: if individuals are able to forget −at least partially− past
unethical behavior, they do not have to entirely bear its moral costs. Using a lab-
2In psychology, Tenbrunsel et al., 2010 have explored the biased perceptions that people hold of
their own ethicality. They argue that the temporal trichotomy of prediction, action and recollection is
central to these misperceptions: people predict that they will behave more ethically than they actually
do, and when evaluating past (un)ethical behavior, they believe they behaved more ethically than they
actually did.
3Selective memory corresponds to a different likelihood of recalling or not an event depending on the
desirability of this event. Selective memory predicts that the more self-image enhancing is the event, the
higher will be the likelihood of recalling it instead of forgetting it. This can be illustrated by the following
example. An individual often passes by a homeless person on her way home from work. Sometimes she
does not give him money ($0), sometimes she gives a low amount ($1), and sometimes she gives a high
amount ($10), equiprobably. Since she likes to think of herself as a generous person, she may better recall
the times she gave a positive amount than when she gave nothing. If she underestimates the number of
times she gave nothing, she exhibits selective memory. Biased memory is different and refers to the size
and the direction of the memory errors. Keeping the same illustration, given inaccurate recalls, if the
person is more likely to recall having given $5 when she actually gave $1 than to recall having given $8
when she actually gave $10, memory errors are biased. In other words, selective memory expresses the
idea that given that the person recalls the given amounts correctly, the likelihood of recalling the times
she gave $0 is lower than the likelihood of recalling the times she gave either $1 or $10. Biased memory
errors express the idea that when the person does not recall the given amount correctly, the likelihood
of overestimating this amount is higher than the likelihood or underestimating it.
4In particular, memory manipulations may distort the ability to recall events and thus impair prob-
ability assessments (e.g., Hammond et al., 2006).
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oratory experiment, our study aims at understanding whether and to what extent
individuals manipulate their memory to sustain their demand for pro-social self-
image. This relies on two assumptions. First, the demand for positive self-image
is linked to the desire to appear pro-social not only in the eyes of others (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007) but also in one’s own eyes
(Ariely et al., 2009; Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017). Second, people are able
to distort their memory. They can influence the way they encode and recollect
information and, if needed, ex-post revise their recalls.5
Most of the economic literature on this topic is theoretical. Identifying em-
pirically whether individuals use their memory self-servingly is difficult with ob-
servational data. Laboratory experiments enable to observe the memory retrieval
of outcomes induced in the laboratory. Observing both the action and the rec-
ollection phases permits not only to identify selective recalls but also to measure
the direction and magnitude of memory errors. In this respect, the rare economic
experiments on motivated memory differ from most experiments in psychology
that rely on self-reported and/or on autobiographical memory.6 Moreover, using a
controlled environment minimizes the effects of rehearsal and associativeness that
strongly impact the individuals’ ability to store and recollect information.7 This
permits also to control for the time between the action and the recollection phases,
avoiding potential confounds between the effect of time and the effect of motiva-
tion on memory retrieval. A last advantage is the control for individual differences
5Memory revisionism is a process according to which individuals selectively and self-servingly revise
the memory of their past behavior to maintain a coherent self-identity (Epstein, 1973; Greenwald, 1980;
Markus and Wurf, 1987).
6Self-reported or autobiographical memory does not permit to disentangle false memory (when
a person recalls something that actually never happened) from motivated memory (when a person
experiences a differential percentage of recall or awareness in response to desirable or to undesirable
events). In addition, with autobiographical memory the experimenter can hardly check the veracity of
the recalled event, which prevents the study of motivated memory at an individual level.
7Rehearsal corresponds to the fact that the higher frequency to which an event is remembered makes
it easier to remember again. Associativeness corresponds to the fact that the similarity of a past event
to a current event makes this latter event easier to recall (Kahana, 2012).
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in memory capacity that are hardly observable in natural settings.
To investigate whether individuals use their memory as a self-impression man-
agement strategy, we designed an experiment where participants were asked, first,
to play a series of binary dictator games and, second, to recall the amounts allo-
cated to the receiver. By introducing social interactions, we differ from the previ-
ous economic experiments that mainly investigated how people manipulate their
memory about their performance in intelligence tests (Li, 2017; Chew et al., 2018;
Zimmermann, 2019), with the exception of Li (2013) who considered trust games
and the recent study of (Carlson et al., 2018) on sharing decisions. In our exper-
iment, non selective memory would predict similar percentages of correct recalls
and symmetric memory errors for both selfish and altruistic decisions. In contrast,
motivated memory predicts that dictators exhibit a different degree of memory
accuracy about the amounts given to the receivers, depending on whether they
have chosen the option that favors them (the "selfish" option) or the option that
favors the receiver (the "altruistic" option). Our intuition is that the choice of the
altruistic option leads to a higher memory accuracy and to less biased recalls than
the choice of the selfish option because its memory is not self-image threatening.
When they have chosen the selfish option, we conjecture that dictators i) exhibit a
lower memory accuracy (selective recalls), ii) are more likely to over-estimate and
iii) to a larger extent the amount given to the receiver (biased memory errors),
compared to when they have chosen the altruistic option. Indeed, dictators who
value pro-social self-image may suffer from a higher discrepancy between their self-
interested decisions and their desire to see themselves as pro-social when recalling.
Memory manipulations may be used self-servingly to reconcile these two selves.
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Our contribution to the nascent experimental economic literature on memory
is threefold. First, our design allows us to investigate the existence of motivated
memory in social interactions in an economic framework. Dictator games engage
moral behavior (Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2007), a domain susceptible to
motivated memory (Moore, 2016). Moreover, our calibration of the games allows
us to identify whether motivated memory is more susceptible to emerge under
advantageous or disadvantageous payoff inequality between the dictator and the
receiver. Our second contribution is establishing causality between the respon-
sibility of the decisions and motivated memory, by manipulating the dictator’s
responsibility for the receiver’s amount. Contrary to ultimatum or trust games
where the responsibility for the final outcome is shared by two players, in dictator
games one player bears the entire responsibility for both players’ outcomes. This
setting does not enable a dilution of responsibility that may substitute to memory
manipulations. Our third contribution is estimating selective recalls and biased
memory errors (the direction and magnitude of memory manipulation) separately.
While most previous experiments (Li, 2013; Chew et al., 2018) offer binary mea-
sures −forgetting or recalling−, we can measure the extent to which individuals
distort their memory. Also, by manipulating incentives we can, like Zimmermann
(2019), disentangle between forgetting and suppression or selective retrieval of past
decisions: if past decisions are actually forgotten, incentives should not change the
recall accuracy.
In our experiment, participants play 12 binary dictator games. In each game,
the dictator has to choose between a selfish and an altruistic option for sharing an
amount between himself and a receiver. Across games, we vary both the inequality
of payoffs in the two options and whether the dictator or the receiver is in an ad-
vantageous position with both options. Then, after performing a distraction task,
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players are asked to recall the amounts allocated to the receiver. Participants are
not informed of the memory task when playing the dictator games. This design
allows us to investigate whether the percentage of correct recalls, the direction,
and the magnitude of memory errors differ depending on the option chosen by the
dictator.
We introduce four treatments in a between-subjects design. In the Incentive
- Receiver’s Amount treatment (IRA hereafter), dictators are responsible for the
amount allocated to the receiver and correct recalls of the receiver’s amount are
incentivized. We conjecture that motivated memory increases the dictators’ prob-
ability to recall after they chose the altruistic rather than the selfish option. The
Incentive - Receiver’s Amount - Computer treatment (IRAC hereafter) is similar to
IRA except that the option is randomly selected by the computer program. Since
in this treatment the dictator is not responsible for the amount allocated to the re-
ceiver, we conjecture no difference in recalls between selfish and altruistic options.
The No-Incentive - Receiver’s Amount treatment (NIRA hereafter) is similar to
the IRA treatment, except that correct recalls are not incentivized. If individuals
forget past decisions, introducing or removing incentives should not affect the ac-
curacy of recalls; in contrast, if accuracy depends on incentives, it suggests that
people either selectively suppress the past decisions they are not so proud of, or
make a greater effort to retrieve past image-enhancing decisions. Finally, if selfish
dictators make more memory errors, it might be because of motivated memory or
because they paid less attention to the receiver’s amount when making decisions.
We ran an Incentive - Dictator’s Amount treatment (IDA hereafter) that is similar
to the IRA treatment, except that participants have to recall the amount allocated
to the dictator. We conjecture that biased dictators should exhibit a different per-
centage of correct recalls and a different magnitude of memory errors depending
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on their chosen option not only when they have to recall the receiver’s amount,
but also when they have to recall their own amount.
Our results show evidence of selectively accurate vs. inaccurate recalls driven
by the responsibility of actions. First, when dictators are responsible for the
amount allocated to the receivers, their percentage of correct recalls is higher after
they chose the altruistic rather than the selfish option. This is not the case when
the receiver’s amount is selected randomly. Second, incentivizing correct recalls
increases the dictators’ percentage of correct recalls when they chose the altruistic
option but not when they chose the selfish option. This suggests that people do
not forget their past decisions but when given a monetary incentive to provide a
memory effort, they allocate this effort to retrieve the memory of desirable rather
than undesirable information. Finally, in the IDA treatment dictators are also less
likely to remember their own amount after choosing the selfish than the altruistic
option. In contrast, we do not find clear evidence of biased memory errors. Dicta-
tors are more likely to over-estimate than under-estimate the amount allocated to
the receiver after choosing the selfish rather than the altruistic option. However,
the same asymmetry is found when the amount allocated to the receiver is ran-
domly selected by the program. Also, the magnitude of dictators’ memory errors
is similar regardless of the pro-sociality of decisions and of whether dictators are
responsible or not for the amount allocated.
Overall, these findings identify a causal effect of the responsibility of pro-social
decisions on selective recalls but not on biased memory errors. Individuals have a
less accurate memory of past behavior when they have been selfish but they do not
exhibit overly optimistic recalls of their past behavior. These selective recalls in
social interactions are consistent with theoretical and empirical studies establish-
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ing an asymmetric recall of feedback depending on whether people receive good
news or bad news about their relative performance (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Li,
2017; Chew et al., 2018; Zimmermann, 2019). These findings show that memory
errors can result from cognitive impairment but also from motivated biases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedures. Section 4
outlines the behavioral conjectures. Section 5 reports the results and section 6
provides robustness tests. Section 7 discusses these findings and concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Psychologists have intensively investigated the individuals’ tendency to selectively
forget self-threatening information. They have shown that people are more likely
to recall their successes than their failures (Korner, 1950; Mischel et al., 1976),
they have self-serving recollections of their past performance (Crary, 1966), they
exhibit poorer recall of negative vs. positive self-relevant information (Green and
Sedikides, 2004; Sedikides and Green, 2009), and they recall more accurately fa-
vorable than unfavorable feedback (Story, 1998). In the context of social inter-
actions, people sometimes engage in actions that harm others, which contradicts
their demand for pro-social image and may even be inconsistent with their own
preferences (Banaji and Bhaskar, 2000; Banaji et al., 2004; Chugh et al., 2005;
Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). Since people are threatened by information that has un-
desirable implications for their self-image, poor recall of this information may help
think of past behavior under a positive light (Moore, 2016). For example, Stanley
et al. (2017) have shown that recalled actions that involve emotional harm are per-
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ceived as more morally wrong when participants are put in the shoes of the actor
than when put in the shoes of an observer. Also, people have less clear memory of
their own unethical experiences than of their ethical experiences, while they recall
others’ ethical and unethical actions similarly (Kouchaki and Gino, 2016).
While the economic literature modelling cognitive limitations in recalls and
their impact on belief formation and decision-making is substantial (Dow, 1991;
Piccione and Rubinstein, 1997; Mullainathan, 2002; Bénabou and Tirole, 2004;
Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Wilson, 2014; Bor-
dalo et al., 2017), very few papers have investigated the use of memory as a self-
deceptive mechanism. In a model where individuals can vary the probability of
recalling a given piece of data, Bénabou and Tirole (2002) show that individuals
have an incentive to forget signals that undermine long-term goals (for motivational
reasons) or lower self-esteem (for affective reasons). In a multiple-self model, Got-
tlieb (2014) shows that after observing a negative signal, the decision-maker faces
a conflict between forgetting the signal and having a better self-image, or recalling
it and making a better decision. When there is no ex-post decision to make, the
self-image factor takes over and the decision-maker recalls a negative (positive,
respectively) signal with probability below (above, respectively) the actual per-
centage. Our study takes root in these models, focusing on the case where signals
have a purely hedonic or affective value. The decision-maker does not make any
ex-post decision and the only reason for memory manipulation is the improvement
of his self-view.
Economists recognize the role played by memory in the maintenance of self-
image in theoretical models, but they have provided limited empirical evidence.
As far as we are aware of, the only empirical studies on motivated memory in
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economics are Li (2013); Dessi et al. (2016); Li (2017); Chew et al. (2018); Zim-
mermann (2019) and Carlson et al. (2018). Chew et al. (2018) show that after
a delay of several months, individuals exhibit asymmetric recalls of past perfor-
mance in an IQ test. They forget more their incorrect answers than their correct
ones. However, before having to recall whether their answer was correct or not
they were shown the correct answer. Thus, they may distort their recalls but also
deceive themselves to self-signal a higher ability without using their memory, es-
pecially since the time between the action and the recollection was from months to
a year (see, e.g., Mijović-Prelec and Prelec (2010) for a model of self-deception as
self-signalling). In our experiment people do not receive any feedback between the
decision and the recollection phases that both take place within the same session.
Thus, they have a higher chance to recall the amounts given to the receivers, which
should limit direct self-signalling deception. Also, we can explore the magnitude
of memory errors.
Zimmermann (2019) investigates the underlying mechanism of motivated be-
liefs and provides evidence of asymmetry in the recall of feedback on past relative
performance in an IQ test. Different treatments manipulate the incentives for
correct recalls and the time between feedback and the second elicitation of be-
liefs about one’s rank in a group. People adjust their posterior beliefs just after
receiving feedback on their performance, but when these beliefs are elicited one
month later rather than immediately, people who received positive feedback keep
high beliefs whereas those who received negative feedback return to their prior
beliefs. By varying incentives, Zimmermann (2019) find that people manage to
suppress feedback that threatens their desire to view themselves as intelligent per-
sons. Li (2017) also tests whether individuals exhibit biased memory in recalling
their performance but using a word-entry task instead of an IQ test. Forty days
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after performing the task, participants are asked to recall their number of mistakes
and their performance rank. The design manipulates whether they forecast their
absolute or relative performances, and whether they receive or not feedback. Both
having to forecast performance and receiving feedback eliminate biased recalls.
Like these studies, we aim at identifying motivated memory and we investi-
gate the selectivity of recalls. We also manipulate the existence of incentives for
accurate recalls to test for forgetting or suppression of past decisions. In con-
trast to these studies, we manipulate exogenously the dictators’ responsibility of
decisions and therefore we are able to identify a causal effect of decisions on selec-
tive memory. We also focus on the memory of other-impacting decisions and we
explore another side of individuals’ desired self-view: the demand for pro-social
self-image. Motivated memory on pro-sociality has been almost unexplored. An
exception is Li (2013) who investigates the recollection of decisions in a trust game
after various delays.8 Betrayed trustors have a lower recall accuracy, while those
who benefit from kind acts remember perfectly. In contrast, the probability of
trustees to recall their past decisions is the same, regardless of whether they re-
ciprocated or betrayed the trustor. We differ from this study in several respects.
We use dictator games instead of trust games because the dictator bears the full
responsibility of the receiver’s payoff, which we assume has a key role in triggering
selective memory and allows us to identify a causal effect on selective memory.
Also, we do not manipulate the time between decisions and recalls but we explore
both selective recalls and biased memory errors, which highlights the underlying
mechanism of motivated memory. A key point is indeed to investigate not only
whether participants recall or not, but also whether recalls are systematically bi-
ased self-servingly in one direction and whether the magnitude of the bias depends
8Dessi et al. (2016) study the ability to recall information about friendship networks, but not in the
perspective of exploring memory as a self-view management mode.
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on the pro-sociality of the decision. Finally, we have been aware of a recent study
by Carlson et al. (2018) that, like us, investigate motivated memory in dictator
games. The two studies developed independently. The authors found that misre-
membering in dictator games is more likely when participants made decisions that
fall short of their personal view of fairness. By contrast, we focus on the role of
personal responsibility in decision-making on motivated memory and we compare
whether memory errors differ when participants have to recall the amount given
to another person and the amount kept for themselves.
1.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We describe the design of the experiment before detailing the procedures.
1.3.1 Design
Our experiment consists in four parts. In part 1, participants play dictator games.
In part 2, they perform a distraction task used to wipe out the instant memory
of part 1. In part 3, in most treatments they are asked to recall the amount
allocated to the receiver in each game played in part 1. In part 4 we measure the
participants’ general memory capacity. Instructions are included in Appendix 1.
We now describe each part in detail.
Part 1: Dictator Games
In part 1, participants play twelve binary dictator games, as described in Table
1.1. Half of the participants are dictators (players A), the other half are receivers
(players B). Roles are randomly assigned at the beginning of the part and kept
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constant for the twelve games.9 Dictators and receivers are randomly re-matched
after each game. In each game, the dictator has to choose one of two options.
Option X pays Xa to the dictator and Xb to the receiver. Option Y pays Ya to the
dictator and Yb to the receiver. The receiver is passive. At the end of the session,
one game is randomly selected for payment. Participants are not informed that
they will be asked to recall the receiver’s amounts in part 3. To avoid any possible
confound, each game is unique and each receiver’s amount (Xb or Yb) appears only
once. Figure 1.1 illustrates the games. The calibration is inspired by Bruhin et al.
(2018). Each star represents a set of four dictator games in different payoff spaces.
In the top-left payoff space, dictators are always in an advantageous position: their
amount is always higher than the receiver’s amount, regardless of the chosen op-
tion. In the middle payoff space, the position depends on the chosen option. In
option X dictators are in a disadvantageous position while they switch to an ad-
vantageous position in option Y. In the bottom-right payoff space, dictators are
always in a disadvantageous position, regardless of the chosen option. Hereafter,
option X is called the "altruistic" option and option Y the "selfish" option. In the
altruistic option, the dictator’s amount is always lower than in the selfish option.
A crucial aspect of the design is that participants must pay sufficient attention
to the games to encode and to be able to recall the amounts in part 3. To that
aim, we implemented some rules. First, the screens that display the two options
are frozen during five seconds before dictators can enter their decision. Second,
dictators have to type in the dictator’s and the receiver’s amounts in the chosen
option. Then, the option chosen by the dictator remains visible on the receiver’s
9We decided not to play under the veil of ignorance for two reasons. First, deciding under uncertainty
about one’s role could have affected the measurement of other-regarding preferences (Casari and Cason,
2009; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2011). Second, choices under role uncertainty are less image threatening
both before and after role assignment. Before, because the player does not know whether his decision is
going to be implemented and he may thus distantiate himself from the responsibility of outcomes. After,
because once roles have been assigned, the dictator can persuade himself that the others have made the
same selfish choices, which may reduce guilt and the need to bias memory.
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Notes: Each game is represented by a line that connects options X and Y. The slope of the line represents
the cost for the dictator of increasing the receiver’s amount. Each of the three stars represents a set of four
games in different payoff spaces. In the top-left space, dictators are always in an advantageous position.
In the middle space, the position depends on the chosen option. In the bottom-right space, dictators are
always in a disadvantageous position. Example (dashed lines): option X yields 20 ECU to the dictator and
8 ECU to the receiver.
Figure 1.1: The Dictator Games
screen for five seconds. For symmetry receivers have also to type in the same
amounts. Typing the amounts increases the probability to recall these amounts,
as writing down a statement helps memorize it (see, e.g., Naka and Naoi (1995)
and Skinner et al. (1997)).
Part 2: Filler Task
Part 2 introduces a filler task (solving mazes during eight minutes - see Appendix 1)
that requires attention and concentration and which purpose is to distract partici-
pants from the previous task and allow some forgetting. Drawing the participants’
attention away from the previous dictator decisions may open a wiggle room for
memory manipulation. Each maze solved pays e0.25.
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Table 1.1: The Binary Dictator Games
Games Option X Option Y Relative position of
Altruistic Selfish the dictator
1 (2, 32) (10, 30) Disadvantageous
2 (3, 34) (9, 28) Disadvantageous
3 (5, 35) (7, 27) Disadvantageous
4 (6, 36) (6, 26) Disadvantageous
5 (11, 20) (19, 18) Mixed
6 (12, 22) (18, 16) Mixed
7 (14, 23) (16, 15) Mixed
8 (15, 24) (15, 14) Mixed
9 (20, 8) (28, 6) Advantageous
10 (21, 10) (27, 4) Advantageous
11 (23, 11) (25, 3) Advantageous
12 (24, 12) (24, 2) Advantageous
Notes: The first numbers in parentheses display the dictator’s amounts, the sec-
ond numbers the receiver’s amounts. The receiver’s amount is always higher with
option X. The dictator’s amount is always higher (or equal) with option Y.
Part 3: Memory Task
Part 3 introduces the memory task. For each dictator game played in part 1,
participants, regardless of their role, are asked to recall and report the amount
allocated to the receiver in the selected option.10 For each game the screen dis-
plays the two options, but for the option actually chosen by the dictator in part
1, the receiver’s amount is replaced by a question mark. All the amounts to be
recalled are between 2 and 36. However, to give each amount a chance to be over-
and under-estimated, we allowed the recalls to lie in the interval 0 to 38, inclu-
sive. Participants are informed that the amounts to recall are within this range.
This task allows us to measure both selective recalls and biased memory errors.11
10Participants were not informed about the memory task before part 3 because it might have impacted
not only their recall accuracy but also their choice of option. Indeed, if they anticipate negative utility
due to self-image threatening decisions, they may make less selfish choices strategically and thus, they
have no incentives to bias their recalls. In addition, knowing that they will be paid for correct recalls,
they could act strategically by choosing not the option they prefer but the option whose amounts are
easier to recall.
11Note that over-estimating the amount given to the receiver, if any, could be driven by motivated
memory but also possibly by social image concerns vis-a-vis the experimenter. Eliciting recalls a month
later instead of within the same session would help investigate whether memory selectively fades over
time; however, it could also reinforce social image concerns. When recalls are elicited in the same session,
incentives might still be salient and the trade-off between a better social image and a higher payoff might
be pronounced. In contrast, a month later incentives have been received, probably spent, and might
thus appear less salient; thus, the relative importance of social image might increase over time.
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Games are displayed in a random order independent from their order in part 1.
Two recalls are selected randomly. Each correct recall pays two Euros, a correct
recall plus or minus one unit pays one Euro, and otherwise participants neither
earn nor lose anything.
Dictators are asked to recall the amount allocated to the receiver in the selected
option and not the chosen option for three reasons. First, the time span between
the decision and the recollection may be too short to observe forgetting. In Li
(2013), less than 5% of the players forgot their choice when the decision and the
recollection were on the same day. Having to recall the amount left to the other
player is harder and leaves room for forgetting. Second, if a participant does not
recall his decision, he may simply play the game again. If preferences are stable
over time, he should be able to find the option he had chosen without recruiting
any memory effort. Third, asking the receiver’s amount allows us to measure
both the direction and the magnitude of memory errors, if any, and not only the
existence of selective recalls.12
Part 4: Elicitation of Memory Capacity
The capacity to memorize may be heterogeneous across individuals. Thus, in the
last part we elicit participants’ memory capacity in an individual environment. To
avoid any confound with the memory task in part 3, the new task does not involve
numbers but tests verbal memory. It is adapted from one of the three paradigms
used to study memory performance (Bordalo et al., 2017): the free recall test (see
e.g., Murdock Jr (1962); Tulving et al. (1972)). This part is made of three rounds.
12Our memory task is cognitively demanding. We could have used instead a standard one-shot
dictator game and increased the time span between decisions and recalls. However, in Li (2013) even
after 43 days, more that 85% of the participants recalled their choice in a trust game. Using a repeated
game increases the space for forgetting. Moreover, at the time of recollection, participants could have
played the game another time instead of trying to remember their decision. Thus, any difference between
recalls and decisions could be attributed to motivated memory but also to a variation of preferences over
time.
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In each round, participants have to read and memorize a sequence of 15 random
words. Each word is displayed one by one on the screen for two seconds. Then,
participants are asked to recall as many words as possible. They receive no feed-
back on their performance until the end of the session. They are paid according
to their performance in a round selected at the end of the session. Each correct
recall pays e0.25. Finally, participants have to fill out a standard demographic
questionnaire.
We acknowledge that this measure is imperfect since it tests verbal memory
whereas our main task is about memorizing numbers, and it was administered at
the end of the experiment when subjects were possibly tired. But administering
the test at the beginning of the session could have primed the subjects about the
nature of the main task. Despite its limitations, this measure remains informative
since psychologists have shown that verbal empan (the highest number of words
that an individual is able to recall) and digit empan (the highest number of digits
that an individual is able to recall) are significantly correlated within individuals
(Hilton, 2006).
Treatments
Our four between-subjects treatments are summarized in Table 1.2. The Incentive
- Receiver’s Amount treatment (IRA) is the baseline. Dictators choose the amount
allocated to the receiver, have to recall this amount, and are paid for accurate re-
calls. The Incentive - Receiver’s Amount - Computer treatment (IRAC) is similar
to IRA, except that the option in the dictator games is always selected randomly
by the computer program instead of being chosen by the dictator. Dictators in
this treatment bear no responsibility for the receiver’s outcome. The comparison
between the IRA and IRAC treatments indicates whether the responsibility for
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decisions triggers motivated memory, if any.
The No-Incentive - Receiver’s Amount treatment (NIRA) is similar to IRA,
except that recalls are not incentivized. The comparison between the NIRA and
IRA treatments allows us to test whether individuals erase definitely some decisions
from their memory, or whether they either suppress or retrieve them selectively.
We expect that recalls are less selective and biased when manipulation is costly.
If individuals actually forget, incentives should not affect the accuracy of recalls
regardless of the option (see Zimmermann, 2019). If selfish choices are recalled
less when incentives are absent rather than present, this indicates that individuals
suppressed them; if altruistic choices are recalled more when incentives are present
than when they are absent, this indicates that individuals allocate their memory
effort selectively.
Finally, in the Incentive - Dictator’s Amount treatment (IDA) participants have
to recall the amount allocated to the dictator instead of the amount allocated to
the receiver. Recalls are incentivized like in IRA and IRAC. This treatment should
control for the fact that social preferences may condition the attention paid to the
receiver’s amount, and thus the memory of it. If any difference in memory accuracy
across the chosen options in IRA is driven by differential attention, the percentage
of correct recalls should not differ between the selfish and the altruistic options
when dictators have to recall their own amount. If memory accuracy depends on
self-image concerns, the difference in accuracy between the recalls of selfish vs.
altruistic decisions should be similar in this treatment and in IRA.
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Table 1.2: Summary of Treatments
Treatment IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
Active dictator Yes No Yes Yes
Incentives for accurate recalls Yes Yes No Yes
Recall of the receiver’s amount Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: IRA: Incentives - Receiver’s Amount. IRAC: Incentives - Receiver’s
Amount - Computer. NIRA: No-Incentives - Receiver’s Amount. IDA: In-
centives - Dictator’s Amount.
1.3.2 Procedures
The experiment was programmed using Java language. It was conducted at GATE-
Lab, Lyon, France. A total of 620 participants were recruited from our subject-
pool, mainly from local engineering and business schools, using hroot (Bock et al.,
2014). 158 participated in the IRA treatment, 154 in the IRAC treatment, 146 in
the NIRA treatment and 162 in the IDA treatment. Table A2.2 in Appendix 2
summarizes the participants’ characteristics in each treatment.
Upon arrival, each participant was randomly allocated to a terminal. Instruc-
tions for each part were self-contained and displayed on the participants’ screen
at the end of the previous part. No feedback on performance or earnings was pro-
vided until after all parts were completed. The use of paper, pen or mobile phone
was prohibited. Sessions lasted on average 55 mins. At the end of the session,
participants were paid individually in cash in a separate room. They earned on
average 15.01 Euros (S.D. 2.79), including a 5-Euro show-up fee.
1.4 Behavioral Conjectures
The following section formulates four behavioral conjectures regarding the asym-
metry of dictators’ recalls conditional on the selected option (selective recalls), the
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direction and the magnitude of memory errors (biased memory errors).
At the time of the decision, dictators may prefer the option that maximizes
their own payoff. But at the time of the recollection, they may prefer to recall
that the chosen option was more generous to the receiver than it was actually.13
When dictators have chosen the altruistic option, recalling correctly how much
they gave to the receiver has no undesirable implications in terms of self-image.
In contrast, when dictators have chosen the selfish option, recalling accurately the
amount given to the receiver may conflict with the desire to see themselves as pro-
social. In this case, dictators have some motivation to exhibit poorer recall of the
amount actually allocated to the receiver. This is consistent with Benabou and Ti-
role (2002) where individuals are motivated to forget signals that undermine their
long-term goals (motivational reason) or lower their self-esteem (affective reason).
Here, motivated memory can only respond to affective reasons when the individual
sends a signal to himself about his nature when he chose his options in the dictator
games.
In contrast to IRA, in IRAC the receiver’s amount is selected randomly by the
program. Since the dictator is not responsible for the amount allocated to the
receiver, the selection of the selfish option is not self-image threatening. We con-
jecture that the responsibility for the receiver’s amount in IRA leads to selective
recalls, i.e. a difference in the probability of an accurate recall after the choice of
the selfish option vs. the altruistic option. In contrast, we do not expect any differ-
ence in this probability when the option has been selected by the program in IRAC.
13Tenbrunsel et al. (2010) use the "want/should" framework to explain the bounded ethicality that
arises from temporal inconsistencies. They posit that the "should" self, −characterized by intentions and
beliefs on how one ought to behave−, dominates during the prediction and recollection phases, whereas
the "want" self, −characterized by a relative disregard for ethical considerations−, dominates during the
action phase.
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We state our first conjecture as follows:
Conjecture 1 (Selective Recalls) Because people prefer receiving good rather
than bad signals about their own nature, the percentage of accurate recalls is higher
when the dictators chose the altruistic option than when they chose the selfish
option, whereas these percentages are the same when dictators bear no responsibility
in the choice of option.
If individuals actually forget their past decisions, the accuracy of recalls should
not vary according to the presence (IRA) or absence (NIRA) of monetary incen-
tives. If they do not forget, monetary incentives are expected to increase the
accuracy of recalls. There may be two effects. First, incentives may increase the
individuals’ effort to retrieve the memory of decisions that give them a positive
self-image more than the memory of those that threaten their self-image. As a
result, introducing incentives should increase the accuracy of recalls when the al-
truistic option has been chosen. Second, incentives may discourage people from
suppressing the memory of decisions they are not so proud of because of the op-
portunity cost for not being accurate. Indeed, as modeled in Bénabou and Tirole
(2002), incentives introduce a trade-off between the affective benefits from biasing
beliefs in a self-serving way and the monetary incentives for accurate beliefs: on
the one hand, a correct recall increases payoff but may threaten self-image, on the
other hand, forgetting satisfies the demand for positive self-image but leads to give
up the bonus for correct recalls. As a result, introducing incentives may increase
the accuracy of recalls when the selfish option has been chosen.
This leads to our second conjecture about selective recalls:
Conjecture 2 (Incentives and Selective Recalls) The percentage of dictators’
correct recalls is higher when correct recalls are incentivized than when they are not
incentivized, regardless of the option.
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The following two conjectures are related to biased memory errors. Psychol-
ogists have shown that individuals not only tend to forget self-image threatening
information but also sometimes arrange past events or even create false memo-
ries (Gonsalves and Paller, 2002; Gonsalves et al., 2004; Chrobak and Zaragoza,
2008). Biasing one’s memory self-servingly allows individuals to reconcile their
actual action with the action they, ex-post, would have preferred to think they
made. Our design allows us to investigate not only whether participants recall
correctly the amounts allocated to the receivers, but also the direction and the
magnitude of memory errors. When participants do not recall the exact amount,
they can either over-estimate or under-estimate it, and to a greater or a lesser
extent. The difference between the recalled and the actual amounts across deci-
sions allows us to disentangle simple errors from biased memory errors. Simple
errors should give similar percentages of over- and under-estimation and a similar
magnitude of memory errors across options and across treatments. In contrast, if
dictators manipulate their memory to appear pro-social to themselves, they are
expected to over-estimate more often the receiver’s amount when they chose the
selfish option than when they chose the altruistic option, and to a larger extent.
This leads to our third and fourth conjectures:
Conjecture 3 (Direction of Memory Errors) The percentage of over-estimated
recalls is higher when dictators chose the selfish option than when they chose the al-
truistic option, while no difference is expected when dictators bear no responsibility
in the choice of option.
Conjecture 4 (Magnitude of Memory Errors) Dictators’ recalls over-estimate
the amount given to the receiver to a larger extent when they preferred the selfish
option to the altruistic option, while no difference is expected when dictators bear
no responsibility in the choice of option.
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1.5 Results
We present four results that correspond to the four conjectures. The first result
analyzes the impact of dictators’ responsibility on selective recalls. The second re-
sult presents the impact of monetary incentives on selective recalls. Results three
and four investigate biased memory errors by exploring the direction and the mag-
nitude of these errors, respectively. In this analysis, a recall is defined as correct
if the recalled amount is equal to the actual amount plus or minus one unit.14,15
When a recall is incorrect, a memory error is defined as the difference between the
recalled amount and the amount actually transferred by the dictator.
We introduce our first result:
Result 1 (Selective Recalls) The percentage of dictators’ correct recalls is
higher when they chose the altruistic option than when they chose the selfish op-
tion; this is not the case when dictators bear no responsibility in the choice of
option.
To support Result 1, we provide three types of analyses. Two of the three
analyses support Conjecture 1.
Support for Result 1: We start with the most conservative non-parametric
tests. Figure 1.2 displays the average percentage of dictator’s correct recalls in
14We replicated our analysis using both a stricter definition (a recall is defined as correct if it matches
exactly the actual amount) and a less strict definition (it is defined as correct if it deviates from the actual
amount by up to two units). All specifications qualitatively confirm the main results (see Appendix 4).
15We restrict our analysis to the dictators’ recalls although we also elicited the receivers’ recalls
of dictators’ choices. Comparing dictators’ and receivers’ recalls cannot provide a clean identification
of dictators’ motivated memory because receivers may also motivate their memory, albeit for different
reasons. For example, they may remember better the altruistic decisions because they may want to
believe that they are surrounded by altruistic people, because they made them happier, or because they
try to experience the positive anticipated utility from expected higher future payoffs. Interested readers
can find an analysis of the receivers’ recalls in Appendix 5.
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Notes: The Figure displays the percentages of dictators’ correct recalls de-
pending on the option (altruistic or selfish) chosen by the dictator in IRA or
by the program in IRAC. p-values are from Mann-Whitney tests.
Figure 1.2: Average Percentage of Dictator’s Correct Recalls in IRA and IRAC
the IRA and IRAC treatments, by option, and Table 1.3 summarizes descriptive
statistics on recalls (the raw individual decisions and recalls are displayed in Figure
A3.5 in Appendix 3).16 In IRA, dictators recall accurately the amount allocated
to the receiver 31.96% of the time when they have chosen the altruistic option and
22.98% of the time when they have chosen the selfish option. These percentages
go in the direction of Conjecture 1; however, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (W
test, hereafter) with one observation per subject per type of decision, shows that
the difference is not significant (p=0.517).17 In the IRAC treatment in which the
option is selected by the program, dictators recall accurately the amount allocated
to the receiver 16.31% of the time when the altruistic option has been selected,
and 18.79% of the time when the selfish option has been selected. This difference
16Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 presents the relative frequency of the selfish choice in each game, by
treatment. This frequency is 69.30% in IRA, 53.57% in IRAC, 69.75% in NIRA, and 67.70% in IDA and
it varies across games, which gives opportunities for memory manipulation. Table A2.3 in Appendix 2
summarizes statistics on behavior in the four parts of the experiment and in the final questionnaire, by
treatment.
17In all non-parametric tests reported in this paper, the average recall of each individual gives one
independent observation, and all tests are two-sided.
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is marginally significant (p=0.088) and goes in the opposite direction of what is
observed in IRA. Comparing IRA and IRAC reveals that the percentage of correct
recalls for the altruistic option is significantly higher in IRA (Mann-Whitney tests
−M-W hereafter−, p<0.001); this is also the case for the selfish option but to a
much lower extent (p=0.097).
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics - Dictators’ Recalls
IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentage of correct recalls, by chosen option
Alt. option 31.96% (291) 16.31%***(429) 25.28%** (265) 42.36%* (314)
Self. option 22.98% (657) 18.79%* (495) 24.06% (611) 28.27% (658)
p-values 0.517 0.088 0.320 0.010
Percentage of over-estimated recalls, by chosen option
Alt. option 31.82% (198) 23.96% (359) 30.30% (198) 52.49%*** (181)
Self. option 54.74% (506) 62.44%*** (402) 54.96% (464) 38.98%*** (472)
p-values <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Magnitude of absolute memory errors, by chosen option
Alt. option 5.06 (291) 7.27*** (429) 6.08 (265) 3.10*** (314)
Self. option 5.75 (657) 7.02*** (495) 5.58 (611) 4.11*** (658)
p-values 0.665 0.566 0.355 0.035
Notes: In the non-parametric tests, each individual gives one independent observation. Numbers in
parentheses indicate the number of individual observations. The p-values in lines compare recalls
when the altruistic vs. selfish options have been chosen, using W tests. The stars in columns come
from pairwise treatment comparisons with IRA taken as the reference category, using M-W tests.
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Our second test of Conjecture 1 examines whether the accuracy of recalls varies
across various types of dictators. In each treatment, we split the sample of dic-
tators based on the median frequency of selfish choices.18,19 In IRA, the more
selfish dictators (those who chose the selfish option in more than eight games,
N=41) exhibit a lower average percentage of correct recalls (21.34%) than the less
18In IRA, the median frequency of selfish choices is 8. It is 6 in IRAC since the options were selected
at random.
19The design of the 12 games allows us to identify more than two types of dictators, i.e., spiteful,
altruistic, inequality averse individuals and social welfare maximizers. However, we did not use these
categories in our analysis of motivated memory for several reasons. In particular, there are no obvious
mechanisms that would justify conjectures on dictators’ recalls depending on their type. For example,
between social-welfare maximizers and inequality-averse individuals, it is not clear who should be more
susceptible to exhibit motivated memory. Moreover, such a classification requires that players exhibit a
consistent pattern of decisions across the 12 games, which is not systematically observed.
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selfish dictators (N=38; 30.48%). The difference is highly significant (M-W test,
p=0.006). This is not the case when dictators are not responsible for the amounts
allocated to the receivers. Indeed, in IRAC the percentage of correct recalls is
17.34% for dictators with a number of selfish choices above or equal to six (N=37)
and 17.92% for those with a number of selfish choices below six (N=40). These
percentages are not significantly different (M-W, p=0.810). This analysis sup-
ports Result 1: dictators exhibit selective recalls when they are responsible for the
amount given to the receivers. The difference in recall accuracy between the more
selfish and the less selfish active dictators cannot be explained by differences in
memory capacity. Indeed, more selfish dictators (N=41) do not differ from less
selfish ones (N=38) in terms of memory capacity in the verbal memory task. On
average more selfish dictators remember 24.66 words correctly out of 45 and less
selfish dictators remember 25.29 words correctly (M-W test, p=0.640).
Our third test of Conjecture 1 is based on a regression analysis that controls
for the characteristics of the games and of the individuals. Table 1.4 reports the
marginal effects from Logit regressions in which the dependent variable is equal
to one if the recall is correct and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered at the individual level. In model (1) the independent variables include the
four treatments (with IRA as the reference category) and the option chosen by
the dictator (selfish vs. altruistic) in order to test the presence of selective recalls.
They also include the three sets of games indicating whether the dictator was in
an advantageous or a disadvantageous position regardless of his choice, or in a
mixed situation depending on his choice (with the advantageous category taken as
the reference). This allows us to test whether the demand for motivated memory
is lower when the dictator is always in a disadvantageous position in a game be-
cause it might be easier to justify a selfish choice in this setting. The independent
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variables also include the time spent to enter the recall and the game orders in
part 1 (dictator games) and in part 3 (recalls) because they may impact memory
accuracy, as attention may have decreased over time. Finally, we control for the
performance of the participant in the verbal memory task performed in part 4
and for various demographic variables (age, male and educational attainment, as
measured by the number of years of study after high school). Models (2) to (5)
replicate model (1) for each treatment separately.
Table 1.4 supports Result 1 on the existence of selective recalls. Having to
recall the amount given to the receiver when the selfish option has been chosen
in IRA decreases significantly (at the 5% level) the likelihood of a correct recall
(model (2)).20 This is not the case in IRAC: there is no difference in the likelihood
of recalling accurately when the program has selected the selfish or the altruistic
option (model (3)). The relative position of the dictators in the game does not af-
fect memory, as the various sets of games have no significant effect. This confirms
descriptive statistics: the average percentage of correct recalls is 26.61% when
dictators are in a disadvantageous position, 25.24% when they are in a mixed po-
sition, and 23.95% when they are in a disadvantageous position, with no significant
differences in pairwise comparisons (W tests, p>0.010). The conclusion remains if
the analysis is restricted to the cases in which dictators select the selfish option:
when in an advantageous position, they do not exhibit less memory accuracy than
in any other position (see Table A2.4 in Appendix 2). This may result from the
fact that the games were presented in random order, which probably makes the
identification of the three categories of games impossible.
20Throughout the analysis, we define an option as "selfish" when it maximizes the payoff of the
decision-maker. We acknowledge that in some games, choosing the "selfish" option is consistent with
other types of preferences. For example, a subject who chooses the selfish option in games 1, 5 and 9
may be maximizing social welfare. We confirm that our results are robust to the exclusion of these games
in regressions similar to those presented in Table 1.4. These regressions are available upon request.
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Table 1.4: Determinants of Dictators’ Correct Recalls
Dependent variable Dictator’s Correct Recall
All IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IRA treatment Ref. -
IRAC treatment -0.099*** -
(0.023)
NIRA treatment -0.015 -
(0.026)
IDA treatment 0.073*** -
(0.025)
Selfish option -0.057*** -0.083** 0.025 -0.014 -0.146***
(0.017) (0.034) (0.025) (0.034) (0.035)
Dict. in disadv. position Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
- - - - -
Dict. in mixed position -0.007 0.017 -0.039 0.009 -0.016
(0.017) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Dict. in adv. position -0.028 0.014 -0.025 -0.035 -0.077*
(0.018) (0.034) (0.029) (0.044) (0.039)
Performance verbal memory 0.004** 0.0001 0.005** 0.002 0.006**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Time to recall -0.003*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Game order, part 1 0.002 0.006 0.002 -0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Game order, part 3 -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Age -0.00004 -0.005** 0.010 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005)
Male 0.025 0.052 0.029 -0.048 0.061*
(0.017) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034)
Educational attainment 0.007 -0.009 -0.006 0.010 0.021**
(0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
N 3720 948 924 876 972
Clusters 310 79 77 73 81
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.026 0.016 0.011 0.035
Log pseudolikelihood -2050.25 -526.65 -423.81 -481.70 -593.62
Wald chi2 93.01 33.73 15.67 9.80 41.26
prob > Chi2 <0.0001 0.0002 0.1096 0.4584 <0.0001
Notes: The Table reports marginal effects from Logit regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
These models provide additional insights for our understanding of memory
mechanisms. First, the participants’ performance in the verbal memory task is
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positively correlated with the likelihood of making a correct recall in part 3 (model
(1)). This confirms the significant correlation between the percentage of correct
recalls of the dictators in the dictator games and their performance in the verbal
memory task (pairwise Pearson’s correlation coefficient = 0.12, p=0.039, N=310).
This effect is, however, mainly driven by the IRAC treatment (model (3)), whereas
it is not observed in IRA and NIRA (models (2) and (4), respectively). In IRAC,
the Pearson coefficient between the average number of correct recalls and the per-
formance at the verbal memory task is equal to 0.21 (p=0.073). In the other
treatments, it is not significant (p=0.515, p=0.246 and p=0.220 for IRA, NIRA
and IDA). This gives a valuable indication that individuals actually did a memory
effort to recall the amounts, but less so when they had to remember the conse-
quences of their choices on the receiver. Second, Table 1.4 shows that spending
more time to recall a given amount is negatively correlated with the likelihood of
a correct recall. The extra time spent to recall does not increase accuracy. Finally,
the probability of a correct recall is negatively correlated with the order in which
participants had to recall this amount (p<0.001). This may be due to tiredness or
weariness.
Are dictators conscious of their selective recalls? At the end of the experi-
ment participants had to report their belief about the accuracy of their recalls
on a 10-point scale, with 0 if they believe that they had no correct recall and 10
if they believe that all their recalls were correct. Pooling all the treatments, the
correlation between the percentage of correct recalls and the belief about memory
accuracy is highly significant (correlation coefficient=0.17, p=0.002), indicating a
good perception of performance in the recall task. This correlation is highly signif-
icant for the less selfish dictators (correlation coefficient=0.21, p=0.005) but not
for the more selfish ones (0.11, p=0.205). Moreover, there are differences across
56
Chapter 1. Motivated Memory in Dictator Games
treatments. The correlation is stronger when dictators are responsible for the re-
ceiver’s amount (IRA, p=0.021) than when they are passive (IRAC, p=0.092). An
interpretation is that in IRAC participants provided a lower memory effort and
were thus more uncertain of their performance.21
We now introduce our second result:
Result 2 (Incentives and Selective Recalls) Incentivizing recalls increases
the percentage of dictators’ correct recalls only when they chose the altruistic op-
tion.
31.96%
25.28%
 p = 0.039
0
10
20
30
40
Incentivized recalls Non-incentivized recalls
Altruistic option
22.98% 24.06%
 p = 0.987
0
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20
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40
Incentivized recalls Non-incentivized recalls
Selfish option
Notes: The Figure displays the mean percentages of dictators’ correct recalls
depending on the option chosen by the dictators (altruistic in the left panel,
selfish in the right panel) in the IRA (incentivized recalls) and the NIRA
treatments (non-incentivized recalls). p-values are from M-W tests.
Figure 1.3: Average Percentage of Correct Recalls in IRA and NIRA, by Option
21This interpretation is supported by an additional questionnaire on the intensity of memory effort
reported on a 10-point scale. On average, the self-reported memory effort is 7.02 in IRA and 5.84 in
IRAC (M-W, p<0.001). Table A2.3 in Appendix 2 displays the average reported beliefs on memory
accuracy and the average reported memory effort across treatments.
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Result 2 supports only partially Conjecture 2.
Support for Result 2: Each dictator was asked to recall 12 amounts, which
gives 3720 (310*12) recalls in total for all treatments. 25.27% of these recalls
are correct. The percentage of dictators’ correct recalls is 24.43% in NIRA and
25.74% in IRA. These percentages are not significantly different (M-W, p=0.583).
The picture changes when we consider the selected options separately. Figure 1.3
displays the average percentages of dictators’ correct recalls in IRA and NIRA,
depending on the selected option. When dictators chose the altruistic option the
percentages of correct recalls is significantly higher in IRA (31.96%) than in NIRA
(25.28%, M-W test, p=0.039). This is not the case when they chose the selfish
option (22.98% in NIRA and 24.06% in IRA; M-W test, p=0.987). This finding
shows that since dictators somewhat react to incentives, they have not completely
forgotten their decisions. With incentives, dictators do not remember more their
choices when they were selfish but they remember them more when these choices
were altruistic. We take this as evidence that with incentives dictators provide
a higher effort to recall, but they allocate this effort to retrieve selectively the
memory of desirable rather than undesirable decisions.
We now turn to biased memory errors and introduce our third result:
Result 3 (Direction of Memory Errors) Dictators are significantly more
likely to over-estimate their recalls when they chose the selfish option than when
chose the altruistic option. This is also the case when they bear no responsibility
in the choice of option.
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Result 3 does not support Conjecture 3.
Support for Result 3: If dictators bias their memory self-servingly for self-image
reasons, they should more frequently over- than under-estimate the amount given
to the receiver when they make memory errors. In IRA, when dictators make an er-
ror they over-estimate the receiver’s amount 48.30% of the time, regardless of their
actual choices. This percentage is not significantly different from 50% (one-sample
test of proportion, p=0.366). Conditioning the percentage of over-estimated recalls
on decisions reveals interesting differences. On average, when they make an error
dictators over-estimate the receiver’s amount 31.82% of the time when they chose
the altruistic option and 54.74% of the time when they chose the selfish option.
The difference is significant (W test, p<0.001). However, these percentages are
similar in IRAC: dictators over-estimate the receiver’s amount 23.96% of the time
when the program selected the altruistic option and 62.44% of the time when it
selected the selfish option. The difference is also significant (W test, p<0.001) and
it can hardly be motivated by the willingness to bias recalls for self-image reasons
since it is common knowledge that dictators are passive.
Table A2.5 in Appendix 2 reports the marginal effects from Logit regressions
in which the dependent variable is the likelihood of observing an over-estimated
recall rather than an under-estimated recall, conditional on making an incorrect
recall.22 Model (1) pools all the treatments together while models (2) to (5) con-
sider each treatment separately. The independent variables are the same as in
Table 1.4. Robust standards errors are clustered at the individual level. Model
22We also considered two-step Heckman models, estimating first the likelihood of making an incorrect
recall and then, the likelihood of over-estimating the amount given to the receiver, conditional on making
a memory error. We used probit models to estimate both the selection and the outcome equations. Since
the Inverse of the Mill’s Ratio was significant in no model, showing that we do not need to correct for a
possible selection bias, and since the results on the main variables were not affected, we omit reporting
these regressions.
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(1) confirms that the probability to over-estimate rather than under-estimate the
receiver’s amount is significantly higher when the selfish option has been selected
(p<0.001). However, this is independent from the responsibility of the action itself
since this is found not only in IRA (model (2)) but also in IRAC (model (3)). Had
the dictators motivated their memory to appear more pro-social to themselves, the
difference in the percentage of over-estimated recalls between the selfish and the
altruistic options should have been higher in IRA than in IRAC. These findings
suggest that the difference between the percentages of over-estimated amounts in
the altruistic and selfish options in both treatments results more from the structure
of the games (i.e., lower amounts are structurally more likely to be over-estimated)
than from behavioral determinants.23
We introduce our last result about biased memory errors based on the analysis
of the magnitude of these errors, defined by their absolute value:
Result 4 (Magnitude of Memory Errors) The magnitude of over-estimated
recalls is not significantly different between altruistic and selfish choices. This is
observed regardless of the dictator’s responsibility for the receiver’s amount.
Result 4 rejects Conjecture 4.
Support for Result 4: Table 1.3 displays the average absolute value of memory
errors across options, conditional on making an error.24 In IRA, the average mag-
nitude of dictators’ memory errors is 5.06 when they chose the altruistic option
23Incidentally, the fact that in IRAC dictators are also more likely to over-estimate the receiver’s
amount when the program has selected the selfish option indicates that selective recalls are not driven by
a concern for social-image independent from memory biases. This over-estimation cannot be explained
by the willingness to appear more generous in the experimenter’s eyes since in IRAC it is common
knowledge that the receivers’ amounts are randomly selected by the program without any intervention
of the dictators.
24Considering the average memory error in non-absolute instead of absolute values does not qualita-
tively change the results.
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and 5.75 when they chose the selfish one. The difference is not significant (W test,
p=0.665). In IRAC, the average magnitude of memory errors is 7.27 and 7.02,
respectively, and the difference is not significant either (W test, p=0.566). Further
support is provided by Table A2.6 in Appendix 2 that reports the marginal effects
from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the absolute value of the
magnitude of memory errors, conditional on making an error. The independent
variables are the same as in the previous regression Tables. Tobit models are justi-
fied since data are censored on the left. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. With the exception of model (4) for NIRA, models (1) to (5) show
that having to recall the outcome of the selfish option has no significant impact on
the magnitude of memory errors compared to when the altruistic option has been
selected. Thus, when they do not recall the amount given to the receiver, dictators
do not inflate their recalls self-servingly. Model (1) also indicates that the mag-
nitude of memory errors is significantly higher when the set of available options
puts the dictator in a disadvantageous position, and that a higher performance at
the verbal memory task decreases the magnitude of memory errors.
1.6 Robustness Tests
This section presents three checks. We first examine whether memory errors differ
from pure noise. Then, we test whether selective recalls are driven by a higher
attention paid to the receiver’s amount by other-regarding dictators. We finally
investigate the role of guilt.
1.6.1 Memory Errors or Noise?
The recollection task was hard for the players because of the number of values
to recall (12). Could the higher (lower, respectively) probability to over-estimate
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the receivers’ outcome when the selfish (altruistic, resp.) option has been chosen
derive from the fact that dictators simply recall the average outcome of the two
options? To investigate whether recalls differ from pure noise, we simulated three
distributions of recalls and tested whether our results differ from these simulated
distributions. The first two simulated sets of recalls follow a normal distribution
centered at 18 (the mean actual receiver’s amount) with a standard deviation
of 4 or 2 (to simulate players that almost always reported the average receiver’s
amount). The third simulated set follows a uniform distribution over the range of
possible recalls from 0 to 38.
This exercise reported in Table A2.7 in Appendix 2 shows that the percentage of
correct recalls is significantly higher in the experimental data than in any simulated
distribution (W tests, p<0.001). Thus, participants used their memory actively.
A test of normality shows that participants did not simply report the average
receiver’s amount (skewness/kurtosis test for normality, p<0.001). Moreover, the
magnitude of memory errors is significantly lower in the experimental data than
in any simulated distribution (W tests, p<0.001). In contrast, the probability to
over-estimate the receiver’s amount is not significantly different between actual
and simulated data (except in the second simulation). Thus, Result 3 would have
been obtained for normal or uniform distributions of recalls, confirming that the
difference between the probability to over-estimate a selfish vs. an altruistic option
does not result from motivated memory, but probably from the structure of the
amounts themselves.
1.6.2 Memory and Attention
In the treatments in which players had to recall the receiver’s amounts, the higher
percentage of dictators’ correct recalls when they chose the altruistic option could
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be explained not only by motivated memory but also by a higher attention paid to
the receiver’s amount. In contrast, when they made their decisions selfish dictators
may have simply compared their own amount in the two options and ignored the
receiver’s amounts, leading to more memory errors. Analyzing behavior in the
IDA treatment where players have to recall the amount kept by the dictator is
informative because both other-regarding and selfish dictators are likely to have
paid attention to their own amount. If the difference in recalls observed in the
main treatment is driven by differential attention, we should observe no difference
in recalls in IDA. In fact, in IDA also the percentage of correct recalls differs
significantly between the altruistic and the selfish options (42.36% and 28.27%,
respectively; W test, p=0.010, see Table 1.3). It would not be the case if recalls
were only driven by differing attention according to the chosen option. Moreover,
model (5) in Table 1.4 shows that having to recall the choice of the selfish option
decreases significantly (at the 1% level) the likelihood of a correct recall of one’s
amount by the dictators. These findings support the interpretation of behavior in
terms of motivated memory rather than in terms of differences in attention in our
main treatments.
1.6.3 Memory and Guilt
Impression management may depend not only on the chosen option but also on
the very nature of the individual. A selfish dictator who accepts his egotist nature
may feel no need to recall selectively. Motivated memory may be needed only by
individuals who suffer from a dissonance between their actions and their self-image,
in particular those who suffer from guilt. In the post-experimental questionnaire
dictators were asked to report on a 10-point scale their feelings toward the re-
ceivers, from 0 for very guilty to 10 for perfectly serene (mean=7.21, S.D=2.46,
see Table A2.3 in Appendix 2). Table A2.8 in Appendix 2 displays the average
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percentage of dictators’ correct recalls depending on their reported feeling toward
the receiver. It shows that dictators who report a feeling below or equal to the
median (7) on the serenity scale exhibit a lower percentage of correct recalls than
dictators who report a serenity level above the median (M-W test, p=0.028, all
treatments pooled). Considering only treatments in which dictators bear respon-
sibility in the choice of options (IRA, NIRA and IDA), more guilty dictators have
also a significantly lower percentage of correct recalls than more serene dictators
(M-W test, p=0.005). This is not the case when dictators bear no responsibility in
the choice of options (IRAC, p=0.717). Overall, this suggests that dictators who
experienced more discomfort vis-à-vis the receivers retrieve more selectively their
recalls when they are responsible for the receiver’s payoff.
1.7 Conclusion
Individuals develop a variety of deceptive strategies to maintain their self-concept
when behaving in ways that may threaten their self-image, including strategic igno-
rance of information or delegation of decisions. In this study, we explored whether
individuals manipulate their memory to appear more pro-social to themselves than
they actually are. In our experiment, participants played binary dictator games
and then, had to recall the amounts allocated to the receivers. This design al-
lowed us to investigate whether dictators exhibit selective recalls and bias their
memory errors self-servingly (over-estimating more often and to a larger extent
the receivers’ amounts), after making selfish rather than altruistic decisions.
We found evidence of selective memory. Individuals remember better the
amount allocated to the receiver when they made altruistic rather than selfish
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decisions. We interpret these asymmetric recalls as a self-deception strategy moti-
vated by self-image concerns. This finding is consistent with previous theoretical
and empirical studies on motivated memory revealing an asymmetric recall of
feedback depending on whether individuals receive good or bad news about their
relative performance (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Gottlieb, 2014; Li, 2017; Chew
et al., 2018; Zimmermann, 2019). More generally, it contributes to the literature
showing that individuals have motivated cognitive limitations even in the absence
of risk and uncertainty (Exley and Kessler, 2018), selective memory being one of
these self-serving biases. We complement the previous studies on motivated mem-
ory by showing that individuals also use selective memory in social interactions
and by revealing the crucial role of personal responsibility in this process. Indeed,
the asymmetric recalls that we identified are no longer observed when decisions are
made at random by a robot. Moreover, our study shows that incentivizing correct
recalls increases the percentage of dictators’ correct recalls when they chose the
altruistic option but has no effect when they chose the selfish option. This suggests
that when dictators are given a monetary incentive to provide a memory effort,
they allocate this effort to retrieve the memory of desirable rather than undesir-
able information in terms of image. Like Zimmermann (2019), we interpret the
fact that incentives generate more accurate recalls as evidence against complete
forgetting. Individuals selectively suppress bad news (in the case of Zimmermann,
2019) or selectively retrieve good news (in our case).
In contrast, we found no clear evidence of biased memory errors. Dictators are
more likely to over-estimate than under-estimate the amount transferred to the
receiver after choosing the selfish rather than the altruistic option. But this does
not prove the existence of motivated memory since this also applies when dicta-
tors are not responsible for the amount transferred to the receiver. Moreover, the
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magnitude of memory errors is not significantly different across options. Thus, in-
dividuals recall selectively but they do not manipulate their memory self-servingly
to appear altruistic when they were selfish. There are several possible explanations
for the absence of biased memory errors. First, dictators may not bias their mem-
ory because it is common knowledge that the experimenter knows the information
dictators are asked to recall. In a different domain, it has been shown that the
propensity of individuals to lie differs depending on whether the experimenter can
or cannot observe the truth (Gneezy et al., 2018). The same might apply to our
setting: forgetting is unverifiable but inflating one’s recalls systematically is de-
tectable. An extension of our study could be to design games in which participants
know that the experimenter cannot observe memory errors at the individual level.
Second, the limited bias of memory errors may also result from the short span of
time between action and its recollection. We chose to hold the action and recol-
lection phases in the same session to make it cognitively doable for the subjects
to retrieve their memory. But it is possible that a larger span of time is needed to
bias recalls self-servingly. A natural extension would be to vary the length between
the decision and the recollection phases to test how it affects biased memory errors.
Other possible extensions can be thought of to study biases in memory errors.
Even if a majority of individuals probably prefer to think of themselves as generous
rather than egoist and unfair, the dissonance between making selfish decisions in
dictator games when a pro-social alternative is available and maintaining a positive
self-image may not be strong enough to generate an internal conflict. Introduc-
ing decisions that threaten self-image more deeply, by revealing to participants a
more precise and valuable information about their intrinsic nature, could gener-
ate a stronger need for biased memory. Finally, in our design individuals could
manipulate their memory only for hedonic reasons. Another interesting extension
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would be to introduce strategic reasons to use selective memory and to bias recalls
asymmetrically. Testing how memory can be manipulated self-servingly for moti-
vational purposes is left for further investigation.
Appendices
A1: Instructions (translated from French)
Introduction
We thank you for participating in this experiment on decision-making. Please
switch off your cellphone and put it away. You are not allowed to communicate
with the other participants. If you have any question during the session, you
can press the red button on the side of your cubicle. An experimenter will come
and answer to your questions in private. During the session, you will have to
make several decisions. These decisions are anonymous and can earn you money.
Regardless of these decisions, you will receive a five euros show-up fee. Your earn-
ings will be expressed in Experimental Currency Units (ECU) and converted into
Euros at the following rate: 4 ECU = e1. You will be paid in cash and in pri-
vate, in a separate room. Other participants will not be informed of your earnings.
The session consists of 4 parts. At the end of each part, you will receive the
instructions for the next part. All the instructions will be displayed on the screen.
Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand or press the red button. When you are ready, press OK to see the
instructions for Part 1.
Instructions Part 1
This part consists in 12 independent periods. At the beginning of the part, you
will be assigned a role, either A or B. You will keep this role for the 12 periods.
At the beginning of each period, you are going to be randomly matched with
another participant, to form a pair. In each pair, a participant has the role A and
the other has the role B. If you have the role A, you are matched with a participant
with role B and if you have the role B, you are matched with a participant with
role A. Participant B has no decision to take.
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The decision of participant A consists in choosing the preferred option between
two options: option X and option Y. Each option is composed of two amounts:
the first amount corresponds to the payoff of participant A, the second amount
corresponds to the payoff of participant B.
To validate his choice, participant A has to click on the option he prefers and
type the amounts corresponding to that option in the corresponding box. It is
very important to look carefully at the two amounts of each option before choos-
ing the preferred option. Once A has chosen his preferred option, B is informed of
the option chosen by A. Player B has in turn to click on the option chosen by A
and type the amounts corresponding to this option in a box. Then, a new pair is
formed and a new period starts.
How is determined your payoff in this part?
At the end of the session, the program selects at random one period among the
twelve. Participant A receives the first amount corresponding to the option he has
chosen in this period. Participant B receives the second amount corresponding
to the option chosen by participant A in this period. For example, if the option
chosen by A in the randomly selected period is (20, 12): A receives 20 ECU and
B receives 12 ECU.
Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, raise your hand
or press the red button. Before starting this part, you have to answer to an
understanding questionnaire. Press OK to answer to these questions.
Instructions for Part 2 (displayed on the subjects’ screen after complet-
ing Part 1)
In this part, you have 8 minutes to solve mazes. There are 30 mazes in total with
different levels of difficulty (10 easy, 10 intermediate, 10 difficult). You can skip
a maze, but you cannot return to a previous maze. To solve a maze, you have to
move a small character from the top left of the maze to the exit, at the bottom
right of the maze. To move the character, use the left, right, top and down arrows
of your keyboard. Before starting this 8-minute part, you will have the opportu-
nity to practice on a maze. Solving this practice maze is not paid.
How is determined your payoff in this part?
You will earn 1 ECU for each maze solved.
Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, raise your hand
or press the red button. When you are ready, press OK to start Part 3.
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Translation: "You have role A. Please click on the option you prefer and type in the amounts
corresponding to this option in the two boxes below. Me. Player B."
Figure A1.1: Example of a screen in Part 1, player A
Figure A1.2: Example of a maze in Part 2
Instructions for Part 3 (displayed on the subjects’ screen after complet-
ing Part 2)
In each of the twelve games in Part 1, you (respectively, player A) had to choose
the option you (respectively, he) preferred among two. Each option contained two
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amounts: the first amount corresponded to your (respectively, player A’s) payoff
and the second amount corresponded to the payoff of player B (respectively, your
payoff). The amounts between you (respectively, player A) and player B (respec-
tively, A) were different between the two options.
You are going to see again, successively and in a random order, the options
that you have seen in each of the 12 periods of Part 1. However, in the option you
(respectively, player A) have (has) chosen, the amount received by player B (re-
spectively, you) will be hidden and replaced by a question mark, as in the example
below. Your task consists in recalling this amount. In the above example, if you
(respectively, player A) have (has) chosen option X that gave you (respectively,
player A) 20 ECU, you have to recall the amount replaced by the question mark.
This amount corresponds to player B’s (respectively, your) payoff in the option you
(respectively, player A) have chosen. Note that the amounts are bounded between
0 and 38. This means that no amount can be lower than 0 and higher than 38.
How is determined your payoff in this part?
At the end of the session, two recalls will be randomly selected. Your payoff de-
pends on the accuracy of your recall in each of these two recalls. If your recall is
correct, you will earn 8 ECU (e2). If your recall is correct plus or minus one unit,
you will earn 4 ECU (e1). For example, if the amount to recall is 24 and that
your recall is 24, you earn 8 ECU. If your recall is 23 or 25, you earn 4 ECU. If
your recall is lower that 23 or higher than 25, you do not earn anything. You will
be informed of your total number of correct recalls at the end of the session.
Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, raise your hand
or press the red button. When you are ready, please press OK to start Part 3.
Instructions for Part 4 (displayed on the subjects’ screen after complet-
ing Part 3)
This part consists in 3 independent rounds. In each round, you will see a list of 15
words corresponding to singular nouns, without accent and written in lowercase.
Each word will be displayed on your screen one by one during a few seconds. Your
task consists in memorizing these words. Once you will have watched the 15 words,
you will have to type the highest number of words that you recall from the list in
a dedicated box. You will have 2 minutes to write the words you recall. The order
in which you recall the words does not matter.
How is determined your payoff in this part?
At the end of the session, one round out of the three will be randomly selected.
For each word correctly recalled in that round, you will earn 1 ECU.
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Translation: "In part 1, you have chosen option X. What was the amount allocated to the Player B
you were matched with?"
Figure A1.3: Example of a screen in Part 3, player A
Please read again these instructions. If you have any questions, raise your hand
or press the red button. When you are ready, press OK to start Part 4.
A2: Tables
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Translation: "Please type in the words that you remember."
Figure A1.4: Example of a screen in Part 4
Table A2.1: Summary Statistics - Decisions in the Dictator Games
Games Option X Option Y Percent. of dictators choosing opt. Y
Altruistic Selfish All IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
1 (2, 32) (10, 30) 86.77 97.47 50.65 98.63 100.00
2 (3, 34) (9, 28) 87.42 98.73 54.55 95.89 100.00
3 (5, 35) (7, 27) 75.81 75.96 62.34 82.19 82.72
4 (6, 36) (6, 26) 28.06 21.52 50.65 26.03 14.81
5 (11, 20) (19, 18) 88.06 98.73 54.55 98.63 100.00
6 (12, 22) (18, 16) 89.35 98.73 61.03 98.63 98.77
7 (14, 23) (16, 15) 73.87 83.54 48.05 84.93 79.01
8 (15, 24) (15, 14) 31.61 24.05 58.44 27.30 17.28
9 (20, 8) (28, 6) 81.94 91.14 51.95 91.78 92.59
10 (21, 10) (27, 4) 69.03 77.22 53.25 72.60 72.84
11 (23, 11) (25, 3) 49.35 54.43 45.45 52.05 45.68
12 (24, 12) (24, 2) 19.68 10.13 51.95 8.22 8.64
Total 65.08 69.30 53.57 69.75 67.70
Notes: The first numbers in parentheses in columns 2 and 3 indicate the dictator’s amounts, and the second
numbers indicate the receiver’s amounts. The percentages of dictators choosing option Y are significantly
different neither between IRA and IDA, nor between IRA and NIRA. The percentages of option Y selected
randomly by the program (IRAC treatment) are always significantly different from the percentages of dictators
choosing option Y (treatment IRA) at 5% level, except for games 3 (Mann-Whitney tests, p=0.066) and 11
(p=0.264).
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Table A2.2: Summary Statistics - Participants, by treatment
Treatments All IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
Male 47.23% 43.67% 50.00% 45.20% 51.23%
Age 22.55 22.84 21.06*** 24.64 21.62**
Number of participants 578 158 154 146 162
Number of sessions 24 7 6 6 7
Ave. num. of part. per session 24.51 22.57 25.67 24.33 23.14
Notes: The Table reports the results of two-tailed M-W tests in which each individual is taken
as an individual observation. NIRA, IDA and IRAC are compared to IRA.
Table A2.3: Summary Statistics on Each Part, by Treatment
All IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
Part 1 Percentage of selfish choices (out of 12) 65.08 69.30 53.57*** 69.75 67.70
Part 2 Num. of solved mazes 12.21 12.08 12.45** 11.64 12.64*
Part 3 Num. of correct recalls (out of 12) 3.01 2.93 2.30*** 2.87 3.88***
Part 4 Num. of correct words (out of 45) 24.73 25.31 24.98 23.78** 24.78
Quest. Reported belief on mem. accu. (0-10 scale) 4.16 4.44 3.54*** 4.21 4.43
Reported memory effort (0-10 scale) 6.50 7.02 5.84*** 6.51 6.61*
Reported feeling toward the other player:
Dictator (0: very guilty; 10: very serene) 7.21 7.14 7.45 6.89 7.32
Receiver (0: very angry; 10: very serene) 6.45 6.61 5.91** 6.41 6.85
Notes: The Table reports the results of two-tailed M-W tests in which each individual is taken as an individual
observation. IRAC, NIRA, and IDA treatments are compared to IRA. mem. accu. = memory accuracy.
Table A2.4: Percentage of Dictators’ Correct Recalls, by Option and by Position (IRA)
Position p-values
Disadv. Mixed Adv.
(1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (1)-(3)
Altruistic 35.71% 28.00% 31.82% 0.165 0.873
Selfish 21.12% 25.31% 22.28% 0.226 0.872
Notes: The p-values are from two-tailed W tests in which each indi-
vidual gives one independent observation.
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Table A2.5: Determinants of Dictators’ Over-Estimated Recalls
Dependent variable Dictator’s Overestimated Recall
All IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IRA treatment ref. -
IRAC treatment 0.024 -
(0.025)
NIRA treatment -0.007 -
(0.028)
IDA treatment -0.054 -
(0.034)
Selfish option 0.247*** 0.312*** 0.362*** 0.360*** -0.164***
(0.023) (0.048) (0.026) (0.039) (0.045)
Dict. in disadv. position ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
- - - - -
Dict. in mixed position 0.139*** 0.271*** 0.228*** 0.150*** -0.115***
(0.022) (0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.039)
Dict. in disadv. position 0.352*** 0.532*** 0.460*** 0.477*** -0.183***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.034) (0.045) (0.046)
Performance verbal memory 0.002 -0.0002 0.006** 0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Time to recall 0.002** 0.001 -0.002 -0.0003 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Game order, Part 1 0.0004 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Game order, Part 3 0.010*** 0.004 0.0001 0.0002 0.014***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 0.004** 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.014***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.004)
Male -0.036* -0.007 -0.047* -0.052 -0.039
(0.021) (0.043) (0.028) (0.041) (0.053)
Educational attainment -0.010* -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.015
(0.006) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
N 2780 704 761 662 653
Clusters 310 79 77 73 81
Pseudo R2 0.1083 0.2181 0.2753 0.1780 0.0672
Log pseudolikelihood -1709.08 -381.22 -378.65 -376.76 -415.74
Wald chi2 244.32 167.24 235.53 121.73 48.42
Prob > chi2 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Notes: Marginal effects from Logit models are reported, with robust standard errors clustered at the indi-
vidual level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A2.6: Determinants of Dictators’ Magnitude of Memory Errors
Dependent variable Dictator’s Magnitude of Memory Error
All IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IRA treatment ref. -
IRAC treatment 1.414*** -
(0.380)
NIRA treatment 0.010 -
(0.369)
IDA treatment -1.637*** -
(0.338)
Selfish -0.278 -0.126 -0.078 -0.927* 0.258
(0.245) (0.514) (0.429) (0.541) (0.389)
Dict. in disadv. position ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
- - - - -
Dict. in mixed position -1.186*** -0.862 -1.368** -1.740*** -0.705
(0.286) (0.547) (0.598) (0.639) (0.483)
Dict. in adv. position -1.269*** -1.449** -1.861*** -1.649** 0.231
(0.318) (0.574) (0.618) (0.790) (0.548)
Performance verbal memory -0.062** -0.088** -0.019 -0.107* -0.041
(0.026) (0.044) (0.051) (0.064) (0.042)
Time to recall 0.0001 -0.044** 0.014 0.009 0.029
(0.012) (0.019) (0.023) (0.035) (0.019)
Game order, Part 1 -0.002 -0.066 0.016 -0.008 0.028
(0.026) (0.058) (0.052) (0.056) (0.035)
Game order, Part 3 -0.096*** -0.068 -0.051 -0.188** -0.032
(0.030) (0.061) (0.065) (0.076) (0.038)
Age 0.063*** 0.024 0.228 0.045 0.152**
(0.022) (0.045) (0.153) (0.027) (0.071)
Male -0.902*** -1.337*** -0.959* -0.401 -0.941**
(0.257) (0.489) (0.541) (0.518) (0.467)
Educational attainment 0.052 0.106 0.052 0.180 -0.206*
(0.070) (0.145) (0.152) (0.158) (0.116)
N 2780 704 761 662 653
Clusters 310 79 77 73 81
Pseudo R2 0.0128 0.0079 0.0053 0.0116 0.0170
Log pseudolikelihood -8599.61 -2161.95 -2437.23 -2100.28 -1804.99
F 13.30 3.68 2.21 3.82 3.08
p > F <0.0001 0.0001 0.0157 <0.0001 0.0008
Notes: Marginal effects from Tobit models are reported with robust standard errors clustered at the individual
level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A2.7: Dictators’ Recalls, Actual and Simulated Distributions
Data Normal Normal Uniform
(s.d.=4) (s.d.=2)
Percentage of correct recalls 22.49 3.48*** 2.09*** 3.88***
Percentage of over-estimated recalls 46.81 47.15 50.15*** 47.92
Magnitude of memory errors 6.09 9.16*** 8.76*** 12.31***
Clusters 458 458 458 458
Notes: The first simulated set of recalls follows a normal distribution centered at 18 (the
mean actual receiver’s amount) with a standard deviation of 4. The second simulated set
of recalls follows a normal distribution centered at 18 but with a standard deviation of 2 to
simulate players that may have almost always reported the average receiver’s amount. The
third simulated set of recalls follows a uniform distribution over the range of possible recalls
from 0 to 38. For each distribution, three variables have been computed: a binary variable
equal to 1 if the recall is correct and 0 otherwise, a binary variable equal to 1 if the recall
is overestimated and 0 otherwise, and a variable that indicates the magnitude of errors and
is equal to the difference between the simulated recall and the actual amount. p-values from
W tests indicate whether each simulated distribution differs from the actual results. Each
individual gives one independent observation. *** p<0.01.
Table A2.8: Average Percentage of Dictators’ Correct Recalls Depending on Their Re-
ported Feeling Toward the Receiver
Reported Feeling
More Serene More Guilty p-value
All 26.44% (214) 22.66% (96) 0.028
Dictators responsible for the decision 29.63% (162) 23.59% (71) 0.005
Dictators not responsible for the decision 16.51% (52) 20.00% (25) 0.717
Notes: Dictators had to report on a 10-level scale their feeling toward the receiver, from 0 (very guilty)
to 10 (very serene), inclusive. The reported guilty group includes dictators reporting a value lower or
equal to 7 (the median of reported feeling); the reported serene group includes dictators reporting a
value higher than 7. p-values from M-W tests are in italics. The average number of correct recalls of
each individual gives one independent observation.
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A3: Figure
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Notes: Each dot represents one recall. Each dot on the diagonal represents an amount
recalled accurately. For a better view, we used the "jitter" option in Stata that
differentiates dots located in the same position.
Figure A3.5: Recalled and Actual Amounts in the Dictator Games, by Treatment
A4: Alternative Definitions of Correct Recalls
In Table A4.9 a recall is defined as correct if the recalled amount is exactly equal
to the actual amount. In Table A4.10 a recall is defined as correct if the recalled
amount is equal to the actual amount plus or minus two units.
A5: Analysis of the Receivers’ Recalls
In our experiment, participants play 12 binary dictator games. Then, after per-
forming a distraction task, they are asked to recall the amounts allocated to the
receivers. While the Results section only reports the dictators’ recalls (comparing
dictators’ and receivers’ recalls cannot provide a clean identification of dictators’
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Table A4.9: Determinants of Dictators’ Correct Recalls (+/- 0 units)
Dependent variable Dictator’s Correct Recall
All IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IRA treatment ref. -
IRAC treatment -0.068*** -
(0.0198)
NIRA treatment -0.012 -
(0.022)
IDA treatment 0.080*** -
(0.022)
Selfish option -0.075*** -0.060* -0.010 -0.016 -0.198***
(0.015) (0.032) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029)
Dict. in disadv. position ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Dict. in mixed position 0.030** 0.053* -0.035 0.051** 0.043
(0.014) (0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.030)
Dict. in adv. position -0.036** -0.003 -0.023 -0.030 -0.090**
(0.014) (0.031) (0.025) (0.033) (0.036)
Performance verbal memory 0.004*** 0.003 0.005** 0.001 0.005**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Time to recall -0.003*** -0.002 -0.0001 -0.004** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Game order, part 1 0.001 0.006** -0.002 -0.0004 -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Game order, part 3 -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.007** -0.008** -0.008**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Age 0.0004 -0.002 0.004 0.001 0.0002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.004)
Male 0.011 0.037 0.005 -0.056* 0.043
(0.015) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Educational attainment 0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.007 0.016*
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
N 3720 948 924 876 972
Clusters 310 79 77 73 81
Pseudo R2 0.0427 0.0352 0.0279 0.0332 0.0729
Log pseudolikelihood -1612.24 -407.41 -318.03 -363.97 -493.07
Wald chi2 120.56 32.93 20.17 29.51 79.65
Prob > chi2 <0.0001 0.0003 0.0277 0.0010 <0.0001
Notes: Marginal effects from Logit models are reported, with robust standard errors clustered at the indi-
vidual level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
motivated memory because receivers may also motivate their memory, albeit for
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Table A4.10: Determinants of Dictators’ Correct Recalls (+/- 2 units)
Dependent variable Dictator’s Correct Recall
All IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IRA treatment ref. -
IRAC treatment -0.075*** -
(0.025)
NIRA treatment 0.014 -
(0.027)
IDA treatment 0.105*** -
(0.027)
Selfish option -0.060*** -0.098*** 0.001 -0.014 -0.136***
(0.018) (0.036) (0.0300) (0.040) (0.039)
Dict. in disadv. position ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Dict. in mixed. position -0.017 0.009 -0.030 -0.002 -0.040
(0.019) (0.039) (0.042) (0.036) (0.035)
Dict. in adv. position -0.005 0.048 0.052 -0.003 -0.115***
(0.020) (0.035) (0.036) (0.049) (0.041)
Performance verbal memory 0.005*** -0.001 0.008*** 0.003 0.009**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Time to recall -0.003** -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Game order, part 1 -0.0004 0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Game order, part 3 -0.003 -0.008** -0.004 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Age -0.0002 -0.002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
Male 0.030 0.068** 0.056 -0.075** 0.073*
(0.019) (0.034) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040)
Educational attainment 0.006 -0.007 -0.009 0.008 0.026**
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
N 3720 948 924 876 972
Clusters 310 79 77 73 81
Pseudo R2 0.0196 0.0182 0.0186 0.0101 0.0352
Log pseudolikelihood -2393.48 -601.48 -549.56 -567.53 -645.62
Wald chi2 69.48 25.11 21.12 10.33 40.60
Prob > chi2 <0.0001 0.0051 0.0203 0.4116 <0.0001
Notes: Marginal effects from Logit models are reported, with robust standard errors clustered at the indi-
vidual level in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
different reasons), this section presents a brief analysis of the receivers’ recalls.
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First, receivers do not exhibit selective recalls. Their percentage of correct re-
calls is 25.43% when the dictator has chosen the altruistic option and 22.07% when
he has chosen the selfish option. The difference is not significant (p=0.383, M-W,
IRA treatment). We also find no significant differences between the percentages
of correct recalls when the dictator chose the altruistic vs. the selfish option in the
IRAC and NIRA treatments (see Table A5.11). In the IDA treatment in which
receivers have to recall the dictator’s amount, they exhibit a higher percentage of
correct recall when the dictator chose the altruistic option (39.81%) than when he
chose the selfish option (28.11%, p=0.013, M-W). We find no significant difference
in the rate of correct recalls between the receivers who have been more frequently
exposed to selfish dictators and the other receivers, in either treatment.25
Second, there is no statistical difference in the percentage of correct recalls
between the IRA and IRAC treatments, neither when the altruistic option was
selected (p=0.174, M-W), nor when the selfish option was selected (p=0.972, M-
W). We also find no evidence of statistical differences between the IRA and NIRA
treatments, neither conditional on the altruistic option (p=0.181) nor conditional
on the selfish option (p=0.588).
Third, receivers are significantly more likely to over-estimate their recalls when
dictators chose the selfish option than when they chose the altruistic option (see
Table A5.11). This could suggest that receivers bias their memory to derive pos-
itive anticipated utility from high-expected future payoffs. However, the opposite
is observed in the IDA treatment in which receivers have to recall the dictator’s
25In IRA, the receivers who have been exposed to selfish dictators more than 8 times out of 12 (N=37)
exhibit the same average percentage of correct recalls (22.30%) than those who have been less exposed
(N=42; 23.80%), and the difference is not significant (M-W test, p=0.522). In IRAC, the respective
percentages (and numbers) are 21.63% (N=37) and 19.79% (N=40), and they are not significantly
different either (p=0.409).
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amount. This result suggests that the likelihood of overestimating the amount is
more driven by the amount itself than by the nature of the option. Indeed, when
the amount is low (selfish option in IRA, IRAC and NIRA and altruistic option in
IDA), it has by construction a higher likelihood of being over-estimated. We also
find no evidence of a different magnitude of memory errors between the altruistic
and the selfish options (see Table A5.11).
Table A5.11: Summary Statistics - Receivers’ Recalls
IRA IRAC NIRA IDA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percentage of correct recalls, by option
Alt. option 25.43% (291) 19.81% (429) 21.51% (265) 39.81%*** (314)
Self. option 22.07% (657) 21.41% (495) 24.22% (611) 28.11%*** (658)
p-values 0.383 0.600 0.170 0.013
Percentage of over-estimation, by option
Alt. option 27.65% (217) 27.33% (344) 30.77% (208) 64.02%*** (189)
Self. option 53.52% (512) 61.44%*** (389) 57.24% (463) 38.90%*** (473)
p-values <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Magnitude of absolute memory errors, by option
Alt. option 5.80 (291) 7.16** (429) 6.12 (265) 3.89*** (314)
Self. option 5.38 (657) 6.41** (495) 5.75 (611) 3.73*** (658)
p-values 0.588 0.097 0.214 0.932
Notes: The p-values in lines are from M-W tests and those in columns (altruistic vs. selfish option)
are from W tests. Each individual gives one independent observation. Numbers in parentheses
display the number of individual observations.
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Mood-driven or goal-driven memory
biases?1
2.1 Introduction
Human beings are not always good judge of themselves. Both experiments and
surveys show that people tend to be unreasonably self-confident and to have an
unrealistically good self-image, in particular when compared to others (Greenwald,
1980; Taylor and Brown, 1988; Gilovich, 2008; Williams and Gilovich, 2008). Over
90% of university professors think they are better at their jobs than their aver-
age colleague (Gilovich, 2008). Almost 90% of drivers think to be safer than the
median driver (Svenson, 1981). 86% of American think to be more “happy and
contented” than about two-thirds of the people (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996).
Over-confidence has some advantages: it can be a trigger of audacious actions,
a driver of personal progress and an instrument for self-regulation. However, it
can also lead to tainted economic and financial decisions. Start-up founders pre-
1This chapter is a joint work with Alberto Prati, PhD candidate at Aix-Marseille School of Eco-
nomics.
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dict their profits to be positive, even when they correctly predict that most new
companies fail (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). As a consequence, the economy is
flooded with an excess of new businesses with respect to market capacity. CEOs
often consider the market valuation of their companies to be lower than their ac-
tual value (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), so that they overinvest when they have
abundant internal funds, but suboptimally restrict investments when they require
market financing. Traders tend to evaluate their private information as better
than average (Odean, 1998), thus leading to an inflated trading volume.
Why does overconfidence happen? In the debate on the origins of the phe-
nomenon, memory stands out as a key factor.2 At least since the pioneering works
of Tversky and Kahneman (1973),3 memory is known to be imperfect and biased in
some predictable ways, so that selective retrieval of previously acquired informa-
tion can explain why economic agents delude themselves into thinking to be better
than average. If negative feedback tends to be forgotten and positive feedback to
be recalled, the overall self-image ends up being positively inflated. Although some
recent studies confirm that individuals recall more accurately positive than nega-
tive feedback (Chew et al., 2018; Zimmermann, 2019; Li, 2017), the origins of the
phenomenon have not been clearly defined.
Two main explanations of this recall asymmetry have emerged. On the one
hand, theories of motivated memory highlight self-serving explanations, according
2Some prominent explanations of over-confidence include the hard-easy effect (Fischhoff et al., 1977),
confirmation bias (Koriat et al., 1980), self-attribution bias (Gervais and Odean, 2001) and self-signalling
(Mijović-Prelec and Prelec, 2010). It is worth noting that all these mechanisms require either neglectful
attention, biased information processing or biased memory as mediators for the initial feedback to be
distorted. In our experiment, we will provide an attention check and elicit both ex-ante and ex-post
beliefs so as to leave memory as the only channel of information distortion. For a thorough discussion
of overconfidence in economics and finance see, Skala (2008) and the symposium on the Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 29 No. 4 Fall 2015.
3Some forerunner evidence of systematic recall errors can be found in Bartlett (1932) and
Von Restorff (1933).
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to which people recall positive information to enhance or protect themselves (self-
enhancement effect). On the other hand, theories of associative memory explain
asymmetric recall as the result of the enhanced accessibility of positive informa-
tion and the attenuated accessibility of negative information, when people are in a
non-negative mood (mood-congruency effect). While the first theory depicts recall
errors as mostly goal-driven behaviors toward well-being, the second one conceives
recall errors as unintentional consequences of high affective well-being.
This study is the first attempt in economics to disentangle two forces which
have been proposed as explanations of memory failures for self-relevant informa-
tion. Our design allows us to create controlled situations where self-enhancement
and mood-congruency effects predict different outcomes. Although the two princi-
ples are not mutually exclusive and most existing evidence is consistent with both
theories, understanding the driving force of the phenomenon is crucial to predict
some suboptimal economic decisions and to develop policies aimed at mitigating
or removing overconfident behaviors, whether necessary.
Let us take the example of an investor who owns a stock for two periods and
decides whether to buy or sell additional stocks at the end of the second period.
Insofar as we acknowledge investor’s memory to be biased, we can rationalize sub-
optimal future investment and violations of Bayesian updating. If the market value
of the asset initially decreases and subsequently increases, both self-enhancement
and mood-congruency predict some over-investment. Consider instead the case
where market value increases in the first period and decreases in the following
period. Mood-congruency predicts negative over-reaction to the news: selective
recall pushes the deceived investor to over-sell the asset (Bodoh-Creed, 2017). Self-
enhancement predicts the opposite: the investor tends to forget the less preferred
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outcomes, so that she over-invests in the stock (Gödker et al., 2019).
The relative dominance either of self-enhancement or of mood-congruency bears
some policy implications to mitigate overconfidence. The first effect suggests the
importance of correcting ex-ante beliefs on what is helpful for oneself. If asymmet-
ric feedback recall is goal-driven, more cautious financial behavior is accomplished
whether the investor is aware that optimistic information is not only self-enhancing,
but also biased toward risk. If feedback recall is mood-driven, tainted decisions
are a collateral effect of good affective states. In this case, the investor should be
informed that she is more likely to take over-optimistic decisions when in positive
mood.
To identify and disentangle the driving force of asymmetric feedback recall, we
set a laboratory experiment where the two theories offer divergent predictions. The
laboratory offers a controlled environment where recall accuracy can be carefully
assessed, and mood exogenously manipulated. Based on the design by Zimmer-
mann (2019), subjects had to perform an IQ test and received incomplete feedback
about their performance relative to their peers. One month later, they came back
to the laboratory and were asked to recall their feedback. Before retrieval, we
intervened or not on their mood, using Andrade et al. (2015)’s procedure.
Our results provide support for the existence of self-enhancement memory.
First, individuals exhibit higher percentage of correct recalls when the feedback
was positive than when it was negative. Second, when they do not recall cor-
rectly, individuals overestimate the number of positive feedback they received.
Together, these results show overly optimistic recall of past feedback and replicate
the findings in Zimmermann (2019). By contrast, we do not find clear evidence
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of mood-congruent memory, although our manipulation proves to be effective in
inducing the desired affective state. Individuals do not exhibit a higher percent-
age of correct recalls when the feedback to retrieve is congruent with their mood.
Overall, our results confirm the effect of self-enhancement memory as a driver of
asymmetric recall, but they fail to support any role of mood-congruency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedures. Section 4
introduces the theoretical predictions of both self-enhancing memory and mood-
congruent memory. Section 5 reports the results and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
The traditional goal of memory is to accurately reproduce the maximum amount
of information. This task is far from being fully accomplished. Not only everyday
experience teaches that memory is limited and imperfect, but also decades of re-
search have unveiled that memory is endogenous: recall errors are, to some extent,
systematic and predictable.
When we narrow our focus on self-relevant memories, overall two dominant
forces emerge: “A tendency for individuals to recall positive information (a self-
enhancement effect), particularly when in a positive mood (a mood-congruent recall
effect)” (Baumeister et al., 2001, p.344). Self-enhancing memory refers to the psy-
chological phenomenon of remembering relevant items in a self-serving fashion,
so that unfavorable information tends to be forgotten or manipulated.4 Mood-
4Various authors may refer to this same process using different terms such as self-serving bias,
self-protecting bias or egocentric bias. Throughout this paper, we will use the overarching adjective
“self-enhancing”.
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congruent memory refers to the tendency to recall more accurately items which
are of the same valence as the current affective state, so that people in good mood
tend to better remember positive than negative information, and vice versa for
people in bad mood.
Psychologists and, more recently, economists have been trying to rationalize
these empirical regularities in memory errors. They have modeled imperfect mem-
ory as a strategic compromise between conflicting goals, where selective recall and
confabulation can be optimal outcomes. Although these models are diverse and
multiform, we can broadly distinguish two different approaches, according to which
effect they focus on and which conflicting goals are at stake. Self-enhancement
effects highlight the conflict between exact information and the demand for self-
esteem. Mood-congruency highlights the contrast between exact information and
effort reduction. In the following paragraphs, we will review some cross-disciplinary
relevant contributions to the understanding of the two phenomena.
2.2.1 Self-enhancing Memory
Psychologists generally agree that memory contributes to maintain a high self-
image. Taylor (1991)’s influential theory of mobilization-minimization tries to
conciliate one’s motivation to prioritize positive image with the antagonistic weight
of negative information. Taylor describes two functionally distinct processes. At
first, negative signals are generally more salient, as they are potentially threatening
and request a quick response (mobilization process). However, in a second stage,
information is reviewed in a self-enhancing way and attention is focused toward
its desirable aspects (minimization process). In the case of self-relevant feedback,
Taylor’s theory predicts negative feedback to be initially more salient, but to be
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dampened down during the subsequent minimization process.
Over the last two decades, the notion of self-enhancement has penetrated the
theoretical literature in economics. Imperfect memory has been modeled as largely
isomorphic to an inter-personal communication dilemma where disclosing negative
information is detrimental while hiding information is costly (Bénabou and Tirole,
2002; Gottlieb, 2014). In consequence, the demand for a positive self-image can
optimistically bias the recall process and generate overconfidence (Köszegi, 2006;
Gödker et al., 2019). In general, these models predict that negative information on
the self tends to be suppressed or biased whenever it is not cognitively too costly,
while positive information on the self tends to be prioritized.
This class of models grants large metacognitive control, so that individuals are
subject to active self-disinformation. For instance, the first assumption of Bénabou
and Tirole (2002) seminal model is that “the individual can, at a cost, increase or
decrease the probability of remembering an event or its interpretation.” (ibid.,
p.886).5 Another peculiar feature of self-enhancement is that it assumes mem-
ory to be similar to a storage device, where information is saved or erased. In
a nutshell, models of self-enhancing memory claim that people try to maintain a
positive self-image through a biased information processing. Hence, people tend
to have biased memories with the goal of being happy.
Motivational mechanisms have been used to explain biased judgments in a va-
riety of economic situations, from pre-trial bargaining (Babcock et al., 1995) to
5This view may seem unrealistic since it concedes individual control over one’s memory. However,
Bénabou and Tirole (2002) clearly state that they are not assuming people to directly suppress memories,
but to engage in behaviors that can affect recall, such as intentional rehearsal or avoiding cues. Moreover,
intentional control over memories is ordinarily assumed, more than it may seem at first sight. For
instance, if one fails to show up at an appointment because she forgets it, she is likely to be blamed
for it. Since some degree of memory control is a necessary condition for being morally responsible for
memory failures, then memory control is ordinarily granted (see Blustein 2017 for a discussion).
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distributional preferences (Deffains et al., 2016), from price setting (Martin et al.,
2018) to reciprocal behaviors (Woods and Servátka, 2019). People display both
input-control strategies, where some potentially available information is avoided
(see Golman et al., 2017, for a review), and internal-biasing strategies, where ac-
quired information is treated in a biased way (see Mele, 1997). Self-enhancing
memory belongs to the second category.
Although valence asymmetry is still object of debate among psychologists, in
the specific case of information which is relevant for one’s self-image, there is con-
sensual evidence on the existence of a positivity bias: favorable information is
better recalled than adverse one.6 In a series of experiments, Sedikides and Green
(2000), Sedikides and Green (2004) and Green et al. (2009) observe extensive mem-
ory neglect of self-relevant negative information. After a personality test, subjects
are presented with an artificial analysis of how much likely they are in engaging
in a list of trustworthy and untrustworthy behaviors, kind and unkind behaviors.
People tend to recall fewer negative than positive behaviors, even when negative
behaviors are consistent with individuals’ low self-esteem. Importantly, the phe-
nomenon is directly related to self-image: asymmetric recall disappears as soon as
the personality analysis is framed in terms of a third person instead of the self (see
also Kuiper and Derry 1982).
A nascent literature in experimental economics has been investigating the ques-
tion of memory and self-image. It provides evidence of motivationally biased recall
for various self-relevant traits, such as trustworthiness and kindness (Li, 2013), gen-
erosity (Saucet and Villeval, 2019) and IQ (Zimmermann, 2019; Chew et al., 2018;
6This and the following claims refer to non-depressive individuals only. According to the paradigm
of depressive realism developed by Mischel (1979) depressed individuals are less subject to self-deceptive
behaviors and therefore have more accurate recollection of self-relevant negative feedback. We will not
discuss specific traits of depressed individuals, which is beyond the aim of our study.
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Li, 2017). Both Zimmermann (2019) and Chew et al. (2018) use a Raven IQ test
as a measure of intelligence and investigate how people subsequently recall their
performance.7 In his series of studies on motivated beliefs, Zimmermann (2019)
provides participants with a noisy feedback on their relative performance in the
Raven test. A few weeks later, he observes that respondents better remember posi-
tive than negative feedback. Chew et al. (2018) provide participants with feedback
for each Raven matrix and, months later, ask them to recall if they saw the matrix
before and if they correctly solved it. Participants not only tend to forget matrices
they failed to solve more than matrices they correctly solved, but they are also
more likely to misattribute a positive outcome to matrices they have never seen
or they did not solve.
2.2.2 Mood-congruent Memory
In psychology, the complex relationship between memory and affect has been mod-
eled in several ways (see Fiedler and Hütter 2013 for a review).8 Associative the-
ories (Isen et al., 1978; Bower, 1981) explain the mood-congruency phenomenon
as being due to the spreading of affective-related items within a memory net-
work. Fiedler (2001) and Bless et al. (2006) treat mood as an associative cue
and predicts differential probability of mood-congruency according to the type of
cognitive task (accomodation-oriented or assimilation-oriented). Theories of affect-
as-information (Schwarz and Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 1988; Schwarz and Clore, 1996)
suggest that judgments are marginally adjusted using affect as an available infor-
mative signal, thereby causing the potential misattribution of an affective state.
7Pioneering evidence on asymmetric recall for intelligence tests can be found in Mischel et al. (1976).
8We use the term affect as a generic term, overarching the more fine-grained category of different
emotions. We interpret affect (aka affective valence) in a standard way, as measureable on a uni-
dimemsional continuum scale, having negative valence and positive valence at its ends. We adopt the
term mood as synonym of affect.
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Among economists, Mullainathan (2002) sketches the first economic model of
associative memory, where recall outcomes are predicted by the informative cues
an individual receives. Nevertheless, mood is never mentioned in his article. Other
recent theories on the economic consequences of associative memory can be found
in Bordalo et al. (2017) and Bordalo et al. (2019), which explore respectively how
events saliency and the representative heuristics distort recalls. Bernheim and
Thomadsen (2005) look at the relationship between anticipatory emotions and
imperfect memory, but they do not endogeneize memory biases. So far, the only
theoretical model of mood-congruency is the recent work by Bodoh-Creed (2017).
In line with the psychology literature, Bodoh-Creed models memory as an asso-
ciative process where the current affective state is a relevant cue for retrieval. In
a dynamic setting, he incorporates mood as a deterministic element of biased re-
call, under the assumption that positive affect increases the probability to recall a
positive item rather than a negative one (and vice-versa). By applying the model
to financial behavior, he draws predictions on information overreaction and asset
price volatility.
The common line of mood-congruency models is to consider recall biases as
the byproduct of a heuristic process, by which mood is an associative cue or in-
formative signal. Contrary to self-enhancement, mood-congruency does not need
to assume recalls to be intentional and depicts memory to be more similar to a
searching device - where information is available or not - rather than to a storage
device. Overall, mood-congruent theories claim that people tend to better remem-
ber information that is congruent with their current emotional state. Therefore,
people tend to have biased positive memories because they are happy.
91
Chapter 2. Mood-driven or Goal-driven Memory Biases?
Studies in experimental economics have been investigating the impact of mood
on productivity (Oswald et al., 2015), risk-aversion (Nguyen and Noussair, 2014),
prudence (Breaban et al., 2016), asset-pricing (Andrade et al., 2015), altruism
(Capra, 2004), reciprocity and generosity (Kirchsteiger et al., 2006). Stock prices
correlate with exogeneous mood-shifters as diverse as weather (Hirshleifer and
Shumway, 2003), seasonal day lengh (Kamstra et al., 2003) and sport events (Ed-
mans et al., 2007).
While economists did not empirically investigate the relationship between affect
and memory, psychologists have extensively explored this path. Applied memory
literature is replete of examples of mood-congruency: people better retrieve infor-
mation whose content is congruent with individuals’ current affective state (see
Blaney (1986) and the literature cited therein).9 Early evidence can be found in
Isen et al. (1978) who show consumers to be significantly happier with a product
when they evaluate their past experience in a positive mood. In the specific context
of self-relevant feedback recall, Story (1998) asks participants to fill a personality
test and provide them with artificial feedback on their traits: she finds that in-
dividuals with relatively low self-esteem have a more accurate recall of negative
feedback, while individuals with a relatively high self-esteem have a more accurate
recall of positive feedback and tend to recall negative feedback as more favorable
than it was.10
9The other fundamental aspect of the interaction between affect and memory is state dependency:
people tend to better remember information which was encoded in a similar affective state.
10An important empirical question is to distinguish to what extent mood-congruency is a genuine
memory phenomenon rather than a general heuristic process. It could be argued that the phenomenon
is just a response bias, on the ground that people in positive affective states are more prone to see the
world in a good light. In their empirical investigation, Fiedler et al. (2001) reject this option. Their
results support the interpretation of mood-congruency as an advantage in retrieval, while they find no
evidence of mood-congruency as a superficial response bias.
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2.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We first describe the design of the experiment and then detail the procedures.
2.3.1 Design
To study the existence and relative importance of mood-congruency and self-
enhancement on individuals’ memory, our design is based on Zimmermann (2019).
We set a longitudinal experiment where subjects participated in two sessions, at
one-month interval. Parts named by a number (1 to 7) are an accurate replication
of Zimmermann (2019)’s design. Parts named by a letter (A to E) are specific to
our design. Figure 2.1 displays the timeline of the experiment. We now describe
each session in detail.
Note: Parts named by a number (1 to 7, in black) are an accurate replication of the Recall treatment in
Zimmermann (2019). Parts named by a letter (A to E, in green) are specific to our design.
Figure 2.1: Timeline of the experiment
2.3.1.1 Session 1
Session 1 consisted in seven parts. Parts 1, 4, 5 and 6 were only filler tasks who
aimed at obfuscating the purpose of the experiment (see Zimmermann (2019), p.7,
for a justification). The experiment started with part A. Subjects were asked to
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report their current affective state with respect to different items on a 0-10 Likert
scale (UK ONS, 2011) and answered a self-image questionnaire (Schwarzer et al.
1995, see Appendix 1). This part was not payoff-relevant.
In part 1 (filler task), subjects played a one-shot dictator game. They were
endowed with 10 euros and could decide if they wanted to donate part of this
amount to the French Red Cross.
In part 2, subjects performed an IQ test in the form of 10 Raven matrices
to solve in 10 minutes. Before the test, subjects were explicitly told that this
kind of questionnaires is frequently used to measure intelligence and performance
is correlated with income and education outcomes. After the test, subjects were
informed that they had been randomly matched with nine people who previously
took the same test.11 They were ranked within this 10-people group according to
their performance in the Raven test. In case of equal score between two or more
subjects, the computer randomly broke the tie. Then, we measured subjects’ prior
beliefs on they relative rank. Individuals were asked to estimate, in percentage,
the likelihood that they were in the upper half of the ranked group. They were
also asked to estimate, for every possible rank (from 1 to 10), the likelihood they
thought it was that they held this rank. Belief elicitation was incentivized through
a quadratic score rule, plus a fixed amount of 4 euros.
In part 3, subjects received a noisy feedback about their relative performance.
The noisy feedback procedure was based on Eil and Rao (2011): 3 out of the 9
members of the group were randomly selected and the participant was informed,
for each of them, if he ranked higher or lower. Thus, each subject could receive
11Specifically, the comparison group is made of 64 subjects with similar demographic characteristics
and from the same geographical area, who took the same test at GATE-Lab in 2015.
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four kinds of feedback: 3 people performed better than him, 2 people performed
better than him, 1 person performed better than him or 0 person performed better
than him. To rule out inattention, subjects were asked to repeat the information
right after receiving the feedback. Then, we measured subjects’ posterior beliefs
on their relative rank. Individuals were asked to estimate, in percentage, the like-
lihood that they were in the upper half of the ranked group.
Part 4 (filler task) consisted in a real-effort task, similar to Abeler et al. (2011):
subjects had five minutes to count the number of zeros in tables containing zeros
and ones and had to report the correct number for each table. They were paid 0.2
euro per correct report, plus a fixed amount of 5 euros.
In part 5 (filler task), subjects were endowed with 2 euros and had to decide
how many cents to put in a risky investment in which the amount invested has
one chance out of three to be multiplied by 2.5 and two chances out of three to
be void (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). They received a fixed payment of 3 euros in
addition to the investment return.
Finally, in part 6 (filler task) subjects filled a socio-demographic questionnaire,
which paid a fixed amount of 5 euros.
2.3.1.2 Session 2
Session 2 took place one month later and consisted in five parts. Session 2 com-
bines the recall elicitation task of Zimmermann (2019) with a mood induction
procedure based on Andrade et al. (2015).
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Session 2 started with part B. Subjects were asked to report their affective
state and to answer a self-image questionnaire. This part mirrored part A in ses-
sion 1 and aimed at controlling for the idiosyncratic baseline levels and variations,
in both affect and self-esteem.
Part C was treatment-specific. Subjects watched a video clip which combined
two excerpts from commercial movies. Depending on the treatments group, the
clip was meant to induce either positive, negative or neutral affective state. In
the Positive treatment, people watched an excerpt from “The Dinner Game” and
one from “Les trois frères”.12 In the Negative treatment, the excerpts were from
“American History X” and “Schindler’s List”. In the neutral treatment, they were
from “Blue” and “The Lover”. Video clips were carefully chosen from the database
of Schaefer et al. (2010), that assesses the relative efficiency of a large sample of
clips in inducing different emotions.13 For each treatment, we selected the two ex-
cerpts that have been ranked as the most effective ones in inducing – respectively
- amusement and negative affect, as well as two neutral excerpts for the control
group. After watching the video, subjects were asked to report their affective
reaction using a Self-Assessment Manikin (Bradley and Lang, 1994), where they
assessed the affective valence (from “clearly positive” to “clearly negative”) and
intensity (from “not intense at all” to “very intense”) of their emotional experience.
In addition, they were asked to choose from a list of emotions the one that best
described their feeling. These self-reported measures, which are very common in
the literature on emotions, were meant to check that the treatments triggered the
12These films are famous comedies in France. According to www.senscritique.com, “The Dinner
Game” in ranked the 2nd best French comedy of all times and had more than 9 million admissions in
the box office. “Les trois frères” is ranked the 10th best French comedy and had more than 6.8 million
admissions in the box office.
13Schaefer et al. (2010)’s study was conducted less than ten years ago, using videos in French language,
on a sample of French-speaking European students, which make it particularly suitable for replication
in our context. In their study, 364 subjects viewed the video clips in individual laboratory sessions and
rated each video on multiple dimensions. Results shows that the video clips were effective with regard
to several criteria such as positive and negative affect, arousal and emotional discreteness.
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desired mood. Both our mood-induction technique and our mood-manipulation
check closely replicated Andrade et al. (2015)’s design.
Part 7 dealt with two recall tasks. Subjects were asked to briefly summarize
each part of session 1 in one sentence and were paid 0.5 euro for a sufficiently
accurate description. Once the summary was completed, they were recalled that
in session 1 they took an IQ test and received feedback about their relative per-
formance within a randomly selected group. Thereafter, we asked them to recall
and report how many people ranked higher than them. Possible answers were “3”,
“2”, “1”, “0” or “I don’t recall”. Subjects were paid 2 euros if they recalled correctly.
This memory elicitation procedure accurately followed the design of the Recall
treatment in Zimmermann (2019).
In part D, we collected one additional piece of information. Subjects were asked
to recall the amount of their donation to the French Red Cross charity in part 1,
session 1. This measure allowed us to glimpse potential interactions between recalls
of two self-relevant traits: intelligence (feedback on IQ) and generosity (donation
to a charity).
Finally, in part E, subjects answered a short questionnaire providing some
feedback on the two sessions. In particular, they reported on a 10-item scale how
much confident they were with each recall task and how much effort they provided
to retrieve the information at stake.
2.3.2 Procedures
The experiment was programmed using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). It was con-
ducted at GATE-Lab (Lyon, France). The first session lasted on average 50 min-
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utes. The second session lasted on average 40 minutes. To reduce attrition and
to incentivize subjects to show-up in the second session, all payments from the
experiment were made at the end of the second session. At the end of the first
session, subjects only received 5 euros payoff for their participation. Moreover,
they were given a slip of paper stating the exact date and time of the second ses-
sion and were reminded twice via email about the second lab session. One month
after, subjects came back to the laboratory on the same weekday and daytime as
in session 1. They received 15 euros payoff plus the earnings made in one part
of the experiment randomly selected for payment. Subjects were informed of this
payment scheme at the very beginning of the experiment.
A total of 250 subjects were recruited, using Hroot (Bock et al., 2014). 25
subjects did not participate to the second session and are therefore excluded from
the analysis.14 96 subjects participated in the Neutral treatment, 60 in the Pos-
itive treatment and 69 in the Negative treatment.15 Table A2.1 in Appendix 2
summarizes the subjects’ characteristics in each treatment.
2.4 Behavioral Conjectures
The following section formulates the hypotheses predicted by the two competing
theories: self-enhancing memory and mood-congruent memory. We define positive
and negative feedback as follows: feedback is positive if the subject has received
14In Zimmermann (2019), subjects that did not show up for the second lab session received an email
with a Qualtrics link that allowed them to complete the study online within the following 24 hours. This
was not feasible in our case since we needed subjects to watch video clips in a controlled environment.
15More data will be collected to reach 120 subjects per treatment. This is the required number to
replicate the data analysis in Zimmermann (2019) (N=118 in the Recall treatment). The temporarily
imbalanced sample size observed between treatments results from a deliberate choice to collect data in
the Neutral treatment as a priority since it aims at replicating Zimmermann (2019)’s study and is the
baseline of our study.
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at least two positive comparisons out of three comparisons. Reversely, feedback is
negative if the subject has received zero or one positive comparison out of three
comparisons. A recall is correct if the participant recalls exactly the number of
positive comparisons he received in session 1.
In our design, each subject can be in one out of six possible states of the world
(2 × 3): they received either positive or negative feedback in session 1, and they
are assigned either to the Neutral, Positive or Negative treatment in session 2.
These six states of the world are represented by the six cells in Table 2.1. Each
letter describes the percentage of subjects who correctly recalled their number of
positive comparisons, in each possible state of the world. For instance, letter A
should be interpreted as the percentage of people who had a correct recall among
the people in the Neutral treatment who received a positive feedback. Since we use
a between-subject design, each case is computed on different individuals. Table
2.2 summarizes the predictions of both self-enhancement and mood-congruency
effects.
Table 2.1: Percentage of correct recalls conditional on the valence of feedback and of the
mood.
Participants’ mood
Neutral Positive Negative
Positive feedback A C E
Negative feedback B D F
Note: Negative feedback =1 if at least 2 out of the 3 com-
parisons with the randomly selected group members are neg-
ative.
Example: Among the people in the positive treatment who
received a positive feedback, C% recall their number of pos-
itive comparisons correctly.
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Table 2.2: Predictions
Zimmermann Self-enhancing Mood-congruent
Interpretation(2019) predicts memory predicts memory predicts
A > B A > B A > B Consistent with self-enhancing
and mood-congruent memoryC >D C >D
C > E Consistent with
mood-congruent memoryD < F
E > F E < F
Tests the relative dominance
of each effect
Note: Each letter describes the percentage of subjects who had a correct recall in each possible state
of the world in Table 2.1.
The Neutral treatment aims at replicating Zimmermann (2019) who finds that
individuals recall negative feedback with less accuracy compared to positive feed-
back. Our first conjecture is a replication of Zimmermann (2019).
Conjecture 1 (Replication of Zimmermann, 2019) : Under neutral mood16,
subjects recall negative feedback with less accuracy than positive feedback. Formally,
A > B.
In the Positive treatment (as in the Neutral treatment), both self-enhancement
and mood-congruency predict subjects to better recall positive feedback, although
for different reasons. Self-enhancing memory predicts positive feedback to meet an
individual’s demand for self-esteem. When the content of the feedback is poten-
tially harmful for oneself, subjects have motivational reasons to forget it. Mood-
congruency predicts people in non-negative mood to better recall non-negative
feedback. Since most people tend to be in a non-negative affective state –in par-
ticular, youngsters (Eurostat, EU-SILC 2013)– mood congruency predicts positive
feedback to be, on average, more accessible to recall. Therefore, observing higher
percentage of correct recall for positive than for negative feedback in the Neutral
16Neutral mood means that participants’ mood was not manipulated. Therefore, it can also be
understood as “in the absence of mood manipulation”.
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and Positive treatment is consistent both with self-enhancement effects and mood-
congruency effects.
To identify the existence of mood-congruency alone, one needs to compare the
percentage of correct recall between treatments. Mood-congruent memory pre-
dicts that being in a negative mood will trigger recall of negative feedback and,
reversely, that being in a positive mood will trigger recall of positive feedback.
Therefore, if mood-congruency plays a role in memory retrieval, negative feedback
should be recalled more accurately in the Negative treatment than in the Posi-
tive treatment, and vice-versa positive feedback. Self-enhancement is silent about
between-treatment comparisons. We state our second conjecture as follows:
Conjecture 2 (Mood-congruent Memory) : Subjects recall negative feedback
with more accuracy under negative mood than under positive mood. Symmetrically,
subjects recall positive feedback with more accuracy under positive mood than under
negative mood. Formally, C > E and D < F .
Self-enhancing and mood congruent memories predict similar outcomes in most
but not all situations. In the Negative treatment, self-enhancement predicts sub-
jects to better recall positive feedback. In contrast, mood-congruency predicts
individuals to better recall feedback that is congruent with their mood, i.e., neg-
ative feedback. Therefore, the particular case in which participants are in a neg-
ative mood allows us to disentangle relative dominance of the two effects. If self-
enhancing memory dominates, people should better recall feedback if the latter
is positive, regardless of their current mood. Therefore, self-enhancing memory
predicts E > F . If mood-congruent memory dominates, people should better
recall feedback if the latter is negative, since negative feedback is more accessi-
ble than positive one when mood is negative. Hence, mood-congruency predicts
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E < F . Importantly, neither outcome discards the existence of the alternative
effect, however it discards its dominance. We state our third conjecture as follows:
Conjecture 3 (Relative dominance of self-enhancing vs. mood-congruent
memory)
• If self-enhancing memory dominates, subjects under negative mood recall
more accurately positive feedback than negative feedback. Formally, E > F .
• If mood-congruent memory dominates, subjects under negative mood recall
more accurately negative feedback than positive feedback. Formally, E < F .
2.5 Results
A prerequisite of our experiment is that mood induction in Part C was effective.
Therefore, before presenting the results about memory effects, we first carefully
check whether Part C produced the desired affective states and report results
regarding participants’ mood elicitation.
2.5.1 Mood Induction
Participants’ mood was elicited through two channels traditionally used to inves-
tigate individuals’ emotions: emotional valence and emotional arousal.
Results on Emotional Valence: Emotional valence corresponds to the value
associated with a stimulus, as expressed on a continuum from pleasant to un-
pleasant. In our design, the stimulus was a video clip watched at the beginning
of session 2. After watching the video clip, a high self-reported valence indicates
that the stimulus was rather pleasant while a low self-reported valence indicates
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that the stimulus was rather unpleasant. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of self-
reported valence and arousal by treatment, on a two-dimension Valence-Arousal
space. Each dot represents one observation. It can be visually inferred that in the
Positive treatment (green squares) and Negative treatment (red triangles) partic-
ipants experienced a very different emotional valence (horizontal axis), compared
to participants in the Neutral treatment (black circles). Table 2.3 reports the aver-
age reported emotional valence and arousal after the treatment manipulation, by
treatment. The average reported valence (V hereafter) in the Positive treatment
(V=7.97) is significantly higher than the average reported valence in the Neutral
treatment (V=5.36, p<0.001, Mann-Whitney).17 Similarly, the average reported
valence in the Negative treatment (V=1.80) is significantly lower than the average
reported valence in the Neutral treatment (p<0.001, MW). The distribution of
the reported valence is also significantly different between treatments (p<0.001,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for all pairwise comparisons). Therefore, participants
in the Positive treatment had a significantly (at a 1% level) more pleasant experi-
ence than participants in the Neutral and Negative treatments, and participants in
the Negative treatment had a significantly (at a 1% level) less pleasant experience
than participants in the Neutral and Positive treatments.
Results on Emotional Arousal: Emotional arousal corresponds to the self-
reported intensity associated with a stimulus, as expressed on a continuum from
not intense at all to very intense (9-item scale). It can be inferred from Figure 2.2
that arousal (vertical axis) is higher in the Positive and Negative treatments than
in the Neutral treatment. Table 2.3 shows that emotional arousal (A hereafter)
is significantly higher in the Negative (A=7.17) and Positive (A=4.97) treatments
than in the Neutral treatment (A=3.31, p<0.001, MW tests). The distribution
17In all non-parametric tests reported in this paper, each individual gives one independent observa-
tion, and all tests are two-sided.
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of reported arousal is also significantly different between treatments (p<0.001,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests). Therefore, participants in the Positive and Negative
treatments experienced significantly (at a 1% level) more intense emotions than
participants in the Neutral treatment.
Table 2.3: Summary statistics - Participants’ mood after treatment manipulation
Treatment
Neu. Pos. Neg.
(1) (2) (3)
Emotional Valence 5.36 7.97*** 1.80***
(1: clearly negative; 9: clearly positive) (1.35) (1.25) (1.43)
Emotional Arousal 3.31 4.97*** 7.17***
(1: not intense at all; 9: very intense) (1.95) (2.03) (1.86)
N 96 60 69
Notes: p-values are from two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests. The Positive and
Negative treatments are compared to the Neutral treatment. Standard devi-
ation in parentheses. One observation per individual. *** p<0.01.
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Note: each dot represents one individual. For a better view, we used the
“jitter” option in Stata that differentiates dots located in the same position.
Figure 2.2: Valence-Arousal 2-dimensional space, by treatment
Participants were also asked to choose from a list of six sets of emotions the
one that best described their emotion after having watched the video. Participants
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could choose only one category of emotions. If watching the video successfully
triggered different affective states, participants should have reported different cat-
egories of emotions depending on the treatment they were assigned to. Table 2.4
reports the percentage of participants by category of emotions and by treatment.
In the Positive treatment, 90% of the participants reported that the category of
emotions that best described their feeling was either “Excited, enthusiastic, happy”
or “Calm, relax, peaceful”, which in both cases are positive emotions. By contrast,
in the Negative treatment 89.85% of the participants stated that they were either
“Anxious, scared, terrified” or “Sad, depressed, unhappy”, which are both negative
emotions. In the Neutral treatment, 57.29% of the participants chose a category
with a neutral valence (either “Bored, disinterested, jaded” or “Neutral (no emo-
tional reaction)”).
Table 2.4: Reported category of emotions that best described actual affective state after
treatment manipulation (in %)
Treatment
Neu. Pos. Neg.
Anxious, scared, terrified 10.42% 0% 55.07%
Sad, depressed, unhappy 4.17% 0% 34.78%
Bored, disinterested, jaded 5.21% 3.33% 2.90%
Neutral (no emotional reaction) 52.08% 6.67% 5.80%
Excited, enthusiastic, happy 2.08% 68.33% 1.45%
Calm, relax, peaceful 26.04% 21.67% 0%
N 96 60 69
Imported Emotions: Since our treatments manipulate participants’ mood, it
is important to control for participants’ mood when they arrived at the lab. In-
deed, it is possible that participants’ mood is affected by characteristics indepen-
dent from the experiment (e.g., weather, events experienced before coming to the
experiment, etc.), and such potential heterogeneity needs to be controlled both
within and between treatments. At the beginning of the first and the second ses-
sion, participants were asked to fill in questionnaires related to their affective state
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and to their self-image. These non-incentivized questionnaires allowed us to con-
trol for idiosyncratic baseline levels as well as heterogeneous exogenous variations,
both in affective state and self-esteem. Table A2.2 in Appendix 2 summarizes the
average answers in this questionnaires, both across sessions and across treatments.
It shows that participants’ affective state and self-esteem when they arrived at
the lab are not significantly different either between treatments (Mann Whitney-
tests), or between sessions (Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Therefore, the different
moods observed between treatments result from our treatment manipulation and
not from idiosyncratic heterogeneity or variations between the first and second
sessions initial states.
Overall, these results show that the treatment manipulation (watching different
video clips) successfully induced the desired affective states.
2.5.2 Memory Accuracy
First, we investigate the average percentage of correct recalls of feedback in the
IQ test. A recall is correct if the participant recalls exactly the number of positive
comparisons he received in session 1. Then, we consider an alternative measure
of recall. Instead of investigating the percentage of correct recalls of feedback, we
investigate how well subjects recall the parts related to the IQ test.18
2.5.2.1 Memory Accuracy of feedback
Figure 2.3 depicts the percentage of correct recalls of feedback for the different
levels of comparisons, by treatment. Results from the Recall treatment in Zim-
mermann (2019), which exactly corresponds to the parts named by a digit in Figure
2.1, are represented by the black-dashed line. Our Neutral treatment (black line)
18This alternative measure of recall is also considered by Zimmermann (2019), Section 3.2.3 p.19.
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is expected to replicate and replicates results from Zimmermann (2019) when par-
ticipants have received 1, 2 or 3 positive comparisons: the percentage of correct
recalls substantially increases with the number of positive comparisons.19
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Figure 2.3: Average recall accuracy for different levels of comparisons, by treatment
We introduce our first result:
Result 1 (Replication of Zimmermann, 2019) : In the Neutral treatment,
subjects recall negative feedback with less accuracy than positive feedback.
Result 1 supports Conjecture 1.
Support for Result 1: Table 2.5 displays subjects’ percentage of correct recalls,
conditional on receiving positive feedback (2 or 3 positive comparisons) or negative
19When participants have received zero positive comparisons, we need to know the number of ob-
servations and the standard deviation in Zimmermann (2019)’s data to test whether the means are
significantly different between Zimmermann (2019)’s data and our Neutral treatment.
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feedback (0 or 1 positive comparisons), by treatment. In the Neutral treatment
(column 1) that replicates the Recall treatment in Zimmermann (2019), the average
percentage of correct recalls is 89% when the feedback is positive and 75% when
the feedback is negative (Table 2.5). The difference is significantly different at a
10% level (p=0.082, MW, N=96).20
Table 2.5: Average recall accuracy
Treatment
Treatment Neu. Pos. Neg. All
Pos. feedback (1) 0.89 0.81 0.90 0.87
(0.31) (0.40) (0.31) (0.34)
Neg. feedback (2) 0.75 0.69 0.74 0.73
(0.44) (0.47) (0.44) (0.44)
p-value (1)-(2) 0.082 0.301 0.102 0.014
N 96 60 69 225
Note: Negative feedback =1 if at least 2 out of the 3 compar-
isons with the randomly selected group members are negative.
P-values are from Mann-Whitney tests. The average recall
accuracy is not significantly different between treatments, re-
gardless of the valence of the feedback. One observation per
individual. Standard deviation in parentheses.
Example: Among the subjects in the Neutral treatment who
received positive feedback, 89% recall their feedback correctly.
Table 2.6 provides coefficients from linear probability models in which the de-
pendent variable is a dummy that is 1 if the participant correctly recalled the
number of positive comparisons and 0 otherwise. In Model (1) the independent
variables are a dummy that is equal to 1 if feedback was negative and 0 if it was
positive, and the three treatments (with the Neutral treatment as the reference
category). Model (2) includes the interactions between the valence of feedback
(positive vs. negative) and the treatments (Neutral, Positive and Negative). Mod-
els (3) and (4) additionally control for the predicted belief adjustment defined
as the belief adjustment if subjects would follow Bayes’ rule, and the Rank which
refers to subject’s rank in their group. These control variable allows us to replicate
20Assuming a power level of 0.8, the required sample size would be 116 observations per group to
have a difference significant at a 5% level.
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Zimmermann (2019), Table 3 (p.15). Model (1) shows that subjects that obtained
negative feedback recall this feedback with significantly less (at a 1% level) accu-
racy one month later, compared to subjects that received positive feedback. This
is also the case (at a 10% level) when controlling for the interaction terms between
the feedback and the treatments (Models (2) and (3)), and the predicted belief
adjustment (Model (3)).
Overall, these results replicate the findings of Zimmermann (2019): subjects
recall negative feedback with lower accuracy compared to positive feedback. One
main explanation for these results is that subjects’ memory is retrieved self-
servingly to enhance individuals’ self-image. This self-enhancement effect predicts
that individuals better recall positive than negative feedback to enhance their self-
image, which is consistent with the results in the Neutral treatment. Another
possible explanation, however, is that individuals simply retrieve feedback that is
associated to their current affective state. This associative recall mechanism could
explain why most individuals (those in positive or non-negative affective state)
would naturally better recall positive feedback, and could be at stake in Zimmer-
mann (2019)’s experiment in which participant’s mood is neither controlled nor
varied.21 We now investigate whether the observed participants’ asymmetric recall
on feedback could be driven by mood congruency.
We now introduce our second result:
21If we consider that experimental subjects are usually undergraduate students, their affective state
is very likely to be on the positive spectrum. More than 7 out of 10 Europeans aged between 16 and 24
report to have been happy all or most of the time during the four weeks prior to the survey. Less than
one over 10 reports to have been rarely or not happy at all (Eurostat, EU-SILC 2013). Indeed, one of
the most robust findings in happiness research is that well-being is U-shaped over the life cycle, so that
young adults tend to be happier than average (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008; Van Landeghem, 2012).
This is true for cognitive measures (life satisfaction) but also for affective measures (mood).
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Table 2.6: Recall Accuracy
Recall Accuracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
=1 if neg. feedback -0.141*** -0.146* -0.153* -0.024
(0.052) (0.077) (0.083) (0.118)
Neutral treatment ref. ref. ref. ref.
- - - -
Positive treatment -0.071 -0.085 -0.084 -0.103
(0.069) (0.089) (0.089) (0.084)
Negative treatment 0.003 0.008 0.010 0.004
(0.062) (0.076) (0.076) (0.072)
=1 if neg. feedback * Neu. treat. ref. ref. ref.
- - -
=1 if neg. feedback * Pos. treat. 0.029 0.027 0.074
(0.137) (0.137) (0.134)
=1 if neg. feedback * Neg. treat. -0.010 -0.010 0.002
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119)
Predicted belief adjustment 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
rank -0.031*
(0.017)
constant 0.889*** 0.892*** 0.883*** 0.976***
(0.047) (0.052) (0.052) (0.059)
N 225 225 225 225
Note: Results are from a linear probability model of the likelihood to correctly recall the
feedback. Negative feedback =1 if at least 2 out of the 3 comparisons with the randomly
selected group members are negative. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Result 2 (Existence of mood-congruent memory) : Subjects do not re-
call more accurately feedback that is congruent with their mood. More precisely,
subjects in the Negative treatment do not recall more accurately negative feedback
than subjects in the Positive treatment, and subjects in the Positive treatment do
not recall more accurately positive feedback than subjects in the Negative treatment.
Result 2 rejects Conjecture 2.
Support for Result 2: The mood-congruency effect predicts that individuals
recall with higher accuracy feedback that is congruent with their mood. There-
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fore, if mood-congruency affects participants’ memory accuracy on feedback, one
should observe higher percentage of correct recalls when the valence of the mood
is of same nature than the valence of the feedback to be recalled. There are two
situations in which feedback and mood are of same valence: when subjects had
to recall positive feedback in the Positive treatment and when subjects had to
recall negative feedback in the Negative treatment. If mood-congruency plays a
role in memory retrieval, one should observe higher percentage of correct recalls in
these two situations than when feedback and mood are of different valence. When
participants have to recall positive feedback and are in a positive mood (Posi-
tive treatment), the percentage of correct recalls is 81% (see Table 2.5). When
participants have to recall positive feedback but are in a negative mood (Negative
treatment), the percentage of correct recalls is 90% (p=0.307, MW). Therefore, af-
ter receiving positive feedback, the percentage of correct recalls is not higher when
feedback and mood are of same valence than when they have opposite valence.
When participants have to recall negative feedback and are in a negative mood
(Negative treatment), the percentage of correct recalls is 74%. When participants
have to recall negative feedback but are in a positive mood (Positive treatment),
the percentage of correct recalls 69%. This could be evidence of mood-congruence.
However, the difference is not significant (p=0.623, MW).
Looking at the interaction terms in Table 2.6 allows us to investigate further
whether mood-congruency may play a role in feedback retrieval. If, as predicted
by mood-congruency, negative feedback are better recalled when subjects are in
a negative mood, the interaction term between the valence of the feedback (=1 if
negative) and the Negative treatment should be positive and significant, meaning
that being in the Negative treatment increases the likelihood of recalling correctly
one’s feedback, compared to when being in the Neutral treatment. This is not the
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case (p=0.909, Table 2.6).
Overall, these results show no clear evidence of mood-congruent memory. In-
dividuals do not exhibit higher percentage of correct recalls when the feedback to
retrieve is congruent with their mood.
We now introduce our third result:
Result 3 (Relative Dominance) : In the Negative treatment, subjects recall
more accurately positive feedback than negative feedback. This result is consistent
with self-enhancing memory but not with mood-congruent memory.
Result 3 supports the dominance of self-enhancing memory.
Support for Result 3: Table 2.5 shows that, in the Negative treatment, the per-
centage of correct recalls is 90% when feedback is positive and 74% when feedback
is negative. The difference is significant at the 90% confidence threshold (p=0.102,
N=69, MW).22 Moreover, the negative coefficient of the interaction term between
the negative feedback and the Negative treatment in Table 2.6 shows that par-
ticipating in the Negative treatment does not alleviate the asymmetric recall bias
observed after subjects received positive vs. negative feedback: subjects that ob-
tained negative feedback recall this feedback with significantly less accuracy one
month later, even in the Negative treatment.
22In the Negative treatment, the required sample size would be 71 observations per group for a
difference significant at a 10% level, and 90 observations per group for a difference significant at a 5%
level.
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2.5.2.2 Memory Accuracy on IQ-related parts
To investigate further the driving force of asymmetric feedback recall, we consider
an alternative measure of recall and explore the recollection of IQ-related vs. non
IQ-related parts of the experiment. If memory accuracy is consistent with the self-
enhancement effect, one should observe lower average recall accuracy of IQ-related
parts for subjects that received negative feedback, compared to subjects who re-
ceived positive feedback, regardless of the treatment. If mood-congruent memory
also plays a role, one should observe higher average recall accuracy of IQ-related
parts for subjects that received negative feedback in the Negative treatment than
for subjects who received negative feedback in the Positive treatment. Symmet-
rically, one should observe higher average recall accuracy of IQ-related parts for
subjects that received positive feedback in the Positive treatment than for subjects
who received positive feedback in the Negative treatment.
Table 2.7 reports the average number of IQ-related parts correctly recalled by
subjects. On average, subjects who received positive feedback recall correctly 1.46
IQ-related parts. Subjects who received negative feedback recall on average 1.09
IQ-related parts. The difference is highly significant (p<0.001, MW). This ten-
dency is also observed when taking each treatment separately (see Table 2.7). By
contrast, the average number of recalled non IQ-related parts is not higher when
subjects received positive rather than negative feedback (see Table 2.7), thus con-
firming memory to be selective with respect to the IQ parts only.
Regarding the existence of mood-congruency, Table 2.7 shows that subjects
who received positive feedback in the Positive treatment recall on average 1.68 IQ
parts. Subjects who received positive feedback in the Negative treatment recall
on average 1.43 parts. This is consistent with mood-congruency (more accurate
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recall when mood is congruent with feedback), but the difference is not signifi-
cant (p=0.262, MW).23 Subjects who received negative feedback in the Negative
treatment recall on average 1.15 IQ-related parts. Subjects who received negative
feedback in the Positive treatment recall on average 1.03 IQ-related parts. This is
also consistent with mood-congruency, but again, the difference is not significant
(p=0.544, MW).24
To explore the relative dominance of each effect, we can compare the average
number of IQ-related parts correctly recalled in the Negative treatment, depending
on the nature of the feedback. When subjects received positive feedback, they re-
called on average 1.43 IQ-related parts. When subjects received negative feedback,
they recalled on average 1.15 IQ-related parts (p=0.089, MW). This finding sup-
ports the relative dominance of the self-enhancement effect over mood-congruency,
with 91% confidence.
Table 2.7: Average number of recalled parts (IQ vs. Non IQ related)
Recall Accu. of IQ parts Recall Accu. of Non IQ parts
Treatment Neu. Pos. Neg. All Neu. Pos. Neg. All
Pos. info (1) 1.30 1.68 1.43 1.46 1.32 1.32 1.53 1.38
(0.81) (0.60) (0.82) (0.76) (1.29) (1.05) (1.14) (1.16)
Neg. info (2) 1.08 1.03 1.15 1.09 1.46 1.55 1.28 1.43
(0.82) (0.87) (0.74) (0.80) (1.13) (1.12) (1.17) (1.14)
p-value (1)-(2) 0.202 0.002 0.089 <0.001 0.400 0.471 0.348 0.742
N 96 60 69 225 96 60 69 225
Note: Negative feedback =1 if at least 2 out of the 3 comparisons with the randomly selected group members
are negative. P-values are from Mann-Whitney tests. None of the average recall accuracy are significantly
different treatment, except the average recall accuracy when the feedback to recall was positive, between the
Neutral and Positive treatment (p=0.039, Mann Whitney test). One observation per individual. Standard
deviation in parentheses.
23Assuming a power level of 0.8, the required sample size would be 102 observations per group to
have a difference significant at a 10% level, and 130 observations per group for a type-I error rate of 0.05.
24Assuming a power level of 0.8, one would require more than 550 observations per group to have a
difference significant at a 10% level, and more than 700 observations per group for a difference significant
at a 5% level.
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Overall, these results –especially those observed in situations in which self-
enhancement and mood-congruency predict different memory outcomes– provide
support for the existence of the former effect over the later. This is observed re-
gardless of the variable used to measure recall accuracy: memory of feedback itself
or memory of the parts related to the IQ test.
In the following section, we investigate subjects’ memory errors, which refer to
the direction and magnitude of subjects’ recalls when they do not recall their feed-
back correctly. Investigating memory errors is interesting for two reasons. First,
it allows us to investigate whether memory errors are symmetrically distributed
around zero (imperfect memory), or whether they are biased (motivated memory).
Second, it allows us to explore another dimension of subjects’ memory in which
both self-enhancement and mood-congruency may play a different role than the
one observed when focusing on memory accuracy only.
2.5.3 Direction of Memory Errors
We define a recall error as the difference between the actual number of nega-
tive comparisons and the recalled number of negative comparisons (Zimmermann,
2019). A positive value means that the subject has underestimated the number of
negative comparisons and thus exhibits an optimistic recall bias. By contrast, a
negative value means that the subject has overestimated the number of negative
comparisons and thus exhibit a pessimistic recall bias.
Table 2.8 summarizes the results from a linear probability model in which the
dependent variable is the recall error. In Model (1) the independent variables in-
clude a dummy equal to 1 if the feedback to recall was negative and 0 if it was
positive, and the three treatments (with Neutral treatment as the reference cat-
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egory). Model (2) includes also interaction terms between the feedback (positive
vs. negative) and the treatments (Neutral, Positive and Negative). Models (3)
and (4) additionally control for the predicted belief adjustment defined as the be-
lief adjustment if subjects would follow Bayes’ rule, and the Rank which refers to
subject’s rank in their group. Table 2.8 shows that subjects who received negative
feedback misremember in an optimistic way. Namely, they overestimate the num-
ber of positive comparisons they received. This is the case regardless of the model
specification.
The coefficient of the third interaction term in Table 2.8 (which is equal to 1 if
subjects had to recall negative feedback in the Negative treatment) is negative and
weakly significant, at a 10% level. This may suggest instances of mood congruency,
since subjects who received negative feedback in the Negative treatment exhibit
less optimistic recall than subjects who received negative feedback in the Neutral
treatment. Regardless, self-enhancement effects still dominate: overall, the model
predicts memory errors to be positive in each treatment.
Overall, these results show that, just like memory accuracy, memory errors
are self-serving: when they do not recall correctly, individuals exhibit overly op-
timistic recalls of past feedback. By contrast, we do not find clear evidence of
mood-congruency, although the weakly significant (at a 10% level) negative coeffi-
cient estimated for participants in the Negative treatment may suggest a mitigating
effect of negative mood on optimistic memory errors.
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Table 2.8: Memory errors
Memory errors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
=1 if neg. feedback 0.316*** 0.366*** 0.361*** 0.457***
(0.070) (0.117) (0.118) (0.157)
Neutral treatment ref. ref. ref. ref.
- - - -
Positive treatment 0.029 -0.031 -0.031 -0.044
(0.096) (0.119) (0.119) (0.115)
Negative treatment -0.032 0.129 0.130 0.126
(0.078) (0.101) (0.101) (0.099)
=1 if neg. feedback * Neu. treat. ref. ref. ref.
- - -
=1 if neg. feedback * Pos. treat. 0.138 0.137 0.172
(0.190) (0.192) (0.196)
=1 if neg. feedback * Neg. treat. -0.281* -0.281* -0.272*
(0.150) (0.150) (0.151)
Predicted belief adjustment 0.0004 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Rank -0.023
(0.022)
Cons. -0.133*** -0.162* -0.168** -0.099
(0.045) (0.082) (0.084) (0.088)
N 225 225 225 225
Note: Linear probability model of the difference between recalled and actual number of
positive feedback. Negative feedback =1 if at least 2 out of the 3 comparisons with the
randomly selected group members are negative. Rank refers to subject’s rank in their group.
Predicted belief adjustment is defined as the belief adjustment if subjects would follow Bayes’
rule. Standard errors in parentheses. One observation per individual. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
2.6 Conclusion
This study is the first experiment aimed at jointly testing two well-documented
memory effects: mood-congruency and self-enhancement. Our design creates con-
trolled situations where the two theories predict different outcomes and thereby
allows us to identify their respective roles in the dynamic of false beliefs about
the self. We provide empirical ground for the ongoing debate in bounded ratio-
nality research about how to interpret rationality failures: on the one hand, the
self-enhancement models grant large meta-cognitive control; on the other hand,
congruency models assume an underlying heuristic process without intentionality.
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In doing so, we mediate between two parallel strands of literature.
Our laboratory experiment combines the designs by Zimmermann (2019) and
Andrade et al. (2015) to study self-relevant feedback recollection under different
moods. Our results replicate and extend Zimmermann (2019)’s. First, everything
else equal, people tend to display better recall of positive than negative feedback.
Second, individuals exhibit overly optimistic recalls: they overestimate the number
of positive feedback and under-estimate the number of negative feedback. On the
contrary, even though our mood-manipulation proves to be effective in inducing
the desired affective state, we find no or limited evidence of the effect of mood
on asymmetric recall. Individuals do not recall more accurately feedback that is
congruent to their mood.
One possible explanation for the null results of mood-congruency is the size of
our experimental sample. If the detectable effect of mood-congruency is smaller
than the one of self-enhancement, we may fail to observe the former because of a
lack of power in our tests. Importantly, this explanation would corroborate the
dominance of self-enhancement effects. Although our standard 2D-video technique
successfully induces different emotional states, using more involving techniques,
such as virtual reality goggles (see Mol, 2019) may help increasing the detectable
effect of mood-congruency. Alternatively, it could be the case that the current
affective state is not the most relevant cue for retrieval. In real life, self-relevant
feedback can be embedded with negative emotions but with also other types of
cues such that situations, images, sounds, etc. (Enke et al., 2019). Therefore, an
alternative possibility to investigate the relative role of associative memory and
self-enhancing memory in asymmetric recall of feedback would be to use such other
types of context-dependent and not mood-dependent cues.
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Overall, while we cannot rule out the existence of mood-congruency, it does
not appear to be the dominant force. Instead, self-enhancement predictions are
confirmed. These results underline the importance of motivational over affective
factors in the formation of optimistic beliefs about the self. The relative dominance
of self-enhancement offers direct implications for policies aimed at mitigating or
removing biased judgments. Insofar as individuals mostly distort their memory
because they consider negative feedback to be potentially harmful, removing ex-
ante aversion to negative feedback should be the focus of this policy agenda.
Appendices
A1: Instructions (translated from French)
SESSIONS 1
(Instructions On paper)
Welcome!
Thank you for participating in this experience. By registering for this experience,
you agree to participate in two sessions:
. - a first session that is taking place today
. - a second session to be held in one month, on [date], at [daytime].
Today, you will receive a fixed payoff of 5 euros for your participation in this
first session. In one month, you will receive a fixed payoff of 15 euros for your
participation in the second session. In addition to these 5+15=20 euros, you can
earn extra money depending on the decisions you make during the experiment.
The total of your additional earnings will be paid to you in cash in one month,
together with the 15 euros.
In total, the experience is composed of 10 parts. In each part, you can earn extra
money. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one of
the 10 parts. Your payoff will correspond to the earnings made in the randomly
selected part.
This experience is anonymous. The data generated in this experiment will only
be used for scientific purposes. The researchers conducting this study are the only
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people involved in the data collection and analysis process. This is true for both
sessions of the experiment.
Throughout this session, it is forbidden to communicate with other participants
and to use your mobile phones, tablets, etc.
The experiment will be conducted via computer. The experimenter will soon start
the computer program. For each part of the experiment, you will be precisely
instructed about your task and/or the decision problem you will be facing. For
each part, you will receive specific instructions on your task and/or the decision
problem you will face. Once you have read and understood the instructions, you
can press the OK button to continue.
If you have any questions, you can press the red button on the left or right of your
desktop at any time during the experiment. An experimenter will come to answer
your question in private.
(Computerized Instructions)
We started by eliciting subjects’ personal code. Subjects needed to enter the
their day and month of birth plus the last four digits of their phone number. The
resulting code was also elicited in the session one month later and allowed us to
link participants’ responses.
Please enter in the box below the day and month of birth of your father and
mother, as well as your own day and month of birth. This code will be requested
during the second session of the experiment in five weeks’ time.
NEXT SCREEN
Before we begin Part 1, we would like to ask you a few questions. For each
statement, please check the box that best describes your experience.
NEW SCREEN
(Emotional questionnaire)
For each statement, please check the box that best describes your feelings (0 means
"not at all", 10 means "completely").
- Overall, are you feeling happy at the moment?
- Overall, are you satisfied with your life at the moment?
- Overall, are you feeling calm and/or relaxed at the moment?
- Overall, could you say that you feel at peace with yourself at the moment?
- Overall, could you say that you are feeling full of energy at the moment?
- Overall, are you feeling tired at the moment?
- Overall, are you feeling stressed and/or worried at the moment?
- Overall, could you say that you are often bored at the moment?
- Overall, are you feeling angry at the moment?
- Overall, do you often feel lonely?
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NEW SCREEN
(Self-efficacy questionnaire)
For each statement, please check the box that best describes your experience.
- I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.
- If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want.
- It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.
- I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events.
- Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations.
- I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort.
- I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abili-
ties.
- When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions.
- If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution.
- I can usually handle whatever comes my way.
NEW SCREEN
Part 1
In this part, you are endowed with 10 euros. You can decide if you want to donate
a part of these 10 euros to the French Red Cross. The French Red Cross helps
people in different situations of need. It is especially active in areas of health and
social emergency situations, but is also very engaged in providing help for refugees.
You can decide if you want to donate some part of the 10 euros to the French Red
Cross. You can donate every whole number amount up to 10 euros, or you can
keep the 10 euros for yourself. If you decide to donate a positive amount, the ex-
perimenter will donate this amount to the French Red Cross after the experiment.
The part of the 10 euros that you don’t donate will increase your earning from
this part of the experiment.
Which amount (in euros) would you like to donate?
NEW SCREEN
Part 2
In this part you receive 4 euros. Depending on your decisions you can earn addi-
tional money. In the following, you will go through a Raven IQ-test. This test is
frequently used to measure intelligence. It is often found that performance in the
test is associated with educational success and future income. The test consists of
10 tasks, and you have 10 minutes to solve it. You should try to correctly solve as
many of the 10 tasks as possible.
NEW SCREEN
Subjects had to solve 10 Raven matrices.
NEW SCREEN
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The exact same IQ test you just did was also conducted with a large number of
participants who previously, exactly like you, participated in an experiment in the
Gate-Lab. We randomly selected 9 of these participants. Together with these 9
participants you now form a group of 10 participants.
We constructed a ranking of this group based on performance in the IQ test. The
group member that scored highest in the IQ test obtained rank 1. The group
member with the second highest score obtained rank 2, etc... The group member
with the worst performance in the IQ test obtained rank 10. In case of a draw
between group members, the computer randomly decided who receives the higher
rank.
In the following, we are interested in how you think you ranked in terms of IQ in
the group of 10. We will ask you two questions. In both questions your earnings are
higher, the more precise the estimate is you provide. The computer will randomly
select one of the two questions, and this question will then be relevant for your
earnings from this part of the experiment.
NEW SCREEN
First, we are interested in what you think is the likelihood (in percent) that you
ranked in the upper half of the group. In other words, what do you think is the
likelihood that in the group of 10, your rank is 5 or higher?
You will be paid based on the following formula: Y our payment (in euros) =
2 − 2(I(rank ≤ 5) − beliefs = 100)2, where I(rank ≤ 5) is an indicator variable
that takes the value 1 if your rank was in the upper half of the ranking, and p is
your estimate in percent.
While this formula might look complicated, the basic idea is very simple. On
average, your earnings are highest if you try to estimate as accurately as possible.
In other words, the formula is such that it is best for you to provide an estimate
that is as precise as possible. Your maximum earnings from your estimate are 2
euros, negative earnings are not possible.
On the next screen you can provide your answer.
NEW SCREEN
You can now enter your estimate. You can only enter whole numbers. The lowest
possible number is 0 (percent). The highest possible number is 100 (percent).
I think the likelihood (in percent) that I rank in the upper half of the group of 10
is:
Subjects had to enter their estimate
NEW SCREEN
Your estimate of the likelihood (in percent) of ranking in the upper half of the
group of 10 was: number displayed
Second, we are interested in how you would estimate the likelihood of holding
specific ranks in the group of 10. We will first ask you to state an estimate for
each of the 5 highest ranks. So what do you think is the likelihood that your rank
is 1, what do you think is the likelihood that your rank is 2 etc., until rank 5.
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Notice that the sum of the 5 estimates you provide must equal your estimate of
ranking in the upper half of the groups of 10.
IMPORTANT: The sum of your 5 estimates must be equal to: number displayed
Afterwards we will ask you to state an estimate for each of the 5 lowest ranks.
Notice that you will be paid for your estimates based on a similar formula as
before. In case this question is payoff-relevant, the computer will randomly select
one of the 10 ranks, and your earnings will be based on the following formula:
Y our payment (in euros) = 2 − 2(I(rank) − p = 100)2, where I(rank) is an
indicator variable that takes the value 1 if this is indeed your rank, and p is your
estimate for this rank in percent. So again, you should try to estimate as accurate
as possible.
On the next screen you can enter your answers.
NEW SCREEN
You can now enter your estimates. You can again only enter whole numbers.
Again notice that the sum of your 5 estimates must be equal to: number displayed
Subjects had to enter their estimates
NEW SCREEN
Next, we are interested in how you would estimate the likelihood of holding each
of the ranks 6-10. So what do you think is the likelihood that your rank is 6, what
do you think is the likelihood that your rank is 7 etc., down to 10.
The sum of your 5 estimates must be equal to: number displayed
You can now enter your estimates below. You can again only enter whole numbers.
Subjects had to enter their estimates
NEW SCREEN
Part 3
In this part of the experiment, you receive 5 euros. Earlier you did a test to
measure your intelligence. On the basis of your performance in the IQ test and
the performance of 9 other randomly selected participants, we created a ranking.
(You were, however, not informed about your position in this ranking.) We now
randomly selected 3 out of the 9 other participants from your group. On the next
screen we will inform you, for each of these 3 participants, whether you ranked
higher or lower in terms of the IQ test.
NEW SCREEN
Of the 3 randomly selected participants from your group...
- Number of participants that ranked higher than you in terms of IQ: number
displayed
- Number of participants that ranked lower than you in terms of IQ: number dis-
played
NEW SCREEN
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Please repeat the feedback you just received. Of the 3 randomly selected partici-
pants from your group:
- How many ranked higher than you in terms of IQ? subjects had to insert number
- How many ranked lower than you in terms of IQ? subjects had to insert number
NEW SCREEN
We will now again ask you about the group consisting of yourself and the other 9
randomly selected participants. On the next screen, we will ask you how you now
estimate your rank in this group in terms of IQ.
NEW SCREEN
What do you think now. What is the likelihood (in percent) that you ranked in
the upper half of the group. In other words, what do you think is the likelihood
that in the group of 10, your rank is 5 or higher?
You will again be paid based on the following formula:
Y our payment (in euros) = 2 − 2(I(rank ≤ 5) − beliefs = 100)2, where I(rank
5 or higher) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if your rank was in
the upper half of the ranking, and p is your estimate in percent. Again: While
this formula might look complicated, the basic idea is very simple. On average,
your earnings are highest if you try to estimate as accurately as possible. In other
words, the formula is such that it is best for you to provide an estimate that is
as precise as possible. Your maximum earnings from your estimate are 2 euros,
negative earnings are not possible.
On the next screen you can provide your answer.
NEW SCREEN
You can now enter your estimate. You can only enter whole numbers. The lowest
possible number is 0 (percent). The highest possible number is 100 (percent).
I think the likelihood (in percent) that I rank in the upper half of the group of 10
is: Subjects had to enter their estimate
NEW SCREEN
Part 4
In this part you receive 5 euros. Depending on your decisions you can earn ad-
ditional money. Your task in this part is to count the number of zeros in tables.
Once you have counted the number of zeros in a table, click OK. If you counted
correctly, a new table will be generated. If you miscounted, you can try again
twice. In other words, you have three tries per table. You receive 0.2 euros per
correctly solved table. If you miscount a table three times, 0.2 euros will be de-
ducted from your earnings. You have 4 minutes to count as many tables as you
can.
Subjects had 4 minutes to work on the task.
NEW SCREEN
Part 5
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In this part you receive 3 euros. Depending on your decisions you can earn ad-
ditional money. You need to decide, how much money you want to invest in a
lottery. You obtain an endowment of 200 cents. You can invest any amount be-
tween 0 and 200 cents in the lottery. The amount you choose not to invest will
be directly added to your earnings. The lottery works as follows: The computer
decides randomly if you win or loose in the lottery. The probability that you win
is 1/3, the probability that you loose is 2/3. If you loose the lottery, you loose
the amount you invested. If you win the lottery, the amount you invested will be
multiplied by factor 2.5. This amount will then be added to your earnings from
this part.
On the next screen, you can decide how much you want to invest.
NEW SCREEN
I would like to invest: subjects could enter the investment amount.
NEW SCREEN
Part 6
In this part of the experiment, we will ask you a series of question. In this part
you earn 5 euros. On the next screen, the questions begin.
NEW SCREEN
We collected a number of socio-demographics, e.g., gender, age, field of study.
END
SESSIONS 2
(On paper)
Welcome!
On [date of the experiment ], one month ago, you participated in an experiment.
Today this experiment continues. One month ago you earned a fixed payment of
5 euros. For participating today, you obtain 15 euros. Thus, in total you receive
a fixed payment of 20 euros. You can earn additional money. How much money
you will earn depends on your decisions today and one month ago.
This experience is anonymous. The data generated in this experiment will only
be used for scientific purposes. The researchers conducting this study are the only
people involved in the data collection and analysis process. This is true for both
sessions of the experiment.
Throughout this session, it is forbidden to communicate with other participants
and to use your mobile phones, tablets, etc.
The experiment will be conducted via computer. The experimenter will soon start
the computer program. For each part of the experiment, you will be precisely
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instructed about your task and/or the decision problem you will be facing. For
each part, you will receive specific instructions on your task and/or the decision
problem you will face. Once you have read and understood the instructions, you
can press the OK button to continue.
If you have any questions, you can press the red button on the left or right of your
desktop at any time during the experiment. An experimenter will come to answer
your question in private.
(Computerized)
We started by again eliciting subjects’ personal code to be able to match responses
between the two dates. Subjects needed to enter the day and month of their birth-
date plus the last four digits of their phone number.
Please enter in the box below the day and month of birth of your father and
mother, as well as your own day and month of birth. This code will be requested
during the second session of the experiment in five weeks’ time.
NEXT SCREEN
Before we starting the different parts of the experiment, we would like to ask you
a few questions. For each statement, please check the box that best describes your
experience.
NEW SCREEN
(Emotional questionnaire)
NEW SCREEN
(Self-efficacy questionnaire)
NEW SCREEN
Now, we would like you to watch a video clip. The video clip will appear on your
screen. Please make yourselves comfortable: the clip will last about 4 minutes.
Please click "next" to start watching the video clip.
NEW SCREEN
Now please indicate on the two manikin-like scales below how you emotionally
reacted to the video clip.
The overall emotional experience I felt while watching the video clip was ...
NEW SCREEN
The overall emotional experience I felt while watching the video clip was ...
NEW SCREEN
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Please indicate the emotion that best captures what you have felt while watching
the movie clip. Only one option allowed: The movie clip made me feel...
- Afraid/Scared/Anxious
- Bored/Jaded/Uninterested
- Neutral (no emotional reaction)
- Excited/Eager/Enthusiastic
- Sad/Gloomy/Depressed
- Calm/Relaxed/Peaceful
NEW SCREEN
Part 7
In this part you receive 2 euros. Depending on your decisions you can earn addi-
tional money. Part 7 consists of 2 subparts. In case part 7 will be payoff-relevant,
one of the two subparts will be randomly selected and will determine your earnings.
NEW SCREEN
We would like to know which parts of the experiment one month ago you remem-
ber. Please try to summarize each part you remember in one sentence. For each
sufficiently accurate description of a part (as evaluated by the experimenter), you
earn 0.5 euros.
NEW SCREEN
In the following, please try to describe the different parts of the experiment 1
month ago (1 sentence for each part). In front of you, you find a sheet of paper.
Please write down your descriptions on the sheet of paper. Please inform the ex-
perimenter once you are finished.
The experiment continued once all subjects had handed in their answer sheets.
NEW SCREEN
As a reminder: 1 month ago you participated in an IQ test. We had conducted the
exact same IQ test you did with a large number of participants who previously,
exactly like you, had participated in an experiment in the Gate-Lab. We had
randomly selected 9 of these participants. Together with these 9 participants you
formed a group of 10 participants.
We had constructed a ranking of this group based on performance in the IQ test.
The group member that scored highest in the IQ test obtained rank 1. The group
member with the second highest score obtained rank 2, etc... The group member
with the worst performance in the IQ test obtained rank 10. In case of a draw
between group members, the computer randomly decided who received the higher
rank.
We had randomly selected 3 out of these 9 participants, and informed you, for
each of the 3 participants, whether you ranked higher or lower in terms of IQ.
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In the following, we would like to know if you remember how you ranked compared
to the three randomly selected participants. If you answer correctly, you receive 2
euros. On the next screen you can provide your answer.
NEW SCREEN
Of the 3 randomly selected participants from your group: How many ranked higher
than you in terms of IQ?
NEW SCREEN
Part 8
As a reminder: 1 month ago you were endowed with 10 euros and were given the
possibility to give part of this amount to the French Red Cross.
In the following, we would like to know if you remember how you ranked compared
to the three randomly selected participants. If you answer correctly, you receive 2
euros. On the next screen you can provide your answer.
NEW SCREEN
Out of 10 euros, how much did you give to the French Red Cross?
NEW SCREEN
Before the end of the experiment, we would like to ask you some questions. On
the next screen, the questions begin.
NEW SCREEN
Subjects were asked to guess the purpose of the study, and to report on a 10-
item scale how much confident they were with each recall task (IQ feedback and
donation) and how much effort they provided to retrieve the information at stake.
Then, the experiment ended.
END
A2: Tables
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Table A2.1: Summary statistics - Participants, by treatment
Treatment
Neutral Positive Negative
Male 62% 50% 51%
Age 24 26 25
Students 17% 13% 13%
Nb. neg. comparisons 1.71 1.45 1.58
Rank in IQ test 5.84 5.42 5.61
Nb. correct raven 6.07 6.28 6.25
Ave. nb. of subjects per session. 16 15 17.25
Note: this Table reports the results of two-tailed M-W tests and two-sample
tests of proportions in which each individual is taken as an individual ob-
servation. Positive and Negative treatments are compared to the Neutral
treatment
Table A2.2: Reported emotional state and self-esteem before treatment manipulation
Affective state Self-esteem
Neu. Pos. Neg. Neu. Pos. Neg.
Session 1 18.65 17.33 14.86 34.23 35.50 34.38
(16.65) (18.63) (19.36) (4.16) (5.35) (4.39)
Session 2 16.68 16.47 15.01 34.48 35.27 34.23
(16.26) (18.16) (19.36) (4.86) (5.60) (5.25)
Diff. 1.98 0.87 -0.12 -0.25 0.23 0.14
(14.41) (15.68) (14.98) (3.09) (3.33) (3.79)
Note: The difference between Session 1 and Session 2 is never significantly different from 0 (Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests). None of the reported value are significantly different from each other, except the average
reported self-esteem in session 1 between the Neutral and Positive treatment (p=0.073, Mann Whitney test).
Standard deviations are in parentheses. The affective state can range from -50 to 50. The self-esteem can
range from 11 to 44.
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Chapter 3
Motivated Memory of Unethical
Decisions1
I think as you go through life you do things that you forget
about them, and you try to look back and say: “Well, I was a
saint, I was good, everything I did was good, everything I
thought was good.”
Jack Abramoff, In It To Win: The Jack Abramoff Story
3.1 Introduction
In 2007, Alberto Gonzales, then US Attorney General under George W. Bush’s
presidency, was involved in the arbitrary firing of several U.S. Federal Attorneys.
During the Senate hearing, set up to investigate his role in the case, he claimed
amnesia and uttered the sentences “I don’t recall”, “I have no recollection” or “I
have no memory” more than 60 times. In 2012, rapper Lily Wayne declared to
the Court not recalling any of the criminal actions that were pending against him.
1This chapter is a joint work with Fabio Galeotti and Marie Claire Villeval.
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Examples of crime-related amnesia like this abound in legal judgments. Claims of
amnesia have been found to occur in murders (Taylor and Kopelman, 1984), sex-
ual harassment (Bourget and Bradford, 1995), domestic violence (Swihart et al.,
1999) or fraud (Kopelman et al., 1994). Often, crime-related amnesia is used as
an attempt to avoid responsibility for past misdeeds or to impede police investi-
gation. However, it can also be genuine amnesia in the sense that an offender is
unable to correctly retrieve memories of his or her past offenses (Cima et al., 2002).
Memory impairment is not only a prerogative of criminals and it does not only
concern serious offenses. Indeed, recent studies in psychology show that people
tend to forget the details of their past unethical behavior, so that they can think
of themselves as honest persons (Kouchaki and Gino, 2016; Stanley et al., 2017).
People care about being moral and exhibit perceived cheating aversion (Dufwen-
berg and Dufwenberg, 2018; Gneezy et al., 2018; Khalmetski and Sliwka, 2019;
Abeler et al., 2019); but sometimes, they engage in actions that may contradict
their desire for moral image. Forgetting may be used as a strategy to restore con-
sistency between their past actions and their demand for positive self-image. This
idea is well captured by the opening quote made by former lobbyist and convicted
felon Jack Abramoff during a 2012 interview at the University of Texas at Austin
while talking about his misdeeds.
What can individuals do to preserve their self-image after acting immorally?
Economists and psychologists have highlighted different strategies that people
adopt to preserve their self-image. For instance, individuals can avoid knowing
the consequences of their behavior (Feiler, 2014; Grossman and Van Der Weele,
2017), exploit norm-uncertainty about lying behavior to justify their own deci-
sion to lie (Bicchieri et al., 2019), claim that they have changed (Stanley et al.,
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2017), shift the blame onto someone else (Bartling and Fischbacher, 2011; Oexl
and Grossman, 2013), balance their moral behavior over time (Nisan and Kurtines,
2013; Ploner and Regner, 2013; Gneezy et al., 2014; Cojoc and Stoian, 2014), or use
narratives consisting in, for example, downplay the externalities and/or reinterpret
the circumstances of their actions (Bénabou et al., 2018). Another strategy that
individuals may use to preserve their moral self-image is to forget or manipulate,
either consciously or unconsciously, unwanted memories. This process of forget-
ting or distorting the memory is called motivated memory (Singer and Salovey,
1996). Motivated memory allows people to directly derive utility from thinking
of themselves in good terms. Beyond this purely hedonic motivation, motivated
memory may also be used as an instrument to justify future possibly unethical
actions. For example, if individuals are able to remember the eco-friendly actions
they sometimes undertake but systematically forget the environmentally irrespon-
sible ones, not only they will have a clean conscience from thinking of themselves
as eco-friendly persons (and derive a positive utility from it), but they can also
use these positive memories to justify future irresponsible acts.
In this study, we investigate the existence of motivated memory in the context
of dishonest decision-making. Despite the vast literature on unethical behavior
that has flourished in the last decade (for surveys, see Rosenbaum et al. 2014;
Irlenbusch and Villeval 2015; Jacobsen et al. 2018; Abeler et al. 2019), there is no
economic study investigating memory manipulation as a self-management mech-
anism to sustain moral self-image when acting dishonestly. We explore not only
whether individuals forget their past unethical behavior to sustain their desire for
moral self-image, but also whether they manipulate their memory as an excuse not
to engage in subsequent morally responsible behavior (in our experiment, giving
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back undeserved money).2 Indeed, motivated memory can be thought of as an
instrument, i.e., as something that is not only valued for its own sake (the hedo-
nic value of keeping a good image after a misconduct), but that also helps to get
something else that is valued for its own sake (keeping undeserved money). In
our study, memory manipulation can be used both as “post-violation justifications
[that] alleviate the experienced threat to the moral self” (Shalvi et al. 2015, p.1),
when participants forget that they have cheated in the past, and as “pre-violation
justifications [that] lessen the anticipated threat to the moral self” (Shalvi et al.
2015, p. 1), when dishonest participants plan to keep undeserved money which
they are expected to give back. In this respect, we provide the first experimental
test of the impact of anticipated decisions on memory manipulation.
To study whether individuals (i) manipulate the memory of past dishonest
choices, and (ii) use their memory as an instrument to justify their future deci-
sions, we conducted an on-line experiment that was divided into two parts sepa-
rated by three weeks. In the first part, participants were asked to play a repeated
“wheel game” — a modified version of the “mind game” (see Jiang, 2013; Shalvi
and De Dreu, 2014; Potters and Stoop, 2016; Gneezy et al., 2018) — in which
participants could misreport their outcomes to increase their payoff at no risk of
detection and sanction. The experimenter could infer whether a participant was
dishonest or not by comparing the distribution of the individual reports with a
uniform distribution but was not able to prove that a report was a lie. Three weeks
later, participants were asked to recall the distribution of the outcomes that they
reported in the first part, and were paid for the accuracy of their recalls. This
design allowed us to measure participants’ memory errors, defined as the differ-
2Our study strongly differs from the few ones in psychology that only investigate memory biases
as a consequence of past unethical behavior (Shu et al., 2011; Kouchaki and Gino, 2016; Stanley et al.,
2017). These few studies in psychology rely on attitudinal measures of memory rather than focusing on
behavior, and do not incentivize participants for providing truthful recalls.
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ence between the average reported outcome in the first part of the experiment and
the average recalled outcome in the second part, and to correlate the magnitude
of the memory error with the dishonesty of the participants. Systematic positive
memory errors capture motivated memory. Moreover, we varied between-subjects
whether participants were given or not the possibility to reduce their payoff by
a fixed amount at the end of the second part of the experiment. In the Hedonic
treatment, participants were not given this option. Hence, the only reason why
a dishonest participant could exhibit motivated memory was to maintain a moral
self-image. In the Instrumental treatment, participants were given the possibility
to reduce their payoff and they were especially encouraged to do so if they had
misreported many numbers to their advantage in the wheel game they performed
three weeks before. Therefore, it was made salient that dishonest participants
were expected to reduce their payoff. In this treatment, dishonest participants
could thus motivate their memory not only for hedonic reasons (i.e., preserving a
moral image) but also for instrumental reasons (i.e., not giving back part of the
undeserved money). In both treatments, honest individuals had no reason to ma-
nipulate their memory since accurate recalls were incentivized. So, any memory
errors on their side could be attributed to random rather than motivated forget-
ting, and these errors should be distributed around zero.
It is probably easier to recall a uniform distribution rather than a biased distri-
bution. Thus, in the Hedonic and Instrumental treatments, dishonest individuals
could display positive memory errors not because of motivated memory but be-
cause they had to recall a different distribution than the one faced by honest
individuals. To control for this, we ran Hedonic-Control and Instrumental-Control
treatments. These treatments are similar to the Hedonic and Instrumental treat-
ments, respectively, except that participants were not allowed to cheat in the first
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part of the experiment: they could not enter a number different from the actual
number displayed in the wheel. Moreover, the numbers they had to report reflected
the aggregate distribution of the numbers reported in the Hedonic and Instrumen-
tal treatments. In other words, these participants could observe uniform or non
uniform distributions. In these Control treatments, participants had no reason
to manipulate their memory. Yet, memory errors could be positive if forgetful
participants had a tendency to recall a uniform distribution. The comparison of
the Hedonic and Instrumental treatments with the Control treatments allowed us
to separate motivated memory from non-motivated forgetting. The comparison of
the memory errors in the Hedonic-Control versus Instrumental-Control treatment
additionally allowed us to control for the mere reaction to the possibility to give
money back, when no moral image is at stake. Since participants have no reason
to manipulate their memory (in both treatments they were not allowed to cheat
in part 1), we expect no difference in memory errors between the Hedonic-Control
treatment and the Instrumental-Control treatment.
Our results show that hedonic considerations — i.e., recalling oneself as an
honest person — were not sufficient to trigger a significant memory manipulation
in our setting. Dishonest individuals in the Hedonic treatment did not recall their
past decisions less accurately than participants in the Control treatments. By
contrast, when memory manipulation had an instrumental value — i.e., when for-
getting past lies could serve as a justification not to give undeserved money back —
dishonest individuals did recall their past behavior with less accuracy than partic-
ipants in the Hedonic and Control treatments, although this reduced their payoff
in the recalling task. This finding suggests that individuals recalled selectively as
a self-excusing strategy to justify anticipated future decisions. This confirms that
memory is involved in the various strategies people use to motivate their beliefs
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about themselves and justify they can behave immorally while keeping a positive
self-view.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews
the related literature. Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedures.
Section 4 outlines the behavioral conjectures. Section 5 reports the results and
section 6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Our study contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to bet-
ter understand moral reasoning when facing an opportunity to misbehave. Second,
it contributes to the recent but growing economic literature on motivated memory.
This section briefly reviews these two strands of the literature and illustrates how
our study contributes to each of them.
Many people sometimes act unethically without considering themselves as dis-
honest or immoral persons (Shalvi et al., 2015). The recent economic literature on
cheating and lying has tried to identify when and to which extent people lie, and
it has explored various strategies used by individuals to preserve their moral-self
while acting dishonestly.
Regarding the existence and extent of dishonest behavior, a large body of experi-
mental evidence shows that even in the absence of risk of detection and sanction,
not all people lie and when they do, most do not lie to the full extent (Abeler et al.,
2019). This was found both in the lab when participants misreport the outcome
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of a private random draw or overstate their performance in a task (e.g., Mazar
et al. 2008; Shalvi et al. 2011; Abeler et al. 2019; Gneezy et al. 2018; Kajackaite
2018), and in the field when individuals fraud in public transportation (Dai et al.,
2017), keep undeserved money (Azar et al., 2013; Potters and Stoop, 2016), do
not return misdirected letters containing cash (Keizer et al., 2008; Franzen and
Pointner, 2013; Andreoni et al., 2017) or keep found wallets containing money
(e.g., Cohn et al., 2019).3 In a meta analysis combining data from more than 90
experimental studies, Abeler et al. (2019) found that individuals forgo on average
about 75% of the potential gains by not lying maximally.
When individuals misbehave, they can experience intrinsic costs from behaving
dishonestly, from being potentially perceived as dishonest persons, and from the
violation of social norms (Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg, 2018; Gneezy et al., 2018;
Abeler et al., 2019; Khalmetski and Sliwka, 2019). While these costs can prevent
individuals from acting dishonestly and reveal a preference for truth-telling, they
may also trigger strategies used by individuals to behave self-interestedly while
keeping a good image. Identifying these strategies has been the focus of several
experimental studies in economics and psychology. Using dictator games, Dana
et al. (2007) found that participants exploit the uncertainty of the positive out-
comes in order to behave more selfishly. Feiler (2014) and Grossman and Van
Der Weele (2017) showed that dictators tend to avoid knowing the consequences
of their action on the receivers, while Oexl and Grossman (2013) reported that
dictators tend to shift the blame of unfair outcomes onto an intermediary. Closely
related to dishonesty, Stanley et al. (2017) showed that individuals judge their
own actions as more morally wrong for periods of the past when they considered
they were different persons than for periods of the past when they considered that
3see Rosenbaum et al. (2014); Irlenbusch and Villeval (2015); Jacobsen et al. (2018); Abeler et al.
(2019) for surveys on unethical behavior.
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they were very similar to whom they are today. Differently from these studies,
we explore another strategy that individuals may use to preserve their moral self-
image: motivated memory. We investigate whether individuals manipulate their
memory to lower the moral cost associated to dishonesty. In particular, we test
whether individuals use forgetting of past dishonest decisions to disguise their lies
to themselves and, thereby, maintain a positive self-image.
Few theoretical papers in economics tried to model motivated memory.4 Bén-
abou and Tirole (2002) modelled memory manipulation as the outcome of a game
played between the multiple selves of an individual. In equilibrium, the individual
forgets information that undermines his long-term goals (forgetting for instrumen-
tal reasons) or lowers his self-esteem (forgetting for hedonic reasons). Building
on Bénabou and Tirole (2002)’s self-deception framework, Gottlieb (2014) shows
that after observing a negative signal, the decision-maker faces a conflict between
forgetting the signal in order to have a better self-image but making a less ap-
propriate decision, or recalling it in order to make a better decision. When there
is no ex-post decision to make (i.e., when forgetting has only hedonic value), the
self-image factor takes over and the decision-maker recalls a negative signal with
probability below the actual percentage. When there is an ex-post decision and the
self-image and decision-making factors have opposite signs, the amount of mem-
ory manipulation depends on the difference between the marginal benefit and the
marginal cost of remembering.
Few experimental studies in economics have investigated the use of memory
as a self-deceptive mechanism to sustain positive self-image. Moreover, while the-
4The economic literature modelling cognitive limitation in recalls and their impact on belief forma-
tion and decision-making is substantial (Dow, 1991; Piccione and Rubinstein, 1997; Mullainathan, 2002;
Bénabou and Tirole, 2004; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Wilson, 2014;
Bordalo et al., 2017). However, they all consider memory as an imperfect or limited faculty of people
but not as a self-deceptive strategy used by individuals to sustain their demand for positive self-image.
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oretical models recognize both the hedonic and instrumental values of motivated
memory, the experimental literature has focused only on the hedonic motives of
motivated memory. Chew et al. (2018) showed that individuals exhibit asym-
metric recalls of past performance in an IQ test. Individuals forget more their
incorrect answers than their correct ones (selective amnesia) but they also ex-
hibit false memory, encompassing delusion (remembering a correct answer when
there was none) and confabulation (transforming a wrong answer into a correct
one). Zimmermann (2019) also provided evidence of asymmetry in the recall of
feedback on past relative performance in an IQ test. To study the dynamics of
motivated beliefs, he considered different treatments where he manipulated the in-
centives for correct recalling and the time between feedback and the elicitation of
beliefs. Zimmermann (2019) showed that individuals manage to suppress negative
feedback that threaten their desire to view themselves as intelligent persons. Indi-
viduals perfectly encoded feedback but recalled them asymmetrically one month
later. Using a word-entry task instead of an IQ test, Li (2017) showed that having
to forecast performance and receiving feedback both eliminate biased recalls. In
the social domain, Li (2013) investigated recollection of decisions in a trust game
by manipulating the delay between the decisions and the recollection. While he
found asymmetric recalls among trustors (betrayed trustors recall less accurately
their decisions than trustors who benefited from reciprocity), there was no clear
evidence of selective memory among trustees. Saucet and Villeval (2019) showed
that dictators remember more their altruistic than their selfish choices. A causal
effect of the responsibility of the decisions was identified, as the recall asymmetry
disappeared when options were selected randomly by the computer program. Carl-
son et al. (2018) showed that people misremember the extent of their selfishness
when their actions fall short of their own personal standards. While these studies
investigate motivated memory driven by self-image concerns in the domain of intel-
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lectual ability or social preferences, we focus on the memory of dishonest decisions.
More closely related to our study are two recent papers in psychology, by
Stanley et al. (2017) and Kouchaki and Gino (2016). In Stanley et al. (2017),
participants were asked to recall specific events from their personal pasts which
involved lying. Stanley et al. (2017) found that participants rated as less morally
wrong remembered events in which they were actor of the action than remem-
bered events in which they were the recipient of the action. Kouchaki and Gino
(2016) showed that memories of unethical actions gradually became less clear and
vivid than memories of ethical actions. They called this phenomenon “unethical
amnesia”: people forget the details of their unethical actions, so that they can
keep thinking of themselves as honest individuals. Kouchaki and Gino (2016) also
found that people who cheated a first time and forgot their past behavior were
more likely to cheat a second time. While we also investigate individuals’ recall
of honest vs. dishonest actions, in contrast to these studies we do not only focus
on motivated memory as a way to restore moral self-image but also as an excuse
to justify future behavior.5 In our study, participants know, before recalling, that
they may be tempted to keep undeserved money. Therefore, they can use unethical
amnesia as an excuse not to bend their moral self in the future.6
5In Kouchaki and Gino (2016), participants were not informed of the second cheating task when
being asked to recall their behavior in the first cheating task. Therefore, they could not, at any time in
the experiment, use forgetting as an excuse to cheat a second time.
6We also differ from Stanley et al. (2017) and Kouchaki and Gino (2016) in that i) we elicit memory
of the decision itself and not of the environment surrounding it; and ii) we incentivize correct recalls,
which creates a trade-off between manipulating one’s memory and losing money from inaccurate recall, or
recalling accurately and incurring potential moral cost from threatened self-image and unjustified future
questionable decisions. Stanley et al. (2017) control for difference in memory by asking participants to
rate on a 7 item-scale how well they remembered each event. Kouchaki and Gino (2016) measure memory
using items adapted from the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ) and the Autobiographical
Memory Questionnaire (AMQ), which assess various qualitative characteristics of one’s memory, notably
clarity (how vividly a person remembers an event) and thoughts and feelings (how a person remembers
the feelings and thoughts experienced during the event), also on item-scales. In none of the cases correct
recalls were incentivized.
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3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We describe the design of the experiment and then detail the procedures.
3.3.1 Experimental Design
Our experiment is divided into two parts separated by three weeks. In the first
past, participants played an original wheel game allowing them to misreport the
outcome of a random draw. Then, participants performed a word recognition task
to control for participants’ general memory capacity. In the second part that took
place three weeks later, participants were asked to recall the distribution of their
reports in the past wheel game. Instructions are included in Appendix 1. We now
describe each part in detail.
Part 1
Wheel Game
In the first part of the experiment, participants played an original “wheel game”.
A wheel with six empty squares was displayed on the participants’ screens (see
Figure 3.1). Participants had to choose one square. Once they had made a choice,
the program randomly displayed a number between 1 and 6 (included) in each
square of the wheel. Each number appeared only once in the wheel. Participants
were asked to report the number displayed in the square that they had previously
chosen.
There were two methods to choose the square in the wheel. Participants were
assigned randomly either the “mind” or “click” method. If participants were as-
signed the “mind” condition, they had to choose one square of the wheel in their
head before the numbers were displayed on the wheel. This means that the square
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they chose was not observable by the experimenter and they could misreport the
number appearing in the chosen square. In this condition, the wheel game is a
mind game (see e.g., Jiang, 2013; Shalvi and De Dreu, 2014; Potters and Stoop,
2016; Gneezy et al., 2018), with multiple outcomes. If participants were assigned
the “click” condition, they had to choose one square of the wheel by clicking on
it. The selected square was then highlighted in blue. This means that the square
they had chosen was observable by the experimenter. Participants in this condi-
tion could not misreport their outcome. If they reported a different number than
the number displayed in the square they had chosen, they received a pop-up mes-
sage saying that the entered number was not the right one.7 Participants were not
informed that they would be asked to recall the distribution of their reports in the
second part of the experiment three weeks later.
Participants played the wheel game 20 times. At the end of the second part
of the experiment, one wheel was selected at random among the 20. Participants’
earnings depended on the number that they reported for that wheel. They earned
$0.10 if they had reported “1”, $0.20 if they had reported “2”, $0.30 if they had
reported “3”, and so on and so forth, up to $0.60.
Recognition Task
Once they had played the wheel game, participants had to perform a word recogni-
tion task based on Roediger and McDermott (1995). This task was used to control
for participants’ general memory capacity. Participants were presented with five
lists of words. Each list contained six words belonging to the same lexical field.
Each word was displayed on the screen one by one for less than one second. Partic-
7The wheel game is close to the game used by Gneezy et al. (2018) in their Numbers treatment
in which participants were asked to click, in private, on one of ten boxes on a computer and reveal an
outcome. In our game participants choose one of six squares on a computer, either in their mind or by
clicking on it according to treatments.
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Notes: The Figure displays the wheel game played by participants in part 1. A
wheel with six empty squares was displayed on the screen (top-left wheel). Partic-
ipants chose one square of the wheel (middle wheel, square highlighted in blue for
illustration). When they had made their choice, the program then displayed a num-
ber between 1 and 6 (included) in each square of the wheel (bottom-right wheel).
Participants were asked to report the number displayed in the square that they had
chosen.
Figure 3.1: Wheel game
ipants were informed, before observing these words, that at the end of the session
they would have to recognize, among 35 words, some of the words that had been
shown to them earlier. More specifically, for each of the 35 words, they would have
to indicate whether it had been presented before. If they remembered having seen
the word before, they had to check the button “Old”. If they did not remember
having seen the word, they had to check the button “New”. The order of the 35
words was the same for all participants.
Participants earned $0.02 for each correct answer. After observing the five lists
of words, but before the recognition task, participants were asked to complete a
demographic questionnaire.
143
Chapter 3. Motivated Memory of Unethical Decisions
Part 2
Part 2 took place three weeks later. At the beginning of this part, participants
were informed that they might be given or not the possibility to reduce their payoff
by $0.75 at the end of the experiment, and whether they had or not this oppor-
tunity was determined randomly. If participants were given this possibility, they
would have to decide at the end of the experiment whether they were willing or
not to reduce their payoff by $0.75. We refer to this case as the “Instrumental”
condition.8 If participants were not given the possibility to reduce their payoff
by $0.75, they would have no decision to make at the end of the experiment and
their payoff would remain intact. We refer to this case as the “Hedonic” condition.
Participants were also informed that those who would be given the possibility to
reduce their payoff by $0.75 were especially encouraged to do so if they misre-
ported many numbers to their advantage in the wheel task they performed three
weeks earlier. Precisely, they received the following instructions: “At the end of
today’s part, you may be given or not the option to reduce your total earnings by
$0.75. It would be nice to reduce your total earnings if you are given this option
and you have misreported numbers to your advantage several times in the wheel
task that you performed three weeks ago”. Therefore, participants that had been
dishonest in the first part of the experiment and that were given the possibility to
reduce their payoff had the opportunity to give back money that they had earned
unethically. Importantly, all participants received the same set of instructions and
were told about the two conditions in advance. Informing only participants from
the Instrumental condition that dishonest players were expected to reduce their
payoff would have made salient that cheating was somehow immoral only to these
participants. By contrast, informing all participants of it avoided creating any
8This denomination was not used in the instructions.
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difference in moral cost from remembering past unethical behavior between the
Hedonic and Instrumental conditions.
Recall Task
After being informed whether they actually had or not the possibility to reduce
their payoff, but before deciding whether to do it or not, participants performed
the recall task. After reporting whether they remembered or not the wheel task
they performed in part 1, they were asked to recall the distribution of the 20
numbers they reported in the wheel task. Precisely, they had to recall how many
times they reported the numbers “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”, and “6”. Participants were
paid depending on the accuracy of their recalls. At the end of the experiment, one
number between 1 and 6, inclusive, was selected at random. Participants received
$1 if their recall was accurate, i.e., if they recalled exactly how many times they
reported that number three weeks earlier. Participants received $0.5 if their recall
was inaccurate by plus or minus one. Otherwise, they earned zero.
Once they had completed the recall task, participants allocated to the Instru-
mental condition had to decide whether they were willing to reduce or not their
total earnings by $0.75. Finally, all participants completed questionnaires related
to guilt and religiosity.
3.3.2 Treatments
Our 2x2 between-subject design is summarized in Table 3.1. We varied whether
or not participants could cheat in part 1 and whether or not they could reduce
their payoff in part 2. The condition in which participants could not cheat in the
wheel task (the click condition) and were not offered to reduce their payoff in part
2 is called the Hedonic-Control treatment. In this treatment, participants have
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no reason to exhibit unethical amnesia, either for hedonic motives (since moral
self-image is not at stake when recalling), or for instrumental motives (they do not
need excuses to not return money). This baseline treatment controls for imperfect
memory, i.e., for memory errors when there is no intrinsic incentives for memory
manipulation.
The Instrumental-Control treatment is similar to the Hedonic-Control treat-
ment, except that participants are given the possibility to reduce their payoff by
$0.75 at the end of the experiment. The comparison between the Instrumental-
Control and Hedonic-Control treatments controls for the mere reaction to the
possibility to give money back. Since participants have no reason to manipulate
their memory (since in both treatments they were not allowed to cheat in part 1),
we expect no difference in memory errors between the Hedonic-Control treatment
and the Instrumental-Control treatment.
The Hedonic treatment is similar to the Hedonic-Control treatment, except that
participants could misreport their outcomes in part 1. The comparison between
the Hedonic and Control treatments indicates whether individuals manipulate their
memory in part 2 for hedonic reasons. If in the Hedonic treatment it is morally
costly for dishonest players to recall that they have cheated in the first part of the
experiment, we should observe higher memory errors in the Hedonic treatment
than in the Control treatments.
The Instrumental treatment is similar to the Hedonic treatment, except that
participants were informed, before recalling, that they would be given the possibil-
ity to reduce their payoff by $0.75 later in the experiment. Importantly, they were
encouraged to do so if they have misreported many numbers to their advantage in
the wheel task. The comparison between the Hedonic and Instrumental treatments
indicates whether or not participants exhibit more unethical amnesia when it does
not only serve to make oneself look better (hedonic motive) but also to justify not
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giving back part of the money their had earned unethically (instrumental motive).
If in the Instrumental treatment dishonest players use forgetting of past cheating
behavior as an excuse not to reduce their payoff, we should observe higher memory
errors in the Instrumental treatment than in the Hedonic treatment.
To be able to compare the recalls of participants across treatments, it is impor-
tant that participants in the Control treatments (Hedonic-Control and Instrumental-
Control treatments) have the same aggregate distribution of numbers to recall than
participants from the Hedonic and Instrumental treatments. Thus, we first ran
the Hedonic and Instrumental treatments and we replicated the aggregated distri-
bution of reported numbers from these treatments in the Control treatments. We
calculated the relative frequency of each reported number in the main treatments
and we assigned the same probability of occurrence of each number in the Control
treatments.
Table 3.1: Summary of the treatments
Part 2
Participants Cannot reduce Can reduce
Part 1
Can cheat HEDO INSTRU
Cannot cheat HEDO-Control INSTRU-Control
Notes: In HEDO, participants can cheat in part 1 but are not given the possibility
to reduce their payoff in part 2. In INSTRU, participants can cheat in part 1 and are
given the possibility to reduce their payoff in part 2. HEDO-Control and INSTRU-
Control replicate HEDO and INSTRU, respectively, except that participants are not
allowed to cheat in part 1.
3.3.3 Procedures
The experiment was programmed using Java language and conducted on Amazon
Mturk. A total of 1550 participants in the U.S. were recruited for the first part
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of the experiment. Three weeks later, the same participants were invited to com-
plete the second part. Overall, 1322 participants completed the second session
(85.29%).9 488 participated in the Hedonic treatment, 508 in the Instrumental
treatment, 163 in the Hedonic-Control treatment and 163 in the Instrumental-
Control treatment.10 Table A2.1 in Appendix 2 summarizes the participants’ char-
acteristics in each treatment.
Instructions for each part were self-contained and displayed on the participants’
screen as the experiment processed (see Appendix 1). No feedback on performance
or earnings was provided until all parts were completed. The first part lasted on
average 9.5 minutes. The second part lasted on average 6 minutes. At the end of
the first part, participants only received $1.5 fixed payoff for their participation.
At the end of the second part, participants received $1.5 fixed payoff for complet-
ing the second part, plus the joint earnings made in the first and in the second
parts. Participants were informed of this payment scheme at the very beginning
of the experiment. Participants earned on average 4.31US$ (S.D. 0.48) and were
paid on their Mturk account within 48 hours after the each part of the experiment.
3.4 Behavioral Conjectures
The following section formulates two behavioral conjectures regarding participants’
recalls conditional on (i) whether they could cheat or not in part 1, and (ii) whether
they were offered or not the possibility to reduce their payoff in part 2.
9The attrition rate (14.71%) was consistent with the average attrition rate of 15% observed by
Amazon Mturk for longitudinal studies.
10The sample size was determined by following standard practices in the literature, see Appendix 6
for details about the sample size calculation.
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When performing the wheel task in part 1, participants in the main treatments
face a trade-off between reporting honestly each number but making less money
than if they lied, or over-reporting numbers to increase their payoff but incurring
potential moral costs from lying or being perceived as a liar. At the time of
the decision, the temptation of making more money may take over and part of
the participants may misreport numbers even though it comes with bending their
own morality. At the time of the recollection, however, they may recall that
they were honest or, at least, not that dishonest.11 When participants have been
honest, recalling correctly the reported numbers has no undesirable implication
in terms of self-image. However, when participants have been dishonest, recalling
correctly past cheating behavior may be self-image threatening. Therefore, to lower
the moral cost from recalling that they have been dishonest, participants might
minimize the extent of their lies by recalling a lower frequency of reported high
numbers in session 1.12 By contrast, in the Hedonic-Control treatment participants
could not choose the numbers to report and were thus not responsible for their
value. For these participants, recalling correctly the reported numbers has thus
no moral implication for the self, and this, regardless of whether they have to
recall a honest or a dishonest distribution. Therefore, we expect that participants
identified as dishonest players in the Hedonic treatment will exhibit higher positive
memory errors than participants who had to recall a dishonest distribution in the
Control treatments. By contrast, we do not expect any difference in memory errors
between honest participants in the Hedonic treatment and participants who had to
11Such temporal inconsistencies have been modeled by Tenbrunsel et al. (2010) in a “want/should”
framework to explain bounded ethicality. During the action phase, the “want” self −characterized by a
relative disregard for ethical considerations− dominates. During the prediction and recollection phases,
however, the “should” self −characterized by intentions and beliefs on how one ought to behave− domi-
nates.
12This is consistent with Bénabou and Tirole (2002) where individuals are motivated to forget signals
that lower their self-esteem and with Gottlieb (2014) where the decision-maker, when he has no ex-post
decision to make, recalls negative signals that threat his self-image with probability below the natural
percentage (imperfect memory).
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recall a honest distribution in the Control treatments. We state our first conjecture
as follows:
Conjecture 1 (Hedonic value of memory) Dishonest individuals in the He-
donic treatment exhibit higher positive memory errors than participants that had
to recall a dishonest distribution in Control treatments. No difference is expected
between honest individuals and participants that had to recall an honest distribu-
tion.
In the Instrumental treatment participants were informed, before recalling, that
they would have the possibility to reduce their payoff by $0.75 later in the exper-
iment. They were especially encouraged to do so if they had misreported many
numbers to their advantage in the wheel task. Precisely because of this informa-
tion, honest and dishonest individuals may not experience the decision to reduce
their payoff the same way. On the one hand, an individual that reported truthfully
the numbers in the wheel task should be perfectly fine with keeping the money
since he does not feel concerned (he has no sins to redeem from). On the other
hand, an individual that did misreport some of the numbers in the wheel task
should feel concerned by the information, except if the biased memory of past de-
cisions provides a wiggle room to persuade himself that he did not cheat that much
and that keeping the money is fine. In other words, individuals may bias their re-
calls downward to distance themselves from dishonest players that are expected
to give back part of the money they had earned unethically. In this treatment,
minimizing past cheating behavior can have hedonic motives as in the Hedonic
treatment (to maintain a moral self-image), but also instrumental motives since
unethical forgetting can serve as an excuse for keeping the undeserved money. This
leads to our second conjecture:
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Conjecture 2 (Instrumental value of memory) Dishonest individuals ex-
hibit higher positive memory errors when forgetting serves as an excuse to keep
undeserved money (Instrumental treatment) than when it only serves hedonic mo-
tives (Hedonic treatment).
3.5 Results
A prerequisite of our experiment is that participants cheat in the wheel task when
given the opportunity. Therefore, before presenting the results testing our two
conjectures, we first report behavior in part 1 of the experiment.
3.5.1 Cheating Behavior and Classification of Players
To identify individuals who misreported numbers to their advantage, we used a chi-
square test on the individuals’ distribution of reports. A participant is classified as
dishonest if the observed frequencies from his reported numbers are significantly
different from the expected frequencies of each number (16.67%), at a 10% level.13
Similarly, a participant is defined as honest if his observed frequencies are not
statistically different from the expected frequencies. We used the same method to
identify participants that had to recall a dishonest versus an honest distribution
in the Control treatments.
Overall, 27.01% of participants from the Hedonic and Instrumental treat-
ments were classified as dishonest individuals, and 30.06% of participants from
the Hedonic-Control and Instrumental-Control treatments had to recall a dis-
13We replicated our analysis using both a stricter definition of a dishonest player (a player is classified
as dishonest if his observed and expected frequencies are significantly different at a 5% level), and a less
strict definition (a player is classified as dishonest if his observed and expected frequencies are significantly
different at a 15% level). The results are robust to any specification (see Table A4.4 in Appendix 4).
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honest distribution (see Table A2.1 in Appendix 2). These percentages are not
significantly different (two-sample test of proportions, p=0.285). Figure A3.3 in
Appendix 3 displays the aggregated distribution of participants’ reported num-
bers, by treatment. None of the distributions is uniform (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
one-sample tests, p<0.001). This indicates that our procedure to assign numbers
in the Control treatments was effective, allowing us to compare these populations.
In all distributions, each number below 4 is significantly less frequently reported
than his expected frequency of 16.67% (Student tests, p<0.001) and the frequen-
cies of numbers 5 and 6 are significantly above the expected 16.67% (Student tests,
p<0.001). Number 4 is not significantly less frequently reported than his expected
frequency of 16.67%, but this is the case regardless of the treatment.
Partial vs. Full Cheaters: Among cheaters, some cheated partially and others
cheated to the full extent. We define a full cheater as a participant who reported
number 6 in the twenty wheels. Out of 996 participants allocated to the Hedonic
and Instrumental treatments, 55 cheated to the full extent (4.10% and 6.89% of
full cheaters in the Hedonic and Instrumental treatments, respectively, p=0.053,
two-sample test of proportion).14,15 Because partial and full cheaters may differ in
their very nature, the results presented below describe memory errors of dishonest
participants both when including full cheaters and when restricting the data to
partial cheaters only. The results are robust in both cases. In the last paragraph
of this section, we describe memory errors of full cheaters in more detail.
14Under no circumstances this difference can be attributed to a treatment effect: part 1 was exactly
the same in the Instrumental and Hedonic treatments and participants were assigned one of the two
treatments randomly and simultaneously.
15This low number of full cheaters may be explained by the participants’ desire to balance their
self-interest with their moral values. People may cheat to increase their profit but reasonably not to
harm their moral self-image (Mazar et al., 2008). These low numbers are also consistent with Gneezy
et al. (2018) who find that people report more partial lies when the outcome of a random draw cannot
be observed by the experimenter, to preserve their reputation. When the outcome is not observable by
the experimenter, a participant who lies may choose to report high but not maximal numbers to signal
to the experimenter that he or she does not cheat.
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Participants who do not recall the task: Before they were asked to recall the
distribution of their past reports, participants had to state whether they remem-
bered the wheel task they performed in part 1. The percentage of dishonest players
who stated that they did not remember the wheel task is 14.50% in the Hedonic
and Instrumental treatments. In the Control treatments, 11.22% of participants
that had to recall a dishonest distribution stated that they did not remember the
wheel task. This difference is not significant (p=0.419, two-sample test of propor-
tion). The percentage of players who did not remember the wheel task is also not
significantly different between honest individuals and individuals that had to recall
a honest distribution (10.73% and 10.53%, respectively, p=0.332). Within treat-
ments, the percentage of players who stated that they did not remember the wheel
task is not significantly different between honest and dishonest players (p=0.189
in Hedonic, p=0.316 in Instrumental, p=0.996 in Hedo-Control and p=0.736 in
Instru-Control). Therefore, selecting the option “I don’t recall” does not seem to
depend of the ethical nature of the player (honest vs. dishonest).
This is corroborated by a regression analysis presented in Table A2.2 in Ap-
pendix 2 that reports Logit regressions in which the dependent variable is equal to
one if participants stated that they did not recall the task and zero otherwise. It
shows that neither the treatment nor the players’ type (honest vs. dishonest) are
significantly correlated with the likelihood of stating “I don’t recall”. The score at
the word memory task used to control for individuals’ memory cognitive ability,
and the age of the participants, however, are strongly correlated (at a 1% level)
with the likelihood of reporting “I don’t recall”. The lower the performance at the
word memory task, the higher the likelihood of reporting “I don’t recall”. Regard-
ing age, the older the participants, the higher the likelihood of reporting “I don’t
recall”. Overall, these findings suggest that participants who selected the option “I
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don’t recall” did not do it strategically but because they truly did not remember
the wheel task they performed in part 1. Since these participants may have a
very noisy (if not random) recollection of the numbers they reported in part 1, we
restrict the main data analysis to individuals who reported that they remembered
the wheel task. The same analysis including participants who reported that they
did not remember the wheel task is presented in Table A2.3 in Appendix 2 and
does not change qualitatively the results.
3.5.2 Memory of Past Behavior
We first analyse the participants’ memory errors in the Control treatments. This
allows us to measure imperfect memory, i.e., memory errors when there is no
intrinsic incentives for memory manipulation. We then present the results from
the main treatments in which participants were able to cheat.
Memory Errors in the Control Treatments
We compute the individual’s memory errors as the difference between the aver-
age reported number in part 1 and the average recalled number in part 2, by
individual.16 Figure 3.2 shows the average memory error in the Hedonic-Control
and Instrumental-Control treatments, both for participants that had to recall a
honest distribution and participants that had to recall a dishonest one. In the
Hedonic-Control treatment, the average memory error of participants that had
to recall a dishonest distribution is 0.29. It is 0.28 in the Instrumental-Control
treatment. The difference is not significant (p=0.973, M-W test). In the Hedonic-
Control treatment, the average memory error of individuals that had to recall a
honest distribution is 0.08. It is 0.11 in Instrumental-Control. This difference
is not significant either (p=0.637). There is also no difference in memory errors
16This measure of memory error is also used in Saucet and Villeval (2019) and Carlson et al. (2018).
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(ME hereafter) between the Hedonic-Control and Instrumental-Control treatments
when pooling all participants together (ME=0.14 and 0.16 in the Hedonic-Control
and Instrumental-Control treatments, respectively, p=0.712, M-W test). Since, as
expected, there is no difference in memory errors between the Hedonic-Control and
Instrumental-Control treatments, we pooled these two Control treatments called
“Pooled-Control” in the data analysis presented below.
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Note: The Figure displays the average memory error, by control treatment. P-
values are from two-sample Mann-Whitney tests,***1 % level of significance,
one observation per individual.
Figure 3.2: Average memory error, Control treatments
Memory Errors in the Main Treatments
We present two results that test our two conjectures. The first result analyzes the
existence of motivated memory for hedonic motives. The second result investigates
the existence of motivated memory for instrumental motives.
We introduce our first result:
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Result 1 (Hedonic value of motivated memory) Dishonest individuals in
the Hedonic treatment do not exhibit higher positive memory errors than individ-
uals that had to recall a dishonest distribution but could not cheat.
Result 1 rejects Conjecture 1.
Support for Result 1 : In the Hedonic treatment, the average memory error of
dishonest individuals is 0.31. In the Pooled-Control treatment, the average mem-
ory error of participants that had to recall a dishonest distribution is 0.29. The
difference is not significant (p=0.354, M-W test). This finding shows that partic-
ipants who cheated in part 1 did not motivate their memory to make themselves
look more honest when recalling their reports in part 2. If this would have been the
case, we would have observed higher memory errors from dishonest participants in
the Hedonic treatment, in which participants could cheat, than in Pooled-Control
treatment in which participants could not cheat and thus had no self-image at
stake when recalling.
Table 3.2 reports OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the av-
erage memory error of participants who were classified as dishonest in the main
treatments or that had to recall a dishonest distribution in the Pooled-Control
treatment. In model (1), the independent variables include the three treatments
(with Pooled-Control as the reference category). Model (2) replicates model (1) by
controlling for two factors that are predicted to impact memory errors: the stan-
dard deviation of participants’ reports (since a distribution with a higher variation
of reports may be more difficult to recall than a distribution with fewer variation),
and participants’ score in the word memory task since memory capacity may be
heterogeneous across individuals. It also includes the self-reported propensity to
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take risks. Model (3) includes four demographic variables: gender, age, monthly
expenses and educational attainment. Models (4) to (6) replicate models (1) to (3)
but exclude full cheaters. Table 3.2 supports Result 1 on the absence of motivated
memory for hedonic reasons. Indeed, participating in the Hedonic treatment does
not increase significantly participants’ memory errors compared to the Pooled-
Control treatment. This is the case regardless of the model specification and of
whether full cheaters are included or not. None of the demographic variables (gen-
der, age, monthly expenses and educational attainment) is significantly correlated
with memory errors.
Table 3.2: Determinants of memory errors, dishonest players
Dep. var.: Memory errors
WITH FULL CHEATERS WITHOUT FULL CHEATERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled-Control ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
- - - - - -
HEDO 0.022 0.055 0.060 0.004 -0.010 -0.004
(0.081) (0.084) (0.091) (0.079) (0.093) (0.096)
INSTRU 0.182** 0.221** 0.234** 0.252*** 0.237** 0.258**
(0.089) (0.094) (0.103) (0.097) (0.093) (0.102)
Score word task -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
S.D. report 0.049 0.035 -0.029 -0.041
(0.073) (0.074) (0.123) (0.121)
Risk -0.003 0.005 -0.005 0.003
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Male -0.057 -0.069
(0.082) (0.087)
Age 0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.005)
Cons. 0.287*** 0.288 0.282 0.287*** 0.400 0.404
(0.058) (0.228) (0.327) (0.058) (0.301) (0.396)
Demographics No No Yes No No Yes
N 317 317 317 269 269 269
Note: This Table reports OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual
level are in parentheses. Participants who reported “I don’t recall” are excluded. One observation
per individual. Demographics include monthly expenses and educational attainment. ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
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Note that the rejection of Conjecture 1 is very conservative. Indeed, when
comparing the Hedonic and Pooled-Control treatments, we are implicitly assum-
ing that participants in both cases paid the same level of attention to the reported
numbers in the wheel task. However, in the Hedonic treatment participants had to
choose which numbers to report and were thus active in the decision process. This
was not the case in the Pooled-Control treatment in which participants had just to
report numbers they did not get to choose. As a consequence, participants in the
Pooled-Control treatment probably paid less attention to their reports (and en-
coded them less well) than participants in the main treatments. Thus, inattention
could explain a higher share of the memory errors observed in the Pooled-Control
treatment than in the Hedonic treatment, resulting in more memory errors in this
treatment compared to the Hedonic one.17
We now introduce our second result:
Result 2 (Instrumental value of memory) Dishonest individuals exhibit
higher positive memory errors when forgetting is instrumental (i.e., when it serves
as a justification to keep undeserved money), than when it only serves hedonic
motives (enhancing their self-view). This is not observed for individuals that had
to recall a dishonest distribution but could not cheat.
Result 2 supports Conjecture 2.
17To increase attention in the Control treatments, we could have told participants, at the beginning
of the wheel task, that they will be asked to recall their reported numbers in the second part taking
place three weeks later. However, we decided against it for one main reason: knowing in advance that
they will be asked to recall the reports’ distribution, participants could have simply written down the
reported numbers. Three weeks later, they would just need to report the distribution of numbers they
wrote down three weeks before. Since there is no way of checking who took notes and who did not, it
would be impossible to know whether the recalled distribution in part 2 captures real memory.
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Note: The Figure displays the average memory error of honest and dishonest
participants in the main treatments and participants who received honest or dis-
honest distribution in Pooled-Control treatment. Levels of significance are from
Model (1) in Table 3.2 (for dishonest players) and Model (1) in Table A5.5 (for
honest players). One observation per individual. Partial cheaters are included.
** p<0.05, ns.= non significant.
Figure 3.3: Average memory error of dishonest players, by treatment
Support for Result 2 : Figure 3.3 displays the participants’ memory errors across
treatments, for both honest and dishonest players. It shows that dishonest par-
ticipants exhibit higher memory errors in the Instrumental treatment than in the
Hedonic and Pooled-Control treatments (at the 5% level). No difference in mem-
ory errors is observed between treatments for honest participants (Hedonic and
Instrumental treatments) or participants that had to recall a honest distribution
(Pooled-Control treatment). If dishonest participants had not manipulated their
memory for instrumental reasons, we would have observed no difference in memory
errors between the Instrumental and Hedonic treatments, nor between the Instru-
mental and Pooled-Control treatments.
159
Chapter 3. Motivated Memory of Unethical Decisions
Table 3.2 supports Result 2 on the existence of memory bias for instrumental
reasons. Participating in the Instrumental treatment increases significantly the
memory errors of dishonest individuals. This is the case regardless of the model
specification and whether full cheaters are included or not. By contrast, partici-
pating in the Instrumental treatment does not increase memory errors of honest
participants (see Table A5.5 in Appendix 5). Overall, these findings confirm that
dishonest individuals forget more their past cheating behavior when it serves as an
excuse to keep undeserved money than when it only serves hedonic motives. Only
participants who need a justification for keeping the money, i.e., those who have
been willfully dishonest, under-estimate their past cheating behavior. If dishonest
individuals do not want to give undeserved money back when asked, one strategy is
to forget the extent to which they cheated in the first part to convince themselves
that they do not belong to the category of dishonest players. On the contrary,
individuals that had to recall a dishonest distribution but could not cheat do not
need any justification for keeping the money since they are not responsible for the
high numbers reported in part 1.
Memory Errors of Partial vs. Full Cheaters: The average memory error
of full cheaters (those who reported a “6” 20 times) is 0.32. The average memory
error of partial cheaters is 0.43. This difference is significant at the 1% level (M-W
test, p=0.001). No difference is observed between partial and full cheaters in the
word memory task: on average, partial cheaters recalled correctly 25.35 words out
of 35 and full cheaters 24.47 (p=0.476, MW). Therefore, the difference in memory
errors observed in the wheel game cannot be explained by a difference in cogni-
tive memory ability. Two other reasons may explain this difference in memory
errors between partial and full cheaters. First, recalling could be cognitively eas-
ier for full cheaters than for partial cheaters who had to recall different numbers.
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Models (1) to (6) show that a higher standard deviation of the twenty numbers
reported in part 1 does not significantly increase the memory errors in part 2.
The correlation between the average memory error and the standard deviation of
reports in part 1 is significant neither at the aggregated level (pairwise Pearson’s
correlation coefficient=-0.015, p=0.792), nor by treatment (pairwise Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficient, p=0.858, p=0.674 and p=0.595 in the Pooled-Control, Hedo-
nic and Instrumental treatment, respectively). These results suggest that higher
memory errors for partial cheaters are not mainly driven by the fact that a higher
variation of reports may be more difficult to recall than a distribution with few
variation. Second, the two types of players may have different intrinsic motiva-
tions. Full cheaters, who deliberately chose to maximize their payoff in part 1, may
feel perfectly fine with this strategy and thus do not need memory manipulation
to maintain their moral self-view in part 2. Actually, the fact that none of them
decided to give undeserved money back when given this possibility provides some
support for this interpretation. If full cheaters accept their greedy nature, they
may feel no need to recall selectively or give undeserved money back. By contrast,
partial cheaters may have faced a trade-off in part 1 between maximizing their
payoff by cheating and maintaining their moral value. Therefore, those partici-
pants who cheated to a lesser extent are the ones who use memory manipulation
as a self-management strategy.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter explores the existence of motivated memory in the context of dis-
honest decision-making. In our experiment, participants played a repeated wheel
game allowing them to misreport the outcome of random draws. Three weeks
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later, they were asked to recall the distribution of their reports in the previous
game. Across treatments, we varied the intrinsic motivation to manipulate one’s
memory. In the Hedonic treatment, forgetting past misdeeds can have a hedonic
value since it may help individuals to preserve a good self-image after misconduct.
In the Instrumental treatment, forgetting past misdeeds can additionally have an
instrumental value since it may serve as a self-excuse to keep undeserved money.
In the Control treatments, both the hedonic and instrumental values of motivated
memory are turned off since participants had no possibility to cheat. Overall, this
design allowed us to investigate (i) whether individuals manipulated the memory
of past dishonest choices, and (ii) whether they used their memory as a self-excuse
not to engage in future morally responsible behavior.
We found no clear evidence of motivated memory for purely hedonic value.
Dishonest individuals in the Hedonic treatment do not exhibit higher memory er-
rors than individuals that had to recall a dishonest distribution in the Control
treatments. This does not necessarily contradicts previous evidence. Indeed, this
result is very conservative, as memory errors in the Control treatments were possi-
bly overestimated compared to memory errors in the Hedonic treatment. Indeed,
in the Hedonic treatment, participants had to choose which numbers to report
and were thus active in the decision process. This was not the case in the Control
treatments in which participants reported numbers that they did not get to choose.
Therefore, memory errors in the Control treatments may capture inattention (due
to passiveness), which probably occurs to a lesser extent in the Hedonic treatment
in which people were actively dishonest. This is consistent with Saucet and Vill-
eval (2019) who found, using dictator games, that dictators exhibit significantly
higher magnitude of memory errors about the receiver’s earnings when the later
are randomly chosen by the computer program than when they are chosen by the
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dictators themselves.
We found evidence of motivated memory for instrumental reasons. Dishonest
individuals recall their past behavior with less accuracy when they are informed
that they will have a future decision to make (whether or not to give undeserved
money back) than when they know that they will not have any decision to make.
This difference in memory errors is not observed in the Control treatments. There-
fore, only participants who need a justification for keeping undeserved money, i.e.,
those who have been willfully dishonest, underestimate their past cheating behav-
ior. While the previous studies on motivated memory investigate memory manip-
ulation as a consequence of past self-image threatening decisions, this result shows
that memory manipulation may also occur in reaction to future anticipated deci-
sions. This finding also complements the literature on moral wiggle room which
shows that individuals exploit uncertainty on the consequences of their actions to
behave more selfishly (Dana et al., 2007). In this study, individuals also exploit
uncertainty to act more self-interestedly, but uncertainty comes from the imperfect
memory of past decisions rather than from the consequences of actions.
Appendices
A1: Instructions
SESSION 1
Overview
If you have any questions regarding this study, you can contact us at saucet@gate.cnrs.fr.
This study is divided into two parts:
• you will complete the first part today;
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• you will receive an invitation to complete the second part in three weeks.
For completing today’s part, you will receive $1.5. The additional earnings that
you will make today will be paid to you at the end of the second part.
IMPORTANT: Please agree to participate in the second part by checking the cor-
responding box.
© I commit to participate in the second part of this study.
The first part consists of two tasks. These two tasks are independent. At the
beginning of each task, you will receive the corresponding instructions.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
First task
Choosing a square in a wheel
You will see a wheel with six empty squares. The wheel will look like the one below:
Figure A1.1: Empty Wheel
Your job will be to choose one square of the wheel.
Once you have chosen a square, you will have to press the button “I made my
choice”.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Reporting the number displayed in the chosen square
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The program will then display a number between 1 and 6 (included) in each square
of the wheel. Each square will contain a different number.
Your job will be to report the number displayed in the square that you have chosen.
Please press “Next” to see an example.
NEXT SCREEN
Example
Before seeing the numbers in the wheel, suppose that you have chosen the square
located at the bottom left of the wheel (highlighted in blue in the wheel below for
illustration).
You then discover that the numbers are displayed in the wheel as follows:
Figure A1.2: Full Wheel
Your job will be to report “3”.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
How are your earnings determined?
You will see 20 different wheels one after the other. Before seeing each wheel, you
will choose a square, and then, after seeing the numbers in the wheel, you will
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report the number corresponding to this square.
At the end of the study, one wheel will be selected at random among the 20. The
money your will earn in this task will depend on the number that you have re-
ported for that wheel.
You will earn:
• $0.10 if you have reported “1”
• $0.20 if you have reported “2”
• $0.30 if you have reported “3”
• $0.40 if you have reported “4”
• $0.50 if you have reported “5”
• $0.60 if you have reported “6”
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Method used to choose a square
There are two methods to choose a square in the wheel. Either you will have to
choose a square by clicking on it, or you will have to choose a square by keeping it
in your mind. We refer to these two methods as the “click” and the “mind” methods.
We have predetermined the proportion of participants who will be assigned to each
method and assigned you to one of the two methods when you entered the study.
In the next screen, you will discover which method you have been allocated to.
You will keep the same method for the 20 wheels.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Cheating condition (treatments Hedo and Instru)
You have been allocated to the “mind” method
This means that, for each wheel, you will have to choose one square of the wheel
in your mind.
Once you have chosen a square, you will have to press the button “I made my
choice”.
NEXT SCREEN
No-cheating condition (Hedonic-Control and Instrumental-Control treatment)
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You have been allocated to the “click” method
This means that, for each wheel, you will have to choose one square of the wheel
by clicking on it. Once you have chosen a square, you will have to press the button
“I made my choice”.
NEXT SCREEN
End of the instructions for the first task
We would like you not to take any breaks while completing the 20 wheels.
When you are ready, please press “Next” to start the task.
NEXT SCREEN
Cheating condition (treatments Hedo and Instru)
Please choose a square in your mind and then click the button “I made my choice”.
No-cheating condition (Hedonic-Control and Instrumental-Control treatments)
Please choose a square and click on it. Then, click the button “I made my choice”.
NEXT SCREEN
Please report the number displayed in the square that you have chosen in the pre-
vious screen:
NEXT SCREEN
End of the first task
You have completed the wheel task.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Second task
Words task
This task is totally independent from the first task.
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In this task, you will be presented with five lists of words. Each list will contain
six words. Each word will be displayed on your screen one by one for less than
one second.
Your task consists in memorizing these words.
At the end of today’s part, you will be displayed 35 words. For each of these 35
words, your job will be to indicate whether it has occurred on the lists that you
have been presented before.
If you remember seeing the word on the lists, you will have to press the button
“Old”. If you don’t remember seeing this word, you will have to press the button
“New”.
Please press “Next” to watch the five lists of words.
NEXT SCREEN
Participants are displayed with the 5 lists of words.
NEXT SCREEN
End of the lists
You have been displayed the five lists of words.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Demographic questionnaire
Please answer these few questions about yourself.
NEXT SCREEN
Thank you for completing this short demographic questionnaire.
Recollection of the words
You will now be presented with 35 words. For each of these 35 words, your job will
be to indicate whether it has occurred on the lists that you have been presented
before.
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If you remember seeing the word on the lists, please press the button “Old”. If you
don’t remember seeing this word, please press the button “New”.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
How are your earnings determined?
You will be paid $0.02 for each correct recall.
More precisely, you will earn $0.02 per word if:
• You pressed the button “Old” and the word has occurred on the lists.
• You pressed the button “New” and the word has not occurred on the lists.
If you pressed “Old” while the word has not occurred on the lists, or if you pressed
“New” while the word has occurred on the lists, you will not earn anything.
When you are ready, please press “Next” to enter your recalls.
NEXT SCREEN
Participants are displayed a list of 35 words. For each of them they have to check
either the button “New” or “Old”.
NEXT SCREEN
Earnings
Today, you receive $1.5 for having participated in the first part of the study.
In three weeks, you will receive an invitation to participate in the second part.
This second part will not exceed 5 minutes.
In the second part of the study, you will receive: $1.5 for participating, plus the
earnings that you have made today and the ones that you will make in the second
part. If you do not participate in the second part, the earnings that you have
made today will be void.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Thank you!
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Thank you for taking time out of your busy life to participate to the first part of
this study.
You will receive the $1.5 into your Mturk account within 48 hours.
You will receive an invitation to participate to the second part of this study in
three weeks. Once you receive the invitation, you will have three days to complete
it.
If you have any questions concerning this study, you can contact us at saucet@gate.cnrs.fr.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Your confirmation code to be entered on Mturk webpage is your Mturk worker ID.
Please make the HIT on Mturk with this ID.
SESSION 2
Overview
If you have any questions regarding this study, you can contact us at saucet@gate.cnrs.fr.
This is the second and last part of a study on decision-making. You participated
in the first part three weeks ago.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Information
Today, you will earn a fixed payoff of $1.5 for participating to the second part of
this study.
At the end of today’s part, you may be given or not the option to reduce your
total earnings by $0.75.
It would be nice to reduce your total earnings if you are given this option and you
have misreported numbers to your advantage several times in the wheel task that
you performed three weeks ago.
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Remember that in the wheel task, you had to choose a square in a wheel and
report the number displayed in this square. You performed that task 20 times.
In the next screen, you will discover whether, at the end of today’s part, you will
be given or not the option to reduce your total earnings.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Hedonic condition (Hedonic and Hedonic-Control treatments)
You will not be given the option to reduce your total earnings.
This means that, at the end of today’s part, you will not have the option to reduce
your total earnings by $0.75.
You will now start the first task of the study.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Instrumental condition (Instrumental and Instrumental-Control treatments)
You will be given the option to reduce your total earnings.
This means that, at the end of today’s part, you will have the option to reduce
your total earnings by $0.75.
You will now start the first task of the study.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Instructions for the first task
We would like you to recall the 20 numbers that you reported in the wheel task
you performed three weeks ago. Remember that in this task, you had to choose a
square in a wheel and to report the number displayed in this square.
You performed this task 20 times.
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Do you remember this task?
YES NO
NEXT SCREEN
You saw 20 wheels one after the other and reported a number after seeing each
wheel.
At the end of the study, one wheel was selected at random among the 20. The
money you earned in this task depended on the number that you reported for that
wheel.
You earned:
• $0.10 if you reported “1”
• $0.20 if you reported “2”
• $0.30 if you reported “3”
• $0.40 if you reported “4”
• $0.50 if you reported “5”
• $0.60 if you reported “6”
Your job consists in recalling how many times you reported the number “1”, “2”,
“3”, “4”, “5”, and “6”, respectively, three weeks ago.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
How are your earnings determined?
You will be paid depending on the accuracy of your recalls.
One number (“1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”, or “6”) will be selected at random.
For that number, you will earn:
• $1 if your recall is accurate (you recall exactly how many times you reported
that number three weeks ago).
• $0.5 if your recall is inaccurate by plus or minus one.
• $0 if your recall is inaccurate by more than plus or minus one.
Please press “Next” to enter your recalls.
NEXT SCREEN
Three weeks ago, you saw 20 wheels and reported a number for each wheel. Out
of 20 wheels:
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• How many “1”s did you report?
• How many “2”s did you report?
• How many “3”s did you report?
• How many “4”s did you report?
• How many “5”s did you report?
• How many “6”s did you report?
NEXT SCREEN
End of the task
You have completed the recall task.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Instrumental condition (Instrumental and Instrumental-Control treatments)
Decision to reduce your total earnings by $0.75
Earlier in the experiment, you have been informed that you will have the option
to reduce your total earning by $0.75.
You will now have to decide whether you are willing to reduce or not your total
earnings by $0.75.
Please press “Next” to make your choice.
NEXT SCREEN
Instrumental condition (Instrumental and Instrumental-Control treatments)
Are you willing to reduce your total earnings by $0.75 ?
YES NO
NEXT SCREEN
Instrumental condition (Instrumental and Instrumental-Control treatments)
End of the task
You have completed the task.
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Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
(Guilt and religiosity questionnaires)
And finally a few questions about yourself...
NEXT SCREEN
Thank you!
Thank you for taking time out of your busy life to participate to the second and
last part of this study.
You will receive the posted remuneration into your Mturk account within 48 hours.
If you have any questions concerning this study, you can contact us at saucet@gate.cnrs.fr.
Please press “Next” to continue.
NEXT SCREEN
Your confirmation code to be entered on Mturk webpage is your Mturk worker ID.
Please make the HIT on Mturk with this ID.
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A2: Tables
Table A2.1: Summary Statistics - Participants, by treatment
Treatments All Hedo Instru Hedo_C Instru_C
Male 49.84% 48.15% 54.13% 45.40% 46.01%
Age 39.59 40.01 40.22 38.21 37.62
Monthly expenses (0-7 scale) 3.56 3.60 3.58 3.51 3.41
Education (0-4 scale) 2.76 2.79 2.71 2.75 2.82
Religion (0-16 score) 5.23 5.14 4.98 5.75 5.78
% of dishonest players 27.76% 27.25% 26.78% 30.06% 30.06%
% of “I don’t recall” 11.50% 11.89% 11.61% 14.11% 07.36%
Notes: This Table reports the results of Pearson Chi-square tests in which each individual is taken
as one independent observation. None of the p-values are significant at 5% level or below. The null
hypothesis that the coefficients are equal between treatments can thus not be rejected.
Table A2.2: Determinants of “I don’t recall”
Dep. var.: =1 if “I don’t recall”
WITH FULL CHEATERS WITHOUT FULL CHEATERS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled-Control ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
- - - - - -
HEDO 0.019 0.163 0.0259 0.019 0.166 0.025
(0.276) (0.279) (0.288) (0.276) (0.280) (0.288)
INSTRU 0.024 0.145 -0.019 0.024 0.148 -0.022
(0.273) (0.277) (0.289) (0.273) (0.278) (0.288)
=1 if Dishonest 0.072 0.077 0.104 0.072 0.073 0.103
(0.386) (0.393) (0.406) (0.386) (0.394) (0.407)
=1 if Dishonest * Pooled-Control ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
- - - - - -
=1 if Dishonest * HEDO 0.318 0.374 0.465 0.450 0.455 0.591
(0.487) (0.530) (0.541) (0.492) (0.533) (0.541)
=1 if Dishonest * INSTRU 0.226 0.309 0.282 0.132 0.193 0.149
(0.488) (0.535) (0.546) (0.515) (0.556) (0.568)
Score word task -0.078*** -0.084*** -0.082*** -0.087***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
S.d. report 0.200 0.055 0.168 0.057
(0.278) (0.284) (0.374) (0.383)
Risk 0.051 0.059 0.048 0.055
(0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039)
Age 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.008) (0.008)
Male 0.385** 0.349*
(0.189) (0.193)
Cons. -2.140*** -0.849 -2.585*** -2.140*** -0.680 -2.497**
(0.216) (0.671) (0.896) (0.216) (0.807) (1.027)
Demographics No No Yes No No Yes
N 1322 1322 1321 1267 1267 1266
Note: This Table reports results from Logit regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual
level are in parentheses. One observation per individual. Demographics: monthly expenses and educational
attainment. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A2.3: Determinants of memory errors, including “I don’t recall”
Dep. var.: Memory errors
WITH F.C. WITHOUT F.C.
(1) (2)
Pooled-Control ref. ref.
- -
HEDO 0.048 -0.011
(0.087) (0.093)
INSTRU 0.180* 0.190*
(0.099) (0.098)
Score word task -0.008 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007)
S.D report 0.045 -0.038
(0.070) (0.113)
Risk 0.005 0.007
(0.013) (0.014)
Male -0.060 -0.077
(0.077) (0.081)
Age 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Cons. 0.450 0.471
(0.324) (0.361)
Demographics Yes Yes
N 367 312
Note: This Table reports OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level are in parentheses. One observation per individual.
F.C. accounts for Full Cheaters. Demographics: monthly expenses and edu-
cational attainment. * p<0.10. In model (1), the exact p-value of the INSTRU
coefficient is 0.069. In model (2), it is 0.053.
.A3: Figure
***
***
***
***
*** ***
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0
16.67
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Note: The Figure displays the percentage of reported number (from 1 to
6) of participants, by treatment. Stars display the significance of two-sided
student tests that the observed percentage differs from 16.67%; ***1 % level,
one observation per individual.
Figure A3.3: Percentage of reported number of participants, by treatment
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A4: Memory Errors with Alternative Definitions of Dishon-
esty
So far, we identified a dishonest player if the observed frequencies of his reported
numbers were significantly different from the expected frequencies at a 10% level.
However, the moral cost from remembering dishonest behavior, and thus the in-
trinsic motivations for memory manipulation, may vary with the very level of
dishonesty. The following section uses alternative definitions of dishonesty. Pre-
cisely, we consider a stricter definition of a dishonest player by identifying a player
as dishonest if his observed and expected frequencies are significantly different at
a 5% level. Similarly, we consider a less stric definition of a dishonest player by
identifying a player as dishonest if his observed and expected frequencies are sig-
nificantly different at a 15% level.
Table A4.4 replicates Table 3.2 using these two alternative definitions of dis-
honesty. First, it shows that participating in the Hedonic treatment does not
significantly increase memory errors compared to the Pooled-Control treatment in
which participants could not cheat. This is the case regardless of the definition
(5% or 15%). Second, it shows that participating in the Instrumental treatment
significantly increases the size of memory errors. This is the case regardless of
which definition of a dishonest player is being used. Overall, these findings show
that Results 1 and 2 are not driven by a specific threshold used to classify players,
and are robust to different definitions of a dishonest player.
A5: Memory Errors of Honest Players
Table A5.5 replicates Table 3.2 for honest players. Model (1) shows that partici-
pating in the Hedonic treatment or Instrumental treatments does not significantly
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Table A4.4: Determinants of memory errors with alternative definitions of dishonesty
Dep. var.: Memory errors
WITH FULL CHEATERS WITHOUT FULL CHEATERS
Disho. 5% Disho. 15% Disho. 5% Disho. 15%
Pooled-Control ref. ref. ref. ref.
- - - -
HEDO 0.106 0.044 0.025 0.001
(0.107) (0.078) (0.114) (0.082)
INSTRU 0.285** 0.161* 0.336*** 0.180**
(0.130) (0.085) (0.129) (0.084)
Score word task -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
S.D. report 0.064 -0.0002 -0.025 -0.078
(0.084) (0.068) (0.134) (0.113)
Risk 0.0119 0.00272 0.0102 0.0003
(0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013)
Male -0.032 -0.046 -0.031 -0.056
(0.097) (0.070) (0.105) (0.072)
Age 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Cons. 0.117 0.448 0.288 0.608*
(0.370) (0.287) (0.461) (0.349)
Demographics yes yes yes yes
N 247 382 199 334
Notes: This Table reports OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level are in parentheses. Participants who reported “I don’t
recall” are excluded. Demographics include monthly expenses and educational
attainment. * p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
increase memory errors compared to the Pooled-Control treatment. Unlike dishon-
est players, honest individuals had no reason to manipulate their memory since
accurate recalls were incentivized. Models (2) and (3) show that participants in
the Hedonic treatment exhibit significantly (at a 5% level) lower memory errors
than participants that had to recall a honest distribution in the Pooled-Control
treatment. This is likely due to the fact than in the Hedonic treatment (as in the
Instrumental treatment), participants had to choose which numbers to report and
were thus active in the decision process. Models (2) and (3) also show that the
standard deviation of the numbers reported in part 1 is significantly (at a 1% level)
negatively correlated with memory errors: the higher the standard deviation of re-
ports in part 1, the lower the memory errors in part 2. This might seem counter
intuitive since a distribution with a higher variation of reports may be cognitively
more difficult to recall than a distribution with few variation. However, for honest
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Table A5.5: Determinants of memory errors, honest players
Dep. var.: Memory errors
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled-Control ref. ref. ref.
- - -
HEDO -0.073 -0.111** -0.113**
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048)
INSTRU -0.052 -0.081* -0.070
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Score word task 0.009* 0.008
(0.005) (0.005)
S.D. report -0.416*** -0.402***
(0.105) (0.105)
Risk -0.018*** -0.017**
(0.007) (0.007)
Male -0.026
(0.036)
Age 0.001
(0.002)
Cons. 0.094** 0.665*** 0.379
(0.040) (0.232) (0.250)
Demographics no no yes
N 853 853 853
Notes: This Table reports marginal effects from an
OLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level are in parentheses. Participants
who reported “I don’t recall” are excluded. Demo-
graphics include monthly expenses and educational at-
tainment. * p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
players, a high standard deviation of reports means that they did not cheat in
part 1, which is easy for them to remember. Individuals who reported a uniform
distribution (characterized by a high standard deviation of reports) are the ones
for which recalling is the easiest and thus those who exhibit lower memory errors.
A6: Statistical Power Analysis
To estimate the sample size necessary to uncover the hypothesized effect between
the main and the control treatments, we built on the results of Kouchaki and Gino
(2016). Their Study 6 is very similar to our design since participants played a
die-throwing game and were assigned to one of two conditions: likely-cheating vs.
no-cheating. Two days later, they answered questions about their memory of the
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die-throwing task on the AMQ measure.18 In the likely-cheating condition, the
average memory accuracy was 4.92 (S.D.=1.16, N=134). In the no-cheating con-
dition, it was 5.54 (S.D.=1.16, N=145). Based on the resulting calculated effect
size (Cohen’s d=0.5652), and assuming a type-I error rate of 0.10 and a power
level of 0.8, the required sample size is 40 observations per treatment. Thus, we
are relatively confident that we can uncover the hypothesized effect between the
main and control treatments with our sample size.
For the main treatments, there was no existing study that could give us an in-
sight on the expected effect size between the Hedonic and Instrumental conditions.
Thus, we determined our sample size using the cohen’s d small-medium standard
value (0.35), assuming a type-I error rate of 0.10 and a power level of 0.8. With
this effect size, the required number of observations per treatment is 102. Here
again, we can be relatively confident that the hypothesized effect between the He-
donic and Instrumental treatment can be uncovered since we have 133 and 136
dishonest participants in the Hedonic and Instrumental treatment, respectively.
18The AMQ measures self-reported people’s autobiographical memory with several items (e.g., “As I
think about the coin-toss task/dinner that night, I can actually remember it”), see Rubin et al. (2003).
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General Conclusion
This thesis investigates the existence and strength of memory distortion in three
economically relevant contexts: social preferences, individual performance and
unethical behavior. It explores two different underlying mechanisms of motivated
memory: hedonic when memory manipulation only makes oneself look better in
one’s own eyes, or instrumental when it also helps justify future decisions.
Chapter one investigates whether people retrieve their memory self-servingly
in social encounters. Our results identify a causal effect of the responsibility of
pro-social decisions on selective recalls. When individuals are responsible for the
outcome of a sharing decision, they exhibit higher memory accuracy of altruistic
decisions compared to selfish decisions. This is not the case when the outcome of
the sharing-decision is randomly chosen by the computer. This result shows that
individuals exhibit selective memory of their pro-sociality. Second, incentivizing
correct recalls increases correct recalls but only when participants made an altruis-
tic decision. This suggests that, when incentivized, people allocate extra memory
effort to retrieve the memory of desirable rather than undesirable information.
Finally, selective recalls are not driven by a higher attention paid to the other’s
amount by other-regarding individuals since individuals are also less likely to re-
member their own amount after they made a selfish than an altruistic decision. In
contrast, we find no clear evidence of motivated memory through biased memory
182
General Conclusion
errors. Individuals do not exhibit overly optimistic recalls of the amounts allocated
to the other players. There are two main explanations for the absence of biased
memory errors. First, even if the majority of individuals probably prefer to think
of themselves as generous rather than egoistic, making selfish decisions –especially
in the lab– may not be threatening enough to trigger self-serving memory errors.
This might be particularly the case in our context where only self-image, not social-
image, is at stake. Uncovering how memory for selfish vs. egoistic decisions shifts
as a function of direct observability by others would be informative. Investigating
motivated memory in the domain of morality and ethics, where categorical im-
perative (Kant, 1785) and injunctive norms are more salient, could also generate
a stronger need for biased memory errors. Finally, in our study the only reason
for memory manipulation was hedonic (to make oneself look more generous). An
interesting extension (investigated in Chapter 3 about unethical behavior) would
be to introduce strategic reasons to test whether individuals would use selective
memory and bias their recalls asymmetrically.
Chapter two disentangles between two driving forces that have been proposed
as explanations of memory failures for self-relevant information: self-enhancement
and mood-congruency. The first result of this chapter show that, consistent with
self-enhancing memory, individuals exhibit higher memory accuracy of positive
than negative feedback about their cognitive ability. In contrast, we do not
find clear evidence of mood-congruent memory. Indeed, even though our mood-
manipulation proves to be effective in inducing the desired emotional state, indi-
viduals do not exhibit higher memory accuracy when the feedback to retrieve is
congruent to their mood. Taken together, these results provide support for the
existence and relative dominance of self-enhancing memory over mood-congruent
memory. Thereby, it underlines the importance of motivational over affective fac-
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tors in the formation of optimistic beliefs about the self. Insofar individuals are
able to forget or distort feedback that challenges their beliefs, providing them
with self-relevant information may thus not be the most efficient policy to help
mitigate or remove biased judgments. One potential explanation of why, in our
setting, mood cannot be identified as a driving force of feedback retrieval, is that
the similarity between the valence of the mood and the valence of feedback was
to weak to trigger associative memory and thereby “compete” against the self-
enhancement hypothesis. In real life, self-relevant feedback can be embedded with
negative emotions but with also other types of cues such that situations, images,
sounds, etc. (Enke et al., 2019). Therefore, an alternative possibility to investigate
the relative role of associative memory and self-enhancing memory in asymmetric
recall of feedback would be to use such other types of context-dependent and not
mood-dependent cues.
Chapter three investigates the relative role of affect and strategic reasoning
in motivated memory, with an application in the domain of unethical behavior.
We find that hedonic considerations, in our setting, are not sufficient to trigger
memory manipulation: dishonest individuals do not exhibit lower memory accu-
racy of their past decisions than individuals in the control treatment. One limit
of our design is that participants in the main treatment were more active in the
decision process than participants in the control treatment. Therefore, memory
errors in the control treatment may capture inattention (due to passiveness), which
may hide a memory bias for hedonic reasons in the treatment where people could
cheat. It would be interesting to see if this result holds in a situation where the
hedonic reasons to motivate one’s memory remain absent for participants in the
control treatment but all participants are similarly active in the decision process.
In contrast, we have a remarkable result in the Instrumental treatment. When
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forgetting serves as a justification to not engage in future morally responsible be-
havior, individuals do motivate their memory. Indeed, only participants who need
a justification for keeping undeserved money, i.e., those who have been dishonest,
under-estimate their past cheating behavior. This result suggests that memory
may enter into the decision process not only as a reaction to past decisions but
also in reaction to anticipated future decisions.
Overall, our results show that memory distortions can result from cognitive im-
pairment (imperfect memory) but also from motivated memory. First, individuals
manipulate their memory for hedonic reasons to sustain their demand for positive
self-image, whether “positive” means generous, honest and/or intelligent. Second,
individuals manipulate their memory for strategic reasons. They exploit uncer-
tainty from imperfect memory of past decisions to justify acting self-interestedly
in anticipated future decisions. Such memory distortion in reaction to anticipated
decisions echoes the very recent literature on the “memory of the future” that has
developed the past few years in neurosciences to examine the role of memory in
future thinking (Schacter et al., 2012; Eustache, 2019). Memory, which by its very
nature seems to be oriented towards the past, would in fact be also intrinsically
and deliberately oriented towards the future. Not only individuals would be able
to retrieve past actions, but they would also store and recall the actions they pro-
gram or plan for the future. Those “memories of the future” would form the basis
for anticipations and expectations and would be continuously rehearsed and opti-
mized for decision-making. Economists may be willing to explore this uncovered
aspect of humans’ memory.
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Essais en économie comportementale sur la mémoire motivée
Charlotte Saucet
Résumé
Cette thèse cherche à déterminer si les individus manipulent leur mémoire pour oublier certaines in-
formations qui menacent leurs croyances. Elle teste expérimentalement l’existence et la force de la
mémoire motivée dans trois contextes économiquement pertinents : les préférences sociales, la perfor-
mance individuelle et les décisions malhonnêtes.
Le chapitre 1 examine si les individus font preuve de mémoire motivée dans les interactions sociales.
Les individus oublient-ils les conséquences de leurs actes sur autrui ? Le cas échéant, cela dépend-il de
la nature (par exemple, égoïste ou altruiste) de leurs actes ? Nos résultats confirment la sélectivité des
souvenirs. Les individus se souviennent mieux des conséquences de leurs actions sur autrui lorsqu’ils
ont été généreux que lorsqu’ils ont été égoïstes. En revanche, la direction et la magnitude des erreurs
de mémoire ne diffèrent pas selon la nature des choix.
Le chapitre 2 démêle deux mécanismes identifiés comme explications possibles de l’existence de
mémoire sélective concernant les performances individuelles : l’auto-renforcement et la congruence
de l’humeur. Nous testons l’existence de mémoire motivée dans un environnement contrôlé où les
deux théories offrent des prédictions divergentes. Nos résultats supportent l’existence et la dominance
relative de l’effet d’auto-renforcement par rapport à la congruence de l’humeur, et soulignent ainsi
l’importance des facteurs motivationnels plutôt qu’affectifs dans la formation de croyances motivées.
Le chapitre 3 examine si les individus oublient leurs comportements malhonnêtes, non seulement
pour des motifs hédoniques mais aussi pour des raisons stratégiques, lorsque l’oubli sert à justifier
une décision future. Nous trouvons que les considérations hédoniques seules ne sont pas suffisantes
pour déclencher une manipulation de la mémoire. En revanche, lorsqu’oublier sert d’excuse pour ne
pas avoir à s’engager dans un comportement moralement responsable, les individus manipulent leur
mémoire.
Ces résultats montrent que les erreurs de mémoire dans les contextes économiques peuvent résul-
ter d’une déficience cognitive mais aussi d’une mémoire motivée par la volonté de ne pas avoir à se
confronter à des informations pouvant nuire à l’image de soi et remettre en cause ses choix futurs.
Mots-Clés: Mémoire sélective, Croyances motivées, Oubli, Expériences
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Essays on the behavioral economics of motivated memory
Charlotte Saucet
Abstract
This thesis investigates whether individuals use their memory as a self-deceptive strategy to sustain
motivated beliefs. It tests experimentally the existence and strength of memory manipulation in three
economically relevant contexts: social interactions, individual performance and unethical decisions.
Chapter one investigates whether people retrieve their memory self-servingly in social encounters.
Do individuals forget the consequences of their actions on others? If so, does it depend on the nature
(e.g. selfish or altruistic) of the action? Our results identify a causal effect of the responsibility of
pro-social decisions on selective recalls. In contrast, there is no clear evidence of biased memory errors.
Chapter two disentangles between two driving forces that have been proposed as explanations of
memory failures for self-relevant information: self-enhancement and mood-congruency. We provide a
controlled environment where the two theories predict different outcomes. Our results provide support
for the existence and relative dominance of self-enhancing memory over mood-congruent memory and
thereby underline the importance of motivational factors in the formation of optimistic beliefs about
the self.
Chapter three investigates the relative role of affect and strategic reasoning in motivated memory,
with an application in the domain of unethical behavior. We study whether individuals manipulate
the memory of past dishonest choices, and whether they use their memory as an instrument to justify
future decisions. We find that hedonic considerations are not sufficient to trigger memory manipulation.
When forgetting serves as a justification to not engage in future morally responsible behavior, however,
individuals do motivate their memory.
Together, these results show that memory errors in economic contexts can result from cognitive
impairment but also from memory distortion motivated by the willingness to protect one’s self-image
and future choices.
Keywords: Selective memory, Motivated beliefs, Forgetting, Experiment
